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Since the mid-nineteenth century, immigrants to the United States have, to a 
larger degree than the larger population, tried their hand at starting their own businesses. 
While the Latinos who began entering the United States in greater numbers in the 1990s 
and 2000s do not self-employ as much as did immigrants from central and eastern Europe 
in the 1880s or immigrants from Korea in the 1970s, an estimated 1.54 million Latinos 
are self-employed in unincorporated businesses, while the 2012 national Survey of 
Business Owners counted 3.3 million Latino-owned firms, with a total of $474 million in 
annual sales or receipts. This entrepreneurship is all the more remarkable given that 
Latinos traditionally begin their businesses with lower levels of personal capital and have 
historically had more difficulty obtaining formal startup capital from third parties such as 
banks or government agencies. 
It is relatively easy to summarize the problem at the national level. But what 
about at the metropolitan level? Are there some cities that provide a more hospitable 
environment for Latino entrepreneurship than others? Such a question has become more 
widely relevant in the last three decades, as shifts in immigrant settlement patterns has 
meant new immigrant growth, frequently Latino, in metropolitan areas with little or no 
history of significant foreign-born populations prior to 1990. While there exists a varied 
and detailed body of literature on immigrant entrepreneurship in the United States, much 
of that research was conducted on populations concentrated in urban areas. The post-
1990 immigrant populations are not only more likely than their predecessors to settle in 
metropolitan areas outside the traditional “gateways,” but also more likely to settle in 
xvii 
 
suburban areas. Different metropolitan areas offer different spatial and political 
landscapes for immigrant entrepreneurship, requiring a re-examination of how 
immigrants become entrepreneurs and what policy measures would be most useful in 
helping them establish successful, sustainable businesses. 
This dissertation examines the question of what metropolitan-level factors affect 
Latino-owned business formation and performance. It finds that Latino entrepreneurs 
nationwide face persistent obstacles in the form of obtaining financing for both new and 
existing businesses, which can be addressed at the local level. However, certain concepts 
currently prominent in research about ethnic entrepreneurs, such as the makeup and 
geographic concentration of the “ethnic enclave” and the importance of prior history of 
immigrant settlement in the metropolitan area, may be less applicable to Latinos who 
come from a broader range of countries and settle in less dense metropolitan areas. 
1 
 
Chapter 1 : Introduction 
 
1.1 What Metropolitan-Level Factors Affect Latino-Owned Business 
Performance? 
March 30, 2018, was a Saturday, but activity at the Infinite Energy Forum, a 
conference center in central Gwinnett County northeast of Atlanta, began early in the 
morning. By eight-thirty a line of women had formed. Some were in comfortable-looking 
T-shirts and some in suits with carefully draped scarves; some pushed strollers and some 
stuck close to sisters or friends as they entered; some moved briskly through the line and 
some hesitated as they approached. They were all attending a conference on 
entrepreneurship called the Latina Empowerment Conference, hosted by a prominent 
local nonprofit, the Latin American Association (LAA). 
Having checked in, the attendees dispersed, many of them to a series of Spanish-
language panels on building a business: search-engine optimization marketing, selling 
through Amazon, working with banks. In one conference room a pair of franchising 
consultants tag-teamed their way through questions from a packed audience: Could you 
buy a franchise if in the United States on a spousal visa? (Possibly.) Which industries 
would be best in which to start a business with only $10,000 in start-up capital? (Only 
office or building cleaning; franchises that require a physical space cost more.) Can the 
franchisor help with the financing? (It’s unlikely, though some will help franchisees put 
together a business plan.) 
Such a scene is neither commonplace—this was only the third Latina 
Empowerment Conference—nor unique. Since the mid-nineteenth century, immigrants to 
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the United States have, to a larger degree than the larger population, tried their hand at 
starting their own businesses. While the Latinos who began entering the United States in 
greater numbers in the 1990s and 2000s do not self-employ as much as did immigrants 
from central and eastern Europe in the 1880s or immigrants from Korea in the 1970s, an 
estimated 1.54 million Latinos are self-employed in unincorporated businesses (Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, 2015), while the 2012 national Survey of Business Owners, counted 
3.3 million Latino-owned firms, with a total of $474 million in annual sales or receipts 
(United States Bureau of the Census, 2012).  
Latino entrepreneurship is all the more remarkable when considering the obstacles 
these would-be entrepreneurs face. This is especially true of Latinos who were born 
outside the United States, regardless of documentation status. Not all Latinos face the 
same type and number of obstacles: the term “Latinos” is a catch-all that includes not 
only recent immigrants but their descendants, and native-born residents whose family 
history in the United States may go back several generations. It also covers immigrants 
from a number of different countries and places of origin, who vary in their home 
cultures, native languages, and ability to travel safely between their original residence 
and the United States. Nonetheless, the literature suggests that some of the difficulties to 
be discussed in this research are experienced by the majority of Latino potential 
entrepreneurs, separate from citizenship status or amount of time spent in the United 
States. 
Especially for recent immigrants and their children, it is not merely an issue of 
being able to do business comfortably in English, or to follow American business 
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customs, although those challenges can be intimidating. But Latinos1, on average, bring 
less personal capital to the new business than their non-Latino counterparts, and have 
fewer options in terms of obtaining startup capital from banks (or government agencies, 
or venture-capital firms); moreover, in many cases, their lack of formal education 
credentials limits the types of industry they can enter. For Latino entrepreneurs, the 
potential rewards are harder to gain, and the risks greater—even though they have less 
cushion with which to absorb those risks. 
It is relatively easy to summarize the problem at the national level. But what 
about at the metropolitan level? Some cities are known for relatively high populations of 
Latino-owned businesses, such as New York City, with its long history of immigrant 
entrepreneurship, and Miami, which was established as a Latino business hub by Cuban 
immigrants beginning in the 1960s. Yet even in both New York City and Miami, the 
                                                 
1 The terminology to refer to people who identify as deriving their ethnicity from Latin American countries 
varies between people, groups, and academic disciplines. In the last few years a movement has arisen, 
particularly among artistically-, sociologically-, or politically-focused organizations and communities, to 
replace the umbrella term “Latino” with “Latinx” in order to remove the implied gender from the word 
“Latino” (derived from the Spanish, in which nouns are gendered and adjectives ending in -o usually imply 
a masculine noun). This is sometimes, as in the case of the term “Latin@”, meant to signify that both men 
and women are included in the description, but more often, in the specific case of “Latinx,” meant to 
recognize the presence of those for whom the binary definition of male-and-female fits uncomfortably. 
Salinas and Lozano (2017) describe “Latinx” as “evolv[ing] as new form of liberation,” and also propose 
that it includes the recognition of indigenous cultures within Latin America whose traditional approach to 
gender was not binary. But the term is not widely used, particularly in academic literature; not a single 
paper read for this research used it. That in itself is not an argument against using “Latinx”; languages 
evolve, after all. But it does make using “Latinx” in a work meant to build on previous literature tricky, 
particularly given that so much of the term’s power comes from self-definition, not definition imposed by 
an outside researcher. Even Salinas and Lozano oppose using “Latinx” as a blanket term, instead 
recommending “Latina/o/x” in cases where it is impossible to know the chosen gender identities of the 
entire population being described. An alternative is to assume that when “Latino” passed from Spanish to 
English usage, it dropped its gendered quality; but that would require eliminating “Latina,” which in turn 
can be a point of pride and self-recognition for women from Latin American countries. This paper will 
follow in the tradition of previous academic literature in using “Latino” as the blanket term and “Latina” 
only in cases where the term is clearly used to denote a group of women only. 
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majority of Latino-owned businesses make $50,000 or less in annual revenue (Stanford 
Latino Entrepreneurship Initiative (SLEI), 2017a, 2017b). Meanwhile, since 1990 many 
metropolitan areas with no previous history of Latino in-migration or Latino 
neighborhood formation have experienced both. What obstacles might Latino business 
owners face in those metropolitan areas that they might not in areas with a longer history 
of immigrant sentiment? Comparing Latino entrepreneurship in different metropolitan 
areas offers an opportunity to understand what particular challenges Latino entrepreneurs 
face, how those challenges might vary depending on geographic and spatial context, and 
what measures policy-makers can take to facilitate the creation and survival of Latino-
owned businesses. 
These questions cannot be separated from a context of rising political hostility 
expressed towards immigrants, which in the 1990s and 2000s found expression at the 
state level and in the 2010s has taken on a new force at the federal level. Anti-immigrant 
sentiment is not a new phenomenon in American politics: ever since the rise of Irish 
migration in the mid-19th century prompted the rise of the anti-immigrant, anti-Catholic 
Know-Nothing Party and, in some cases, anti-Irish mob violence (Klein, 2017), new 
migration waves have frequently been met with nativist backlashes. But the lack of 
novelty in current federal policies do not make them any less disturbing. Current anti-
immigrant—frequently anti-Latino—rhetoric is not only needlessly damaging to 
individuals but ahistorical in its failure to recognize the abilities of immigrants and their 
descendants to contribute meaningfully to American society. Recognizing Latinos, 
including Latino immigrants, as entrepreneurs helps combat destructive stereotypes 
fueling harmful and short-sighted policies. 
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This dissertation uses multiple quantitative methods, at differing scales, to 
compare Latino-owned business performance in different U.S. metropolitan areas, 
particularly between 2007 and 2012. These comparisons are then used to examine the 
utility of previous literature on immigrant entrepreneurship when applied specifically to 
Latino entrepreneurship. It then presents three conclusions. First, although there is 
variation in Latino-owned business performance by metropolitan area, several obstacles 
remain of concern for Latino entrepreneurs regardless of location, particularly access to 
startup capital and entrepreneurship knowledge. Second, although the body of literature 
has highlighted how previous groups of immigrant entrepreneurs addressed such 
challenges through the formation of “ethnic enclaves,” such a strategy is less visible 
among Latino entrepreneurs, due to differences in settlement patterns, the lower density 
and more extensive suburbanization of new immigrant destinations, and diversity in 
country of origin among Latino immigrants. Finally, the idea of classifying metropolitan 
areas as different “gateways” with different histories of accepting or being closed off 
from immigrant settlement, while useful for demographic and political analysis, does not 
explain differences in Latino entrepreneurship. Instead, policy-makers need to consider 
specific local variables, such as access to financing and commercial space. 
 
1.2 Entrepreneurship, Immigration, and Planning Research 
Speaking broadly, entrepreneurship falls within the set of business-development 
activities that a planner specializing in local, regional, or state economic development 
might be expected to do. In their textbook, Planning Local Economic Development, 
Leigh and Blakely (2013) argue for business development within the larger context of 
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community building: “Business development is intended to redress the balance between 
community as a social construct and business as an instrument of wealth generation for 
planners.” They then list six key strategies for fostering the development of new local 
ventures:  
• develop diverse sources of capital; encourage an entrepreneurial 
community; 
• foster networking;  
• provide a supportive infrastructure;  
• streamline necessary processes; and  
• foster entrepreneurship education.  
All of these strategies can be carried out relatively cheaply, when compared to typical 
incentive or tax-abatement packages intended to convince existing businesses to relocate. 
But more to the point, these strategies are rooted in the two inseparable goals of local 
business development and of local community building. 
Much of the collective body of immigrant-entrepreneurship research lies outside 
the domain of planning. The term “entrepreneurship” appears twice in the entirety of 
article titles published in the Journal of Planning Education and Research, both of the 
articles being book reviews. For the Journal of the American Planning Association the 
article count is one, and for Urban Studies, five (all published since 2010). While 
research on entrepreneurship in general is more likely to come from business and 
management journals, much of the literature on immigrant entrepreneurship originated in 
sociology A great deal of this sociological research is in the form of case studies, in 
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which planners rarely appear. An unflattering exception is in Tseng (1995), where the 
local government is portrayed as xenophobically opposed to the growth of “Little 
Taipei.” Lung-Amam’s ethnographic study of Asian-Americans in Silicon Valley (2015, 
2017)goes into more detail about how arguments about identity and inclusion play out in 
zoning and economic development decisions, which still gives the impression of 
immigrants having to work against, rather than with, planners.  
More recently there has been a push to expand analysis of immigrant 
entrepreneurship, including geographical variables. But planning literature has only 
recently begun how to address issues pertaining specifically to immigrant communities, 
including local economic development (Kim, Levin, & Botchwey, 2017). 
Moreover, the relationships between planners and immigrant communities have 
historically suffered from a lack of clarity: what is the planner’s role in particular? Kim et 
al. (2017), in their review that focuses specifically on the needs of undocumented or 
unauthorized immigrants, cite Vitiello (2009) in pointing out that new-migrant outreach 
in the United States has historically been in the hands of social workers and non-
governmental organizations, not planners. “As the US planning field excitingly renews 
historic yet underappreciated links to professional traditions such as public health,” Kim 
et al. argue, “it needs to invest, as well, in understanding the role of planners within 
communities’ social infrastructure, and our relationship to professions such as social 
work and community organizing.” One way this can be done to help immigrants 
(regardless of documentation status) and local immigrant communities, they go on to 
suggest, is to support small business entrepreneurship. 
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This dissertation contributes to current theory about immigrant entrepreneurship 
and economic development by extending comparative research in an area dominated by 
singular case studies, and by focusing on both a scale (the metropolitan area) and a 
subject (Latinos) that have historically received less attention in the literature. In doing 
so, it makes a case for both the need for, and the ability of, planners and economic 
development professionals to help Latino-owned businesses in specific ways, namely in 
understanding the obstacles posed by the local environment and using available tools, 
including alliances with nonprofits, to help Latino-owned businesses overcome those 
obstacles. One of the great virtues of planning as a discipline is the steadfast collective 
belief of its scholars that building theory is inseparable from building a more successful 
and more humane practice. Economic development planners can—and, more to the point, 
should—build a more successful and more humane practice by learning about and 
seeking to extend the potential benefits, or mitigating the potential risks, of local Latino 
entrepreneurship. But how? That is the driving question of this work. 
 
1.3 A Potential Model for Understanding Latino Entrepreneurship 
The decision to start a business is often not taken lightly. The nascent 
entrepreneurs interviewed for the Panel Survey of Entrepreneurship Data (PSED) in the 
mid-2000s reported it took, on average, two years to start a business, and 1,200 to 1,600 
total hours of work (Reynolds & Curtain, 2008). The aspiring entrepreneur will spend 
some time well before opening day considering factors ranging from “Who is my 
audience?” to “Where will I put my shop?” to “How much money do I have to spend to 
get started?” The answers to these questions are likely to lie in the immediate surrounding 
9 
 
environment. Three-fifths of respondents to the PSED planned to serve a customer base 
within twenty miles of the firm’s location (Reynolds & Curtain, 2008).  
Broadly speaking, the factors that an entrepreneur might consider can be divided 
into two categories: “personal” and “contextual”. Personal factors would be unique to the 
entrepreneur: ethnic and national backgrounds; native tongue and other languages 
spoken; level of formal education; amount of personal capital. Contextual factors, 
meanwhile, would describe the surrounding area: industry mix; status of the local 
economy; size of the local population; infrastructure networks, such as transport or high-
speed Internet access; and availability of capital. Latinos in the United States might be 
taking into account contextual factors such as size of the local Latino population, the 
presence of lenders who might be more likely to fund Latinos, and the general political 
treatment of the Latino population—as in, Latino-owned business activity might be more 
likely in metropolitan areas that explicitly encourage immigrant entrepreneurship, 
including Latino entrepreneurship, and less likely in those whose legislatures have been 
busy passing more restrictive measures targeted at immigrants. (Such efforts can exist, as 
will become clear, at multiple scales: it is not uncommon to have a city adopt a legal and 
political stance towards immigrants that stands very much at odds with that adopted with 
the surrounding county or state.)  
With that in mind, Figure 1.1, below, suggests a model for factors influencing the 





Figure 1.1: Proposed Model for Personal and Contextual Factors Influencing Latino Business Performance 
 
The analysis that follows will explore how both personal and contextual factors 
might vary between metropolitan areas, and what those variations might imply for 
business formation and performance. But economic development planners, both in 
governmental and non-governmental positions, should assume they will have much less 
control over the personal than the contextual factors. The two categories are not as neatly 
separable as the diagram implies; entrepreneurs with greater personal capital, for 
example, may be less dependent on local capital availability, while non-citizens may feel 
more vulnerable in metropolitan areas with greater and harsher anti-immigrant 
legislation. Finally, which personal and which contextual factors most influence the 
decision of any one aspiring entrepreneur will vary depending on the entrepreneur and 
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the location. The model is not meant to imply rank among the factors, simply to propose 
that these factors are most likely to be taken into consideration. 
 
1.4 Structure of the Dissertation 
The argument will proceed over the following four chapters. The second chapter 
describes the spatial, social, demographic, and economic ground for understanding Latino 
entrepreneurship as currently practiced in the United States. While historically Latino 
immigrant settlement concentrated in a few well-known urban areas, since 1990 the 
group of destination metropolitan areas has diversified, with cities with little history of 
previous immigrant settlement from any group seeing their Latino populations grow 
rapidly. This chapter also introduces the concept of “gateways” first proposed by Singer 
(2004, 2013, 2015; Singer, Hardwick, & Brettell, 2009; J. H. Wilson & Singer, 2011), a 
way of differentiating between metropolitan areas based on their historical and more 
recent history of being chosen by immigrants. Finally, it introduces the issue of variance 
of anti-immigrant sentiment, expressed through legislation and other political measures 
taken at the local and state level.  
The third chapter is a review of the literature on immigrant entrepreneurship in 
the United States, including Latino entrepreneurship. This includes literature dating back 
to the 1970s on immigrants’ motivation to start businesses, their target audiences, and 
their business strategies. A great deal of the literature has focused on the formation of  
“ethnic enclaves,” a spatially concentrated group, linked by ethnic or ethnolinguistic 
background, in which multiple entrepreneurs found businesses in related industries. 
Ethnic enclaves have also historically produced ethnic banks, a valuable resource for 
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immigrant entrepreneurs, who frequently are unable to access capital to the same degree 
as native-born (particularly white native-born) entrepreneurs. The review also surveys 
more recent literature that  to includes geographic analysis, in part out of recognition that 
immigrant settlement patterns have not only shifted between metropolitan areas but 
within them: chiefly, branching out from urban to suburban neighborhoods. Finally, the 
review considers the literature to date specifically on Latino entrepreneurs, to understand 
how they as a group might differ from non-Latino immigrant entrepreneurs. 
The fourth chapter contains three sets of analyses, focusing on the question of 
variances in Latino-owned business formation and business performance by metropolitan 
area. The first set takes place at the national level, using data from the 2014 Annual 
Survey of Entrepreneurs to paint a more detailed picture of Latino entrepreneurship. To 
compare metropolitan areas, a pair of analyses follows, using data from the 2002, 2007, 
and 2012 Survey of Business Owners, as well as selected data from the American 
Community Survey. Separate data is used to create dummy variables for the questions of 
credit available to Latino entrepreneurs, in the form of federally-backed Community 
Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) serving Latinos, and of the presence of local 
anti-immigrant legislation. This data is tested in two ways, first a direct comparison of 
two groups of “gateway” metropolitan areas and second as a linear regression of 57 
different metropolitan areas with significant foreign-born populations. Finally, a third 
analysis, more qualitative and descriptive in nature, compares neighborhoods in two 
specific metropolitan areas (Denver, Colorado, and Durham, North Carolina) to assess 
where Latino-owned businesses locate at the street level, and what these business patterns 
might imply about the opportunities available to, and challenges faced by, Latino 
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entrepreneurs living in those particular metropolitan areas. Denver and Durham were 
chosen because, although of the two metropolitan areas seem to represent a type—a “re-
emerging” gateway with a larger, more settled, and more integrated Latino population, 
and a smaller city who has only seen growth in immigrant population since 1990, with 
resultant local tensions—a closer examination shows that the gateway classification fails 
to predict the factors influencing Latino entrepreneurship in both MSAs. 
The fifth and final chapter presents the conclusions to the research. It will discuss 
the limitations of the research, and suggest paths for future research, including a 
discussion of which methodologies are best suited for studying Latino entrepreneurship, 
given the patterns of data collection at the national level and the possible vulnerabilities 
of the study populations. It will also discuss how economic development and planning 
practitioners, in both governmental and non-governmental organizations, can use these 
findings to examine their particular locality and address challenges facing Latino 
businesses and their owners therein. 
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Chapter 2 : Recent Trends in Latino Settlement and Business 
Creation 
 
2.1 Introduction: The Latino Population of the United States 
According to the Census Bureau’s most recent estimates in the 5-year 2016 
American Community Survey (ACS), there are presently 55 million people of Hispanic 
or Latino descent living in the United States, making up 17.3% of the nation’s total 
population. There are 51.5 million Latinos, or 93.2% of all Latinos, living in one of the 
381 metropolitan areas as defined by the Census Bureau. As can be seen in Figure 2.1, 
below, the Latino population tends to cluster along the east and west coasts, with 
significant concentrations in southern Florida, southern California and southwest 
Arizona, and the area around New York City. 
 
Figure 2.1: Latino Population by County, 2016 (5-year ACS estimates) 
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Table 2.1 shows the ten metropolitan areas (outside of Puerto Rico) with the 
largest Latino populations.2 Together, these ten metropolitan areas combine to host 
nearly half (46.3%) of the Latino population in the United States. 
 




Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA 5,932,201 
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA 4,770,203 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL 2,573,322 
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX 2,354,515 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 2,192,072 
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI 2,057,681 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 1,959,073 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 1,354,364 
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX 1,277,308 
San Diego-Carlsbad, CA 1,076,319 
 
Thus, in the aggregate, the Latino population is largely urban. But simply 
observing that most Latinos live in larger metropolitan areas fails to address the 
differences between Latino populations in the individual cities, and what those 
differences imply for policy-makers. This chapter will first give an overview of the 
geographic settlement of Latinos within the United States, including changes since 1990 
and the implications of those changes for policy decisions within different metropolitan 
                                                 
2 The San Juan-Carolina-Caguas metropolitan area had a Latino population of 2.2 million as of 2016, which 
would put it fifth on the above list.  
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areas. It will then give some information on the current state of Latino entrepreneurship: 
which Latinos are entrepreneurs; what industries they enter; how much capital they start 
their business with; and what language they use in conducting their business. Finally, it 
will consider how recent changes in federal immigration enforcement, and state and local 
cooperation therewith, might affect Latino settlement patterns in the near future. 
 
2.2 Who Is Latino? 
It is worth spending some time defining “Latino.” The United States Census now 
uses “Hispanic or Latino” on its forms, to cover a range of possibilities. A person who 
self-identifies as “Hispanic or Latino” may not have been born outside the United States 
(and, indeed, 65% of Latinos in 2016 reported having been born within the United 
States3); may not have come from a Latin American county (since the category includes 
family origin in Spain)4; and may not speak Spanish as a first or native language (since 
many Latin American countries remain hosts to a variety of indigenous languages). 
Generally speaking, though, the term “Latino” tends to apply to those people who can 
claim family origins in Central and South American countries covered by the Monroe 
Doctrine (Hayes-Bautista & Chapa, 1987). The overarching term “Latino” is not 
universally used in academia; in their historical population survey, Gratton and Gutmann 
(2000) argue for the use of the term “Hispanic”, on the grounds that all groups covered 
originate in countries influenced by Spanish political and legal expansion. But since very 
                                                 
3 According to the 2016 5-year ACS estimates 19.2 million Latinos, of a total of 55.2 million, were born 
outside the United States (United States Bureau of the Census, 2016). 
4 The category does not, however, officially include family origin in Brazil, although Brazilian-Americans 
may choose to self-identify as Latino. For more on this, searun me Marrow (2003). 
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little research to date has focused on immigrants from Spain, it makes sense to consider 
the population being discussed here as having originated primarily in Latin America, 
hence “Latinos.” 
Unfortunately, the very act of talking about “Latinos” as a group carries with it 
the built-in threat of erasure and oversimplification: 
By 1850, there were four distinctly different Latino groups, by nationality, in 
California: the Californios (originally born in Mexican territory, but by then putatively 
citizens of the US), Mexicans (largely miners from the northern Mexican state of Sonora 
who had immigrated after 1848), Peruvians, and Chileans (both also from the mining 
centers there). These Latin Americans of different nationality groups saw themselves as 
quite distinct from each other. However, mining society tended to see them all as one 
race or people, generally lumping them all together under the term “greaser”. For policy 
purposes they were treated as one group. One of the first pieces of legislation passed by 
the state was a Foreign Miners tax, aimed at excluding Latin American miners (the 
“foreigners”) from claiming rights in the gold fields. The native born Californios were 
considered to be foreigners for this purpose, in spite of being legally citizens. 
Irrespective of the intra-Latino differences seen by the Latinos themselves, in the 
eyes of the every-day “North American” inhabitant of California, and in the eyes of some 
early laws, all Latinos were seen to be identical, and were dealt with as one “race”. 
(Hayes-Bautista & Chapa, 1987) 
 
Thus planners, expected as they are to pay particular attention to the unique 
circumstances of their locality, need to take into account variations within Latino 
population by country of origin. Table 2.2, below, repeats the top ten metropolitan areas 
by number of Latino residents, but then adds the top ten metropolitan areas by percent of 











To some degree Table 2.2 is a reflection of concentrated Latino populations in 
certain metropolitan areas: New York City is host to the nation’s largest populations of 
Puerto Ricans and Dominicans and its second-largest populations of Central Americans 
and Cubans. Geography also plays a part in determining population concentration: the 
largest Cuban population, unsurprisingly, is in Miami, and four of the ten largest Mexican 
populations are in metropolitan areas in Texas. But this table also serves to reveal which 
metropolitan areas have relatively diverse Latino populations: Atlanta, Boston, and 
Orlando each appear in four different categories. Within the larger Latino population—
populations, more accurately—of those metropolitan areas, we can expect a different 
dynamic than that of Miami, or of Los Angeles, Riverside, or Dallas, all of which have 
been shaped by a predominantly Mexican-origin Latino in-migration. This implies that 
the “Latino” population, both of the United States as a whole and of individual 
metropolitan areas, is not necessarily unified or networked. Both differences within 
Latino populations and between Latino populations should be kept in mind, especially 
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given how much of immigrant-entrepreneurship research to date stresses the utility of in-
group ties to entrepreneurs. 
One facet of Latino in-migration not identifiable through Census data alone would 
be geographic or ethnic differences within a particular country-of-origin population. 
These differences, too, influence community formation in the United States; see, for 
example, the discussion in Oberle and Arreola (2008) of how in-migration from the 
northwestern Mexican states of Sonora, Chihuahua, and Sinaloa has shaped the Mexican-
American communities in Phoenix. Similarly, from Census data it is difficult to grasp 
how the experiences of indigenous Mexican or Central American immigrants might be 
different from that of Hispanic-origin Mexican or Central American immigrants. These 
differences, obscured as they are by official American data collection, could have 
significant policy implications: imagine a local government or public-health agency 
trying to reach its “Latino” population by distributing information in Spanish, only to 
gain little interest from that portion of the population speaking Q’eqchi’5 at home. Again, 
the overarching term “Latino” oversimplifies, and hides information about the population 
it covers even as it makes that population more visible. Even as it makes sense to speak 
more broadly about the Latino population, it is also necessary to perpetually keep in mind 
that differences in ethnic, geographic, national, and linguistic identity will surface at the 
local level, and thus will impact how a particular Latino community will differ from the 
average. 
 
                                                 
5 A Mayan language spoken in parts of Guatemala, Belize, and El Salvador. 
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2.3 Shifts in Latino Settlement Since 1990 and the Creation of 
“Gateways”  
Twentieth-century Latino immigration was strongly influenced by two federal 
laws, the Immigration Act of 1924 and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 
1952. The former imposed quotas on in-migration from southern Europe, eastern Europe, 
and Asia, but not on migration from Central and South America, including Mexico and 
the Dominican Republic (Tienda & Sánchez, 2013). The latter prioritized family 
reunification, giving an advantage to those transnational families who had been able to 
establish a member in the United States post-1924 (Tienda & Sánchez, 2013). A 
willingness to grant asylum to Cuban refugees and the bracero program, which allowed 
American farms to hire Mexican workers from 1942 to 1964 (and occasionally included 
quick legalization of said workers) (Calavita, 2010), also gave Latinos opportunities to 
settle in the United States, even if neither official government policy nor the larger 
American society was particularly welcoming. 
Political and economic instability and natural disasters in multiple Latin American 
countries (Guatemala, Honduras, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Argentina, Mexico) also contributed  to the rapid growth of the Latino population in just 
fifty years (Tienda & Sánchez, 2013). Figure 2.2, below, shows the growth of the Latino 
population in the United States, from 14.6 million in 1990 to 56.6 million in 2015.6 
                                                 
6 Borjas, Freeman, and Lang (1991) have argued that the 1980 Census, by not counting 
undocumented Mexican in-migrants, undercounted the total Mexican population by 25%. Van Hook and 





Figure 2.2: Growth of Latino Population in the United States, 1960-2015 (author's graph from Census data) 
 
 Tienda and Sánchez (2013) argue that official Census numbers may overstate the 
Latino population, since it conflates temporary entrants, those granted legal permanent 
residency, and applicants for refugee status. Even with that caveat, the growth of the 
Latino population has meant significant demographic shifts, especially for a group of 
metropolitan areas which, prior to 1990, had little history in hosting larger Latino or 
foreign-born populations.  
Figures 2.3 and 2.4, below, show the geographic distribution of the Latino 
population (outside of Puerto Rico) in 1990 and 2016. From comparing the two one can 
see both the growth of the Latino population as a whole and the changes in the spread of 
the population, especially to Oklahoma and Arkansas in the Midwest, North Carolina, 





Figure 2.3: Latino Population by County, 1990 (author’s calculations from 1990 Census SF1 Data) 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Latino Population by County, 2016 (author’s calculation from 2016 5-year ACS) 
 
How did places such as North Carolina and Washington state emerge as new 
destinations for Latino migrants? Light and Johnston (2009) first suggested that new 
Latino residents were attracted to fast-growing metropolitan areas, especially in the 
southeast, for much the same reason as their non-Latino counterparts: namely, 
employment opportunities and less expensive housing. A follow-up paper (Johnston, 
Karageorgis, & Light, 2013) put forward the idea that metropolitan areas with a longer 
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history of Latino settlement, such as Los Angeles and New York, were “staging grounds” 
from which Latino migrants would leave for secondary destinations, depending on 
information gained from their social networks.7 Building upon this work, and upon the 
idea of “cumulative causation” of migration advanced largely by Massey (1990), 
Bachmeier (2013) found that “[i]nterdestination variation in the rate of Mexican 
immigration between 1995 and 2000 is largely a function of the immigration rate 
observed a decade earlier,” although the effect is dependent upon the maturity of local 
ethnic-specific support structures. It thus make sense to hypothesize that migration flows 
will change over time as potential migrants receive feedback from residents in a wider 
variety of potential destinations. Analysis of Mexican in-migration in the 1990s by Card 
and Lewis (2007) supports that hypothesis: their model, which included both supply and 
demand factors, found that much of the decreased in-migration to Los Angeles could be 
attributed to the metropolitan area’s slow employment growth during that decade. In 
addition, there was a correlation, albeit weak, between in-migration destination choices 
and higher wages in the metropolitan area for Mexicans in 1990 (Card & Lewis, 2007). 
It should also be noted that, while Latino immigration has historically been 
associated with cities, the new destinations are more likely to see increased Latino 
populations in suburban sections of the metropolitan area. This is not a trend unique to 
Latinos: increased suburbanization has been a trend among immigrants more generally 
since the 1970s (Kataure & Walton-Roberts, 2015; Murdie & Skop, 2012). But the 
reasons for choosing suburban over urban locations vary by immigrant group. 
                                                 
7 One problem with this hypothesis, which the authors acknowledge, is their failure in their analysis to find 
a relationship between time spent in the United States and increased likelihood of internal migration. 
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Historically immigrant suburbanization has been theorized to arise from “spatial 
assimilation”: newly arrived immigrants begin by finding cheaper, lower-quality housing 
in the central city and then move out to the suburbs as they gain wealth (Murdie & Skop, 
2012). But immigrants with greater socioeconomic resources have been able to settle 
directly in suburban areas, in some cases creating new “ethnoburbs” (Kataure & Walton-
Roberts, 2015; Li, 1998; Li & Skop, 2007).  
In the case of suburbanization of Latino immigrant populations, the spatial form 
of the destination metropolitan areas plays a part, as Houston, Las Vegas, Atlanta, and 
Charlotte lack the denser residential areas of a New York or a Boston. The relative 
affordability of suburban housing, especially rental housing, seems to have played a part 
in driving Latino in-migration. In their study of the suburbanization of poverty between 
1980 and 2010, Howell and Timberlake (2014) found a stronger relationship between the 
suburbanization of black and Latino poor and the availability of affordable housing, as 
opposed to the suburbanization of white and Asian poor, which was more likely to be 
correlated with increased suburban employment opportunities. Smith and Fusereth’s case 
study of Latino in-migration into two particular Charlotte neighborhoods (2004) similarly 
emphasized the availability of affordable housing, particularly rental housing. Thus, the 
shift from urban to suburban settlement is worth taking into account when comparing 
traditional and new in-migration destinations.  
A typology for such comparisons has been proposed in a series of publications 
from the Brookings Institute (Singer, 2004, 2013; Singer et al., 2009; J. H. Wilson & 
Singer, 2011) which divided receiving metropolitan areas into seven different 
“gateways.” The gateway classification is rooted not simply in how large a metropolitan 
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area’s foreign-born population is, but its history in providing a home for new immigrants. 
Thus, a distinction can be made between “quintessential” gateways with a long history of 
immigrant settlement, and “emerging” gateways who only recently began to see 
increased immigrant populations. Table 2.3 shows a selection of metropolitan areas by 
their gateway classification as discussed in Singer (2013). 
 
Table 2.3: Gateway Classification of Selected Metropolitan Areas from Singer (2013) 




Long history of immigrant settlement 
extending back to, or even before, the 
beginning of the 20th century; often 
associated with immigrant settlement 
in popular culture and literature. 




Former gateways These metropolitan areas played host 
to larger immigrant communities at the 
beginning of the 20th century but 
attracted less in-migration as migration 





Post-World War II 
gateways 
Became known for supporting 
immigrant communities between the 





Emerging gateways Metropolitan areas with little previous 
gateway history which have seen the 
largest jumps in immigrant settlement 






Former gateway metropolitan areas 
which have more recently seen 






Smaller metropolitan areas which have 
seen large recent increases in the 
percentage of their population born 






Smaller metropolitan areas with a 






 This classification helps highlight both similarities and differences between 
metropolitan gateways. Table 2.4, below, shows that all save one of the 23 gateways 
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highlighted in Table 2.3 gained overall population between 19908 and 2016 (Cleveland 
being the one exception). All but one (San Francisco) also saw gains in foreign-born 
population, and all saw gains in Latino population. However, the size and impact of those 













































                                                 
8 1990 data courtesy of the National Historical Geographic Information System (Manson, Schroeder, Van 
Riper, & Ruggles, 2017). 
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Table 2.4: Growth in Total, Foreign-Born, and Latino Populations, 1990-2016, For Selected Metropolitan Areas 





Even as new gateways emerged and the proportion of new in-migrants settling in 
the largest gateways decreased, the sheer number of Latino in-migrants meant that those 
largest gateways continued to see population gains. Between 1990 and 2016, Los 
Angeles’s Latino population increased by half, New York’s by three-quarters. Between 
them those two metropolitan areas hosted 10.7 million Latinos in 2016. Latinos also 
continued to move to McAllen, where even prior to 1990 they had made up 85% of the 
population, and Fresno, whose population in 1990 was 35% Latino; indeed, during the 
1990–2016 period Fresno saw its Latino population increase by more than 100%. But an 
influx of Latinos to New York or Los Angeles, or to Fresno or McAllen, represents a 
different kind of policy challenge than that of the in-migration experienced by Charlotte, 
whose Latino population rose by 1,871% between 1990 and 2016, or Nashville (1,584%), 
Atlanta (893%), Las Vegas (658%), or Columbus (553%). The former group of gateways 
hosted increases to a population already previously present; the latter saw growth in the 
Latino population unprecedented in those metropolitan areas’ respective histories. It 
stands to reason that the existing local governments and policy-makers in the pre-
emerging and emerging gateways would not have the same policy tools at hand, or the 
same relationships with the Latino communities within the metropolitan areas, as 
gateways with longer histories with a sizeable Latino presence. 
The second point to make from Table 2.4 is the distinction between Latino and 
foreign-born populations. Some gateways, particularly Charlotte, Atlanta, and Nashville, 
saw their share of foreign-born and Latino residents rise in tandem. But this is not the 
case for all the gateways featured here. San Francisco’s Latino population nearly 
doubled, but the foreign-born population actually lost share, suggesting that few of the 
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Latino in-migrants were born outside the United States. Similarly, Miami’s Latino 
population rose by over 120%, but its foreign-born population rose by only 35.6%; 
Cleveland gained nearly 50,000 Latinos but only about 20,000 foreign-born residents 
between 1990 and 2016. As with distinguishing between Puerto Rican and other Latinos, 
it is necessary to distinguish between U.S.-born and foreign-born Latinos when 
discussing the best policies to serve the communities’ needs. This would prove true in 
particular for the community of aspiring entrepreneurs: U.S.-born Latinos are, as a group, 
more likely to be more comfortable with speaking English and with the American legal, 
tax, and banking systems. The challenges faced by a U.S.-born Latino looking to open a 
business might be more similar to those faced by a black entrepreneur than to a Latino 
recently emigrated from another country. 
Thus, using the gateways typology allows us to further understand the kinds of 
questions that need to be asked when formulating policies to support Latino 
entrepreneurs. Such as: what trends are affecting the Latino population, and how do they 
differ from previous metropolitan history? What employment, or self-employment, 
choices do they make, and how does that affect the resources they need? Thus, the next 
section examines overall Latino business patterns. 
 
2.4 An Overview of Latino-Owned Business Activity 
Although Latino business creation has historically been under-emphasized in 
minority entrepreneurship research (to be discussed further in the next chapter), Latinos 
owned 12 percent of all U.S. firms in 2012, and Latino business creation rate has been 
double or triple that of the national average for the last fifteen years (Rivers, Porras, 
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Rodriguez Ott, Pompa, & Chapa, 2017). The 2012 SBO counted 3.3 million Latino-
owned firms with a total of $474 million in annual sales or receipts (United States Bureau 
of the Census, 2012). That said, Latino businesses are not, on average, as large or well-
funded as those owned by their non-Latino counterparts. It is worth examining Latino-
owned businesses in greater detail to better understand the challenges facing both Latino 
entrepreneurs and the communities that might benefit from their success. 
In the 2015 5-year ACS, 4.3% of Latino respondents reported themselves as “self-
employed.” “Self-employed” includes both incorporated and unincorporated businesses. 
According to a separate Bureau of Labor Statistics (2015) estimate, 1.54 million Latinos 
age 16 or older are self-employed in unincorporated businesses. Table 2.5, below, breaks 
down reported self-employment further: the percentage of Latinos as a whole who report 
being self-employed is less than that of non-Latinos, though Latinos of Cuban descent 
and that group of Latinos not from Mexico, Puerto Rico, or Cuba both self-employ at 
similar levels to non-Latinos. 
Table 2.5: Self-Employment by Ethnic Self-Classification of Worker, 2011–15 ACS data (cross-tabulated by IPUMS) 
 
 
The industry mix for Latino-owned firms differs from the national average. Table 
2.6 shows Latino and non-Latino firms as classified by industry (by two-digit NAICS 











Not Hispanic or Latino 106,225,685 15,203,307 5.80% 140,858,745 53.70% 262,287,737
Hispanic or Latino:
   Mexican 17,176,798 1,330,859 3.84% 16,191,816 46.66% 34,699,473
   Puerto Rican 2,564,659 129,192 2.51% 2,462,528 47.76% 5,156,379
   Cuban 884,302 134,788 6.71% 989,534 49.26% 2,008,624




industry. Latino firms are relatively over-represented in construction, transportation and 
warehousing, and administrative and waste management and remediation services; and 
relatively under-represented in management, mining and quarrying, and finance and 
insurance. 
 
Table 2.6: National Industry Mix for Latino-Owned Firms (author's calculations from 2012 SBO) 
Industry Category 
Latino-owned Non-Latino-owned 
  Firms Revenue Firms Revenue 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and 
hunting 0.53% 0.24% 0.40% 0.21% 
Mining, quarrying, and oil and 
gas extraction 0.15% 0.51% 0.40% 0.96% 
Utilities 0.10% 0.06% 0.05% 0.23% 
Construction 14.38% 11.79% 12.36% 9.87% 
Manufacturing 1.55% 5.34% 4.79% 12.22% 
Wholesale trade 1.94% 20.32% 5.79% 24.74% 
Retail trade 7.74% 19.36% 12.44% 18.30% 
Transportation and 
warehousing 7.35% 6.58% 3.03% 2.83% 
Information 0.92% 0.86% 1.23% 1.90% 
Finance and insurance 1.68% 1.62% 4.22% 3.51% 
Real estate and rental and 
leasing 4.32% 2.65% 5.00% 2.27% 
Professional, scientific, and 
technical services 8.41% 7.08% 14.84% 6.77% 
Management of companies and 
enterprises 0.01% 0.36% 0.33% 0.54% 
Administrative and support and 
waste management and 
remediation services 15.96% 5.60% 5.99% 3.39% 
Educational services 1.62% 0.41% 1.08% 0.38% 
Health care and social 
assistance 10.53% 6.11% 10.92% 5.20% 
Arts, entertainment, and 
recreation 3.07% 0.82% 1.73% 0.84% 
Accommodation and food 





Other services (except public 
administration) 16.73% 4.28% 6.91% 1.67% 
Industries not classified 0.01% 0.01% 0.12% 0.01% 
 
 
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 further highlight the best-represented industries (again, using 
two-digit NAICS classification) among Latino-owned firms nationally, both by number 
of firms and by total annual revenue. Comparing the two reveals that wholesale trade and 
retail trade are overrepresented in terms of revenue, while health care and social 
assistance and the broad category “administrative and support and waste management 
and remediation services” are overrepresented on the firm side.  
 
 
Figure 2.5: Industry Mix by Percentage of all Latino-Owned Firms Nationally (author's calculation from 2012 SBO 
data) 
 




Figure 2.6: Percentage of Total Revenue by Industry, Latino-Owned Firms (author's calculation from 2012 SBO data) 
 
Table 2.7, following, illustrates the relative smaller sizes of Latino-owned firms 
by revenue. With the exception of management, Latino-owned firms in every industry, on 
average, generate less annual revenue than do their non-Latino counterparts. Latino-
owned firms (again, with the exception of management) are also less likely to employ 
paid employees; and that holds true for industries with lower skill requirements and lower 
wages, such as construction and retail trade, as high-skills industries such as professional 







Table 2.7: Percent with paid employees and average receipts for firm by industry, Latino-owned and non-Latino-
owned firms (author's calculations from 2012 SBO) 
 
 
The small size of many Latino-owned businesses becomes even more apparent 
with a breakdown of NAICS category 56, Administrative and Support and Waste 
Management and Remediation Services. Table 2.8, following, shows the eight most 
popular business types under that two-digit classification, accounting for 88% of all 56-
classified firms. With the exception of pest control services, more than 90% of businesses 





Type of industry (2-digit NAICS 
classification)
Latino avg. receipts 
per firm as % of non-
Latino avg. receipts 
per firm
Latino Non-Latino Latino Non-Latino
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting(606) 3.6% 8.2% 64.66 134.79 48.0%
Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction 14.4% 16.0% 493.90 908.98 54.3%
Utilities 4.2% 14.2% 95.78 1,521.20 6.3%
Construction 8.1% 24.4% 117.42 466.80 25.2%
Manufacturing 20.4% 44.5% 491.81 2,515.03 19.6%
Wholesale trade 26.6% 45.1% 1,502.25 4,289.13 35.0%
Retail trade 13.0% 26.8% 358.36 901.69 39.7%
Transportation and warehousing(607) 6.3% 15.2% 128.24 367.49 34.9%
Information 7.6% 17.1% 134.74 608.83 22.1%
Finance and insurance(608) 15.4% 23.5% 138.64 487.68 28.4%
Real estate and rental and leasing 7.0% 10.0% 87.89 182.67 48.1%
Professional, scientific, and technical services 10.6% 20.0% 120.57 234.99 51.3%
Management of companies and enterprises 100.0% 100.0% 4,556.03 3,594.30 126.8%
Administrative and support and waste 
management and remediation services 4.8% 16.4% 50.31 221.29 22.7%
Educational services 4.0% 8.8% 36.70 81.31 45.1%
Health care and social assistance 8.7% 24.7% 83.16 283.21 29.4%
Arts, entertainment, and recreation 2.3% 7.0% 38.29 96.37 39.7%
Accommodation and food services 37.8% 61.5% 283.74 638.34 44.5%
Other services (except public 
administration)(609) 4.2% 10.9% 36.62 79.73 45.9%
Industries not classified 73.5% 87.2% 118.89 155.11 76.6%
Percent with paid employees








Of course, many of these firms could simply be very small.9 (A total of $6.3 
billion in annual revenue across 275,000 firms works out to a mean of just $23,000 per 
firm.) But at least some of them, rather than hiring employees outright, could be 
obtaining workers through informal arrangements (such as day labor) or more formalized 
arrangements, such as working with contractors and subcontractors. Providing employees 
through contractors, an arrangement that rose from an estimated 0.6 percent of all 
workers in 2005 to 3.1 percent in 2015 (Katz & Kreuger, 2016), allows employers to shift 
the costs of providing payroll and benefits to the subcontracting company, and in some 
cases liability and responsibility for safety as well (Saucedo & Morales, 2010). It also 
obscures those workers obtained through formal contractors from such counts as the 
Survey of Business Owners, which reports counts of full-time employees, although the 
                                                 
9 Both the Survey of Business Owners and the Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs limit respondents to owners 
of businesses with $1,000 or greater in annual revenue. 






Percent of firms 
with paid 
employees
561720 Janitorial services 275,702 $6,325,565 2.33%
561730 Landscaping services 94,495 $5,112,915 9.25%
561110 Office administrative services 39,417 $1,850,685 4.36%
561790
Other services to buildings and 
dwellings 22,712 $634,618 2.60%
561410 Document preparation services 18,459 $350,064 1.41%
561740
Carpet and upholstery cleaning 
services 9,426 $387,726 5.80%
561210 Facilities support services 3,380 $484,845 2.31%
561710
Exterminating and pest control 
services 2,180 $401,347 31.19%
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survey itself does ask about the use of part-time and contract work (see Figure 2.7, 
below). 
The longitudinal Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs (ASE), begun in 2014, also 
included the question on types of labor used. Table 2.9, following, shows the percentage 
of respondents (in the 2015 edition of the survey) by the different types of labor they had 
used, broken down by all respondents, Latino respondents, and non-Latino respondents. 
It fails to show a remarkable difference between Latino-owned and non-Latino-owned 
use of full-time employees or contractors; slightly more Latino-owned firms used paid 
day laborers, but that still only applied to less than five percent of firms. This suggests 
that Latino-owned firms are not substituting contract workers for paid employees, but 










Table 2.9: Estimated Use of Different Types of Labor by Firms in 2015 American Survey of Entrepreneurs 
(percentages calculated by Census Bureau) 
 
 
Finally, where are Latino-owned firms? Unsurprisingly, there is a high 
concentration of Latino-owned firms in metropolitan areas with large Latino populations. 
Just five metropolitan areas—Miami, Los Angeles, New York, Houston, and Riverside, 
California—account for 45.7% of the 3.16 million Latino-owned businesses covered in 
the 2012 SBO. But as with Latino population, Latino business activity can have 
significant local variations. Table 2.10, following, takes the sample of gateway 
metropolitan areas featured in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 and compares them by 2012 Latino 










Firms with no 
Latino ownership
Firms with equal 
Latino and non-
Latino ownership
Full-time paid employees 73.3% 72.6% 73.1% 71.2%
Part-time paid employees 51.0% 46.1% 51.1% 51.0%
Paid day laborers 2.9% 4.9% 2.8% 3.0%
Temporary staffing obtained 
from a temporary help service 4.6% 3.8% 4.3% 3.3%
Leased employees from leasing 
service or professional employer 
organization 0.9% 1.1% 0.8% 0.6%
Contractors, subcontractors, 
independent contractors, or 
outside consultants 29.7% 30.1% 29.4% 32.9%
None of the above 9.2% 8.4% 9.3% 9.3%
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Table 2.10: Selected Metropolitan Areas by Latino Population, Latino-Owned Firm Count, and Total Annual Latino-
Owned Revenue, 2012 (author's calculations from 1-year 2012 ACS and 2012 SBO) 
 
 
Again, the concentration in a couple metropolitan areas is clear: New York, Los 
Angeles, Chicago, Miami, and Houston alone hosted 42.7% of the nation’s total Latino-
owned businesses (against 32.2% of its population). Also, all five of these metropolitan 
areas with high proportions of Latino-owned businesses are either “quintessential” or 
“post-WWII” gateways, metropolitan areas with at least several decades’ worth of history 
with significant Latino settlement. Similarly, McAllen is the rare smaller metropolitan 
area with a share of Latino-owned firms and revenue greater than its share of Latino 
population, a probable testament to its proximity to the Mexican border and ability to 
host cross-border trade. By contrast, the business communities of the “emerging” and 
“pre-emerging” gateways are still very small.  
























National total 52,961,017 100.00% 3,305,873 100.00% $473,635,944 100.00%
Boston quintessential 444,517 0.84% 22,612 0.68% $2,617,650 0.55%
Chicago quintessential 2,025,371 3.82% 89,523 2.71% $14,602,672 3.08%
New York quintessential 4,508,478 8.51% 339,415 10.27% $30,374,098 6.41%
San Francisco quintessential 974,781 1.84% 54,669 1.65% $9,333,741 1.97%
Cleveland former 102,921 0.19% 4,742 0.14% $648,775 0.14%
Milwaukee former 155502 0.29% 4,185 0.13% $980,525 0.21%
St. Louis former 75,488 0.14% 3,493 0.11% $820,763 0.17%
Houston post-WWII 2,228,634 4.21% 164,923 4.99% $22,663,273 4.78%
Los Angeles post-WWII 5,857,358 11.06% 393,051 11.89% $42,449,907 8.96%
Miami post-WWII 2,419,441 4.57% 423,163 12.80% $71,761,013 15.15%
Washington, D.C. post-WWII 839,697 1.59% 65,997 2.00% $10,080,799 2.13%
Atlanta emerging 577,276 1.09% 44,240 1.34% $5,549,599 1.17%
Las Vegas emerging 596,269 1.13% 28,630 0.87% $4,899,446 1.03%
Phoenix emerging 1,294,139 2.44% 54,393 1.65% $5,770,566 1.22%
Charlotte pre-emerging 186,478 0.35% 11,610 0.35% $1,374,890 0.29%
Columbus pre-emerging 71,637 0.14% 3,599 0.11% $450,997 0.10%
Nashville pre-emerging 111,138 0.21% 6,194 0.19% $1,405,561 0.30%
Baltimore re-emerging 135,414 0.26% 7,549 0.23% $1,433,025 0.30%
Minneapolis-St. Paul re-emerging 185,806 0.35% 7,189 0.22% $1,457,837 0.31%
Seattle re-emerging 331,001 0.62% 11,906 0.36% not given not given
Fresno minor continuous 485,394 0.92% 19,409 0.59% $2,078,431 0.44%
Hartford minor continuous 160,740 0.30% 6,328 0.19% $1,078,462 0.23%
McAllen minor continuous 733,012 1.38% 71,377 2.16% $8,380,663 1.77%
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Table 2.10 suggests that Latino-owned businesses are relatively small and 
economic activity is dispersed among many firms. Even in New York and Los Angeles, 
with large populations in general and of Latinos in particular, the percentage of firms is 
significantly smaller than the percentage of revenue generated in that particular 
metropolitan area, suggesting that many of the firms in both metropolitan areas are 
relatively small by revenue. In contrast to them—and to every other gateway featured—is 
Miami, which hosts nearly 13% of all Latino-owned firms and 15% of all Latino-owned 
revenue despite having less than 5% of the Latino population within the metropolitan 
area. This suggests that Miami, with its unique history of Cuban in-migration in the 
second half of the 20th century, may differ substantially from many other metropolitan 
areas, even those with large Latino populations. 
 
2.5 Immigration Law, Enforcement, and Latino Settlement Patterns 
There is one more factor that has influenced Latino settlement, and thus Latino 
business creation, in the United States: the legal environment in which immigrants 
generally, and foreign-born Latinos in particular, have come increasingly under scrutiny 
since the passing of the California state ballot initiative Proposition 187 in 1994. 
Controversial at the time, Proposition 187’s focus on “illegal aliens” and its creation in 
the context of largely Latino in-migration could be seen as setting the stage for later 
legislation at the state and federal level meant to facilitate the deportation of 
undocumented workers, such as Section 287(g) of the 1996 Immigration and Nationality 
Act, which allows the Department of Homeland Security to authorize local and state 
police forces to act in the place of federal immigration agents (American Immigration 
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Council, 2017).  Such measures, although ostensibly aimed at enforcing existing 
immigration laws and thus not targeted at residents with official documentation or at any 
particular ethnic group, are widely believed to have a negative impact of the quality of 
life and ease of mind of Latinos throughout the United States, documented or not. 
At present the Census Bureau does not count undocumented or undocumented 
immigrants; some research uses foreign-born non-citizens as a proxy, assuming that 
undocumented immigrants are most likely to fall into this category. In its estimates of 
undocumented immigration, the Pew Research Center uses a formula derived from 
American Community Survey and Current Population Survey data (Passel & Cohn, 
2016). Hoekstra and Orozco-Aleman (2017), studying the immediate effects of the 2010 
passing of Arizona’s restrictive State Bill (SB) 1070 on migration, used data from the 
Survey of Migration to the Northern Border, which is administered on a regular basis in 
Mexico by El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, a research center, and the Mexican federal 
government.10 Other research, such as that by Bohn, Lofstrom, and Raphael (2015), uses 
synthetic control methods to estimate the effects of policy on migration of undocumented 
residents. Suffice to say that researchers interested in measuring undocumented residents 
have worked to get around the difficulties of measurement. 
The Pew Research Center estimates that there are about 11.1 million 
undocumented immigrants in the United States as of 2014, and that 6.8 million of those 
lived in just twenty different metropolitan areas, the biggest being New York, Los 
Angeles, and Houston (Passel & Cohn, 2017). Of the total undocumented immigrants, 5.8 
                                                 
10 More information about the Survey of Migration at Mexico’s Northern Border (EMIF, for Encuestas 
sobre Migración en las Fronteras Norte y Sur de México) is available at https://www.colef.mx/emif/eng/.  
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million were from Mexico and an additional 2.35 million from Central and South 
American countries (Passel & Cohn, 2016). Ninety-seven percent of immigrants deported 
in 2013 came from Latin American countries; Mexican immigrants accounted for two-
thirds of all deportations (Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 
National Day Laborer Organizing Network, & National Hispanic Leadership Agenda, 
2014). Not surprisingly, many legal measures targeting undocumented immigrants are 
assumed to be aimed at Latino immigrants. Proposition 187 was denounced by two 
successive presidents of Mexico, and the final days before the vote on the initiative saw 
large numbers of Latino and Chicano high school students stage school walkouts (Martin, 
1995). A New York Times article in late 2017 on heightened activity by the regional 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) office in Atlanta focused both on Latino 
residents frightened by the law-enforcement sweeps and the role of a journalist for the 
local Spanish-language newspaper, Mundo Hispánico, in warning of their approach (Yee, 
2017). Both SB 1070 and its predecessor, the 2007 Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA), 
have frequently been explained as a reaction to increased Latino in-migration to the state, 
as in, for example, Magaña and Lee (2013). 
Immigration law is set federally; in theory, its enforcement takes place at the 
federal level. Brenner (2009), conducting interviews in 2004–05 for her research on local 
governments’ efforts to integrate immigrant residents, reported, “Most city police 
departments made decisions early on that they were not going to focus on immigration 
issues, which they saw as a federal responsibility; they were concerned with crimes 
within their communities.” But the increased use of 287(g) and publicity surrounding it 
suggests that federal immigration law enforcement has been to some degree localized, 
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albeit not in every community. In short, there will exist differences at the local level as to 
the legal environment awaiting new foreign-born residents, and those differences could 
have an effect on where Latinos, foreign-born or not11, choose to live and work in a 
particular metropolitan area. 
Some research has been conducted on the effects of shifts in local immigration-
enforcement efforts on migration decisions. Hoekstra and Orozco-Aleman (2017), 
looking at the immediate response in the two months after the announcement of SB 1070, 
found a decrease in Mexican migrants planning to cross into Arizona, but no effect on 
migration of undocumented out of the state. Parrado and Flippen (2016) looked at out-
migration among foreign-born Latinos in Durham, North Carolina, after the onset of the 
Great Recession and the Durham police department’s entrance into the 287(g) program 
and the related Secure Communities program in 2008. They found that voluntary returns 
to the home country were unaffected; internal migration to another destination within the 
United States decreased, probably, the authors posit, due to decreased economic 
opportunities and increased fear of new measures similar to Durham’s during the 
recession. Bohn et al. (2015) found more dramatic effects, with the passage of LAWA 
leading to an 17% decrease in undocumented workers in Arizona. 
                                                 
11 To address the obvious conflation: analysts, activists, and writers tend to assume that local anti-
immigration policies are also anti-Latino, and that Latinos themselves, even if not foreign-born, will 
experience such policies as discriminatory. Evidence for this comes from a Pew Hispanic poll taken in 
December 2016, which found that just 16% of polled Latinos thought Latinos as a whole were doing better 
than they had been a year ago, while 32% thought Latinos were doing worse, a doubling since 2013 (Pew 
Research Center, 2017). It should be noted, though, that U.S.-born Latinos are not a monolith in their 
political views: in a 2013 poll, also by Pew, three-quarters of polled Latinos favored granting legal status to 
undocumented immigrants, but 68% supported a proposal to increase border enforcement, and one-quarter 
said that the net overall effect of unauthorized immigration on Latinos was negative (Lopez, Taylor, Funk, 
& Gonzalez-Barrera, 2013). 
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Even less research exists on the recently re-publicized concept of “sanctuary” 
cities, whose leaders announce their intention to not follow the federal government’s lead 
in pursuing deportation of undocumented immigrants. This is partly because the term 
“sanctuary city” has no formal definition. Very generally speaking, it means that city law 
enforcement will not participate in 287(g) agreements or otherwise attempt to determine 
immigration status through routine encounters. But the actual application of policy to 
reinforce declared sanctuary status can vary widely from city to city. The city attorney for 
Seattle, after its mayor re-declared the city’s sanctuary status in November 2016, said as 
much: “‘Sanctuary city’ means different things to different people” (Beekman, 2016).12 
Moreover, different places within the same metropolitan area may have different 
approaches: Gwinnett County, in the Atlanta metropolitan area, is a public 287(g) 
complier, but the city of Atlanta has declared itself a sanctuary city. Thus differing local 
levels of zealotry towards enforcing federal immigration law may influence migration 
shifts within, as well as between, metropolitan areas. Policy, politics, and activism are 
moving faster than data collection: it will take some time for researchers to be able to put 
reliable numbers on the effects of sanctuary-city declarations on immigrant settlement. 
Finally, it should be noted that harsh anti-immigrant laws have been more likely 
to appear in metropolitan areas such as Atlanta, Phoenix, and Charlotte, and have been 
prevalent in the southeastern United States (Walker & Leitner, 2011). In other words, 
harsher anti-immigrant policy and the political sentiment clamoring for it have been more 
                                                 
12 In this particular case, in practice, the city of Seattle bars its employees from asking about immigration 
status unless required to by court order. The police for both the city of Seattle and King County are 
similarly instructed not to ask, although an exception exists for police who have reason to believe the 
suspect has committed a felony and has been deported before. (Beekman, 2016) 
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likely to appear in the “emerging” and “pre-emerging” gateways. Those metropolitan 
areas have seen the most dramatic change in a short period of time; it is not surprising 
that the political counter-reaction would be pronounced. Such enforcement policies and 
political climates will adversely affect how Latinos live, work, and run businesses in 
those metropolitan areas, making for a difference in the Latino experience of 
entrepreneurship in emerging and pre-emerging gateways and the Latino experience of 
entrepreneurship in the quintessential and post-World War II gateways, which have by 
and large eschewed the explicitly anti-immigrant, pro-287(g) stance. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to cast a relatively wide spotlight on the 
Latino population in the United States, particularly in regard to settlement patterns, most 
popular metropolitan areas, and business ownership trends. For the most part, the Latino 
population of the United States has settled in urban areas, though the growth in 
“emerging” gateways has frequently been in the suburbs. As a group, Latinos self-employ 
slightly less often than do non-Latinos; when they do start businesses, those businesses 
are usually smaller in terms of annual revenue, and less likely to have paid employees. 
But while looking at the United States’ Latino population as a whole, this chapter 
has also made the case that there are important differences between metropolitan areas. 
Some have millions of Latinos; some have only a few thousand. Some have been hosting 
immigrant populations for decades, or more than a century; some have only recently 
needed to come to grips with the idea of a local immigrant population at all. Some have 
almost exclusively Mexican populations; some have Latinos of a much greater variety of 
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country of origin, ethnicity, or native language. Some have high concentrations of 
entrepreneurial activity; some have relatively small communities. And while some have 
designated themselves “sanctuary cities,” other metropolitan areas have taken a more 
explicitly hostile stance towards undocumented immigrants and Latino in-migration. 
Yet even in the complete (hypothetical) absence of hostile gestures, migrating to a 
new country and beginning a business there is still a difficult task. What motivates 
immigrants to the United States to start businesses, and what have their experiences been 
once they do so? The next chapter will provide an overview of the literature, also 
discussing what parts of that literature address questions specific to Latinos and what can 
be found about geographic and metropolitan-level differences. The chapter following will 
take the information presented here and engage in a more thorough analysis, exploring 










…at the centre of an extraordinary amount of scholarly attention and controversy 
stands… the lowly immigrant firm. The reasons why ethnic business should have gained 
the spotlight are not difficult to divine: the prospects for moving up through the primary 
sector, as previous immigrants did, seem poor; restructuring has created a better 
opportunity for small firms of the kind immigrants can establish; and immigrants have 
been going into business in large numbers anyway—with or without the endorsement of 
salaried academics. (Waldinger, 1993)13 
 
As implied by Waldinger, a great deal of scholarly research already exists on 
immigrant entrepreneurship. This chapter will review some of the most influential 
developments in the study of how immigrants choose to start businesses, the obstacles 
they most frequently face, and the strategies they use to overcome these obstacles. After 
reviewing the literature for immigrant entrepreneurs as a whole, it will then examine the 
literature for Latino entrepreneurs in particular, and discuss the similarities and 
differences between immigrant entrepreneurs characterized more broadly and Latino 
entrepreneurs in particular.   
Very little of the literature to be reviewed here, it should be said, comes out of 
planning. Research on immigrant entrepreneurship by and large originated with 
sociology, in the tradition of the Chicago School and mid-20th-century writers such as 
                                                 
13 The second ellipsis is in the original. 
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Bonacich (1973) and Light (1973). But a great deal of entrepreneurship literature, 
including literature on immigrant entrepreneurship, is located in management and 
business studies. More recently economic geographers such as Liu (2012b) and Q. Wang 
(2013a) have called for an expansion of the literature to include spatial variables and 
contexts. Speaking in very general terms, the treatment of immigrant entrepreneurs in 
management literature has been more global in scope and less concerned with particular 
sociological contexts, whereas the sociological literature has included more detail about 
national origin. Since this study is focused exclusively on immigrant entrepreneurship in 
the United States, it has slanted towards more of the sociological review, although some 
of the literature presented here comes from business and management research. 
 
3.2 How, and Why, Immigrants Become Entrepreneurs 
According to the estimates of the 2006–10 American Community Survey (ACS), 
there were 2.4 million immigrant entrepreneurs in the United States, accounting for 
18.2% of all business owners; the $121 billion generated by immigrant-owned businesses 
accounted for 15% of total national business income (Fairlie & Lofstrom, 2015). But 
immigrant entrepreneurship has a long history in the United States. The Korean and 
Korean-American entrepreneurs who became the subject of study in the 1970s and 1980s 
were following in a long tradition of immigrant entrepreneurship: they opened “the 
businesses that immigrants in America have operated for hundreds of years—labor-
intensive produce stands, convenience stores, and garment factories.” (Park, 1997) 
Indeed, during this time some Korean immigrants in New York City were buying small 
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corner grocery stores directly from their predecessors, Jewish or Italian families moving 
away from small retail (Waldinger, Aldrich, & Ward, 1990). 
The proportion of immigrant entrepreneurs to native-born entrepreneurs should 
not be overestimated. Of participants in the Panel Survey of Entrepreneurial Dynamics 
(PSED), a survey designed to capture both aspiring and nascent entrepreneurs, 85% were 
native-born to native-born parents (Reynolds & Curtain, 2008). Nonetheless, immigrants 
have self-employed at higher rates than has the native population, according to every 
decennial census going back to 1870 (Bowles & Colton, 2007). Immigrants have, over 
time, contributed enough to American entrepreneurial history to generate a significant 
amount of research into their motivations and strategies. 
3.2.1 Theories of Immigrant Entrepreneurship 
Much of the literature on ethnic entrepreneurship has focused on why some ethnic 
groups were more likely than others to become entrepreneurs. One early theory of how 
immigrants become entrepreneurs was the idea of the immigrant group as “middleman 
minority” (Bonacich, 1973). The “middleman” representative was characterized by an 
orientation towards saving and capital accumulation, a relatively loose attachment to the 
host country (often coupled with a long-term plan to return to the home country), and 
concentration in particular skilled trades (Bonacich, 1973). But the middleman minority’s 
self-positioning as temporary is in contrast to the rise of immigrant groups who left their 
home countries for reasons of political disagreement or safety, who would be more likely 
to establish permanent enclaves within the new country (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993). 
The idea of the “middleman minority” failed to explain early examples of ethnic business 
activity in a concentrated area, such as the growth of Los Angeles’s Koreatown 
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neighborhood in the 1970s and 1980s (Light & Bonacich, 1991) or the success of Cubans 
in Miami (K. L. Wilson & Portes, 1980). 
 Aldrich and Waldinger (1990) eventually proposed that ethnic entrepreneurship 
arose out of the interplay between opportunity structures and group characteristics, with 
members of the group using “ethnic strategies” to address the opportunities and threats 
they encounter. Figure 3.1, below, presents both these opportunity-based and group-based 
factors in greater detail. The group factors but depend on whether the group is in the 
process of migrating or has already migrated, or is drawing from experiences prior to 
migration. Therefore these factors are not constant; different sets of migrants from the 
same ethnic group and country of origin may have to apply different strategies, 










Historically it has been common for immigrant retailers to begin by selling to a 
co-ethnic audience, which means that business growth will be limited by the size and 
resources of the local co-ethnic population (Waldinger, McEvoy, & Aldrich, 1990). An 
alternative strategy is to act as a middleman minority in the setting of a particular 
industry, such as Koreans operating small grocery stores and convenience stores in 
mostly black neighborhoods in Los Angeles (J. Lee, 2007).  
Following on the work of Aldrich and Waldinger is the idea of “mixed 
embeddedness” (Kloosterman & Rath, 2001; Kloosterman, Van Der Leun, & Rath, 
1999). This argues for shifting away from focusing exclusively on the immigrant 
entrepreneurs themselves, towards including information about the “opportunity 
structure” greeting the entrepreneurs in their host country. Thus discussing why and how 
an immigrant chooses to self-employ involves “mixing” characteristics of immigrants 
themselves—personal characteristics, social capital—with the surrounding economic and 
regulatory structure. Kloosterman and Rath (2001) illustrate the potential interplay 
between the immigrant-owned firm, the local market, and the larger society: 
The first Bangladeshi immigrant, who senses a wider market for Indian foods and 
subsequently translates this into starting a restaurant in a predominantly white 
neighborhood, can be seen as a consciously innovative entrepreneur. Others, however, 
may start out as pure copy-cats but eventually turn out to be rather innovative when, for 
instance, demand for foreign foodstuffs rises due to the increase in overseas travelling on 
the part of the indigenous population. A large majority of the immigrant entrepreneurs, 




With its emphasis on the local context, the idea of mixed embeddedness opens up 
theorizing about immigrant entrepreneurship to the need for geographic specificity. 
Considerations of the effects of the local or metropolitan scale were rarer: Light and 
Bonacich’s study of Korean entrepreneurs in Los Angeles, for example, discusses the 
question of why Korean entrepreneurs? at length and the question why Los Angeles? not 
at all. More thorough consideration of the effects of the metropolitan context would come 
later, after the immigrant population—and immigrant entrepreneurship—had expanded 
into more metropolitan areas. 
3.2.2 Pushed or Pulled? 
One of the ongoing questions in the literature on self-employment and 
entrepreneurship in general, and immigrant self-employment and entrepreneurship in 
particular, is: is the new business owner pushed into self-employment for lack of better 
options, or pulled to choose self-employment? “The main debate,” as Portes and Yiu 
(2013) summarize it, “is between those authors who emphasize the role of self-
employment and ethnic entrepreneurship as an economic survival strategy—a resource 
against destitution—and those who mainly describe it as a means of individual and 
collective mobility.”  
The question is obviously primarily answerable on an individual level, but the 
aggregate answer has particular important policy implications. Someone pushed into self-
employment, who would prefer wage employment, would be helped by gaining more 
access to wage employment; whereas the business owner fulfilling the proverbial dream 
should be encouraged and aided specifically in business ownership. Given that very few 
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businesses, even informal ones, operate without at least some startup costs for the owner, 
it makes sense to try and distinguish between pushed and pulled entrepreneurship before 
treating all entrepreneurial efforts as the former or the latter.  
Fairlie and Fossen (2018) characterize the push-pull question as “opportunity” 
versus “necessity” entrepreneurship. They define necessity entrepreneurship as following 
a period of unemployment, and opportunity entrepreneurship as following a period of 
wage employment. Looking at data from the United States and Germany, they found that 
opportunity entrepreneurship was pro-cyclical, meaning opportunity entrepreneurs were 
more likely to start a business in good economic times, and necessity entrepreneurship 
was counter-cyclical, increasing as unemployment rates rose. They also found that 
businesses founded out of opportunity were more likely be employer firms. 
Both push and pull conditions seem to exist in entrepreneurship in the United 
States as a whole. Four-fifths of the participants in the Panel Survey of Entrepreneurial 
Dynamics (PSED) were working for an employer while planning to start their own firm, 
and only 12% reported planning to start of business because they had to, rather than 
because they wanted to. On the other hand,  
Coomes, Fernandez, and Gohmann (2013), looking at data instead of surveys, 
found that a 1% rise in unemployment in an MSA led to an increase in the growth of 
proprietorship between .015% and .057%, thus finding evidence of a push effect. Yet 
push and pull factors are not necessarily mutually exclusive; some entrepreneurs who 
found businesses after losing wage employment may do so because they feel pulled to 
entrepreneurship, rather than because they feel they have exhausted all other options 
(Caliendo & Kritikos, 2010). 
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Chrysostome (2010) reviewed the literature on the characteristics of immigrant 
entrepreneurs as distinguished by their having acted out of opportunity (pulled) or 
necessity (pushed). The pushed immigrant entrepreneurs, she suggests, were less likely to 
be comfortable conducting business in English than were their pulled counterparts, and 
also less likely to have a college degree. With their options in the general wage-
employment environment limited, they were more likely to rely on a local co-ethnic 
community to support their business, turning to co-ethnics as both potential customers 
and as potential employees.  
Making wage employment more available to immigrants may reduce the overall 
rate of immigrant entrepreneurship but means that those immigrants who do self-employ 
are more likely to do so out of a personal desire to start a business.  Whether or not ethnic 
entrepreneurship should be encouraged, then, depends not only on the possible financial 
returns but the possible non-financial returns, which in turn will depend on the aspiring 
entrepreneur’s own goals, social networks, and human and financial capital resources. 
Yet, the difficulties faced by immigrant entrepreneurs are significant enough that some 
researchers have questioned whether entrepreneurship should be encouraged for this 
group. 
3.3  Difficulties Faced by Immigrant Entrepreneurs 
 
3.3.1 Does Entrepreneurship Benefit Immigrants? 
Entrepreneurship can be a risky way to earn a living: there is a certain amount of 
risk involved with the creation of any new business. The truism that half of all businesses 
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fail within the first five years aside14, the failure rate for a given cohort of new firms 
tends to peak at 18 to 24 months after creation (Cressy, 2006). That said, failure rates for 
minority-owned businesses, particularly black- and Latino-owned businesses, tend to be 
higher than those for white-owned businesses (Robb, 2002). 
To be fair, closure of a small business does not necessarily mean the business 
failed, as Bates (2005) points out; it may simply have been a matter of the business being 
less attractive than the alternatives. According to the 1996 Characteristics of Business 
Owners (CBO) survey, one-third of businesses that had closed between 1992 and 1996 
were described as “successful” by their owners. That said, minority business owners were 
more likely to describe their closed firm, in retrospect, as unsuccessful. So were owners 
with less than a high-school diploma, which ties in with Bates’s longstanding 
championship of the link between human capital (for which education attainment is a 
common proxy variable) and business success.  
One factor that has come up repeatedly in Bates’s research (Bates, 1989; Bates, 
Lofstrom, & Servon, 2011; Bates & Robb, 2015) is the size and wealth of the firm’s 
target audience. Minority firms selling to a co-ethnic audience may be hampered by a 
small pool of customers; even more so if that pool is overserved by co-ethnic sellers. 
Human capital, measured by the proxy variable of levels of education (specifically, 
college education) has been positively correlated with firm survival (Bates, 1990, 2005). 
                                                 
14 An online search via Duckduckgo.com finds that many articles using the phrase “half of all businesses 
fail within the first five years” attribute the fact to the SBA (without further citing). A June 2012 SBA 
pamphlet says, “About two-thirds of businesses with employees survive at least two years and about half 
survive at least five years.” Emphasis mine. (United States Small Business Administration, 2012) 
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Higher education levels has also been correlated with greater access to debt financing 
(Bates, 1989).  
Thus some of the literature on immigrant entrepreneurship has argued that 
encouraging immigrants to start their own businesses is encouraging them to work 
against their own interests. Light and Bonacich (1991), for example, argued that ethnic 
entrepreneurship promotes cross-ethnic solidarity at the expense of suppressing class 
conflict, and “serves as a profoundly conservative force, leaving unchecked the worst 
consequences of capitalist social relations.” More financially-minded critiques have 
centered on whether entrepreneurship is a worthwhile route for immigrants wanting to 
establish a sustainable income stream. In their examination of Latina entrepreneurs, for 
example, Lofstrom and Bates (2009) found evidence that the self-employed Latinas in 
their sample would probably have earned higher earnings from wage or salary work. 
Portes and Shafer (2007), surveying both the history of Cuban-origin 
entrepreneurship in Miami and the history of the idea of the “ethnic enclave” (of which 
more later), complain, “[T]here is also a willful resolve—most common among some 
economists—to demonstrate that the independent business route does not pay for 
minorities and, hence, that the possibility of successful ethnic entrepreneurship is a 
‘myth’.”  In fairness, the evidence that ethnic entrepreneurship is financially a good bet is 
mixed at best. But this would not make ethnic entrepreneurship unique. Research has 
suggested that the trend is for all entrepreneurs to receive both lower initial earnings and 
lower earnings growth over time as compared to paid workers, suggesting that the 
benefits of entrepreneurship are mostly nonpecuniary, such as control over one’s time 
and choice of work (Hamilton, 2000). Moreover, many entrepreneurs, immigrant or no, 
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have motivations for starting their own business unrelated to wealth maximization. But it 
is worth acknowledging that many immigrant entrepreneurs face worse-than-usual odds 
when starting their business, due mainly to two gaps of access: access to information, and 
access to financial capital. 
3.3.2 Informational Gaps Faced by Immigrant Entrepreneurs 
Starting a new business requires, in most cases, not only startup capital but a 
certain amount of time—1,200 to 1,600 hours, on average (Reynolds & Curtain, 2008). 
Some of that time has to be spent on the business itself: its industry, its location, the need 
it meets, and so on. But some of it also has to be spent understanding the regulatory 
environment in which the business will operate. Although information necessity does not 
appear in the literature on immigrant entrepreneurship as regularly as does startup capital, 
it is nonetheless important enough an issue that its lack comes up repeatedly. 
These potential informational “gaps” were divided into five broad groups by 
Servon, Fairlie, Rastello, and Seely (2010): capital gaps; non-capital resource gaps; 
transitional gaps, most commonly faced as businesses grow; information gaps; and 
service-delivery gaps, such as difficulty finding relevant training. All of these are more 
likely to occur for entrepreneurs who lack formal credit histories or are not comfortable 
with the dominant language. The authors conducted their survey in New York City, one 
of the metropolitan areas with the longest history of immigrant entrepreneurship, as well 
as a metropolitan area where city government has been openly, formally committed to 
supporting immigrant entrepreneurship; it is thus reasonable to assume similar challenges 
for immigrant entrepreneurs in newer gateways. 
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As Servon has noted in her work on microenterprises and the community-based 
organizations (hereafter CBOs) that serve them (1999), programs targeted at low-income 
aspiring entrepreneurs need to provide more training and support, and therefore require 
more funding for such, than do programs serving better-financed populations. This is in 
line with the interviews by Wah (2008) of representatives of CBOs serving Afro-
Caribbean entrepreneurs in Brooklyn and south Florida, one of whom gently observed 
that the clients “need[ed] a lot of handholding.”  
3.3.3 Immigrants’ (Lack of) Access to Startup Capital 
 “One legacy of our nation’s discriminatory past,” write Blanchard, Zhao, and 
Yinger (2008), dryly, “is that creditworthiness is negatively correlated with minority 
status.” Evidence of such discrimination has been noted repeatedly in the literature. 
Minority business owners are more likely to get loan applications denied than non-ethnic 
white business owners (Bradford, 2013). While some of the discrepancies can be 
explained by pointing to individual credit histories, even controlling for personal wealth 
fails to explain large disparities in loan turndown rates between white and non-white 
applicants (Cavalluzzo & Wolken, 2005).  
The findings of Robb and Robinson (2018) suggest that the problem goes of 
minority startup capital acquisition goes deeper than creditworthiness. They used data 
from the Kauffman Firm Survey to measure potential racial bias in credit scores; if 
minority (defined as black or Latino) applicants were being unfairly discriminated against 
in their credit scores, they reasoned, then their credit scores should underpredict these 
borrowers’ loan repayment ability. Instead they found that the credit-score actually 
overpredicted loan repayment ability: even after controlling for other factors, the minority 
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business owners had worse repayment histories than would be expected from their credit 
scores alone. Robb and Robinson offer three possible explanations for this unexpected 
finding: first, that minority applicants may have a smaller liquidity cushion to start with 
and thus a smaller repayment ability than would white applicants with similar credit 
scores; second; lenders might be relying on “soft” information about applicants, which 
may be more likely to come with biased judgments; third, there might be differences 
between lenders and minority borrowers about the prioritization of repayment and the 
long-term viability of the lender-borrower relationship.  
Minority business owners actually have multiple points of potential 
discrimination. Not only are they more likely to get smaller loans (even after controlling 
for business size), but they also face the possibility of receiving a smaller loan from being 
in a minority neighborhood (Bates & Robb, 2013). Not surprisingly, minority 
neighborhoods in Chicago showed low loan availability and high use of credit cards on 
the part of business owners (Bates & Robb, 2013). Low loan availability can begin a self-
perpetuating cycle, as black and Latino business owners may be more likely to 
preemptively judge themselves as a credit risk and thus less likely to even apply for a 
loan in the first place (Bates & Robb, 2015). They may also ask for smaller loans than 
they need (Bates & Robb, 2015).  
The loan program run by the United States Small Business Administration (SBA) 
is not exactly immune to the trend: noting that in 2004 Asian-American-owned firms 
received 20% of all SBA loan dollars, Latino-owned firms 7%, and black-owned firms 
3%, Park declares the SBA “a racist institution” (2010). Although Asian-American 
entrepreneurs are usually assumed to face less discrimination than black or Latino 
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entrepreneurs, as late as 2010 56% of Korean immigrant entrepreneurs were using 
personal savings as startup capital, as opposed to 19% using bank loans (Park, 2010). 
The risk minority entrepreneurs (disproportionately) face is that, unable to get 
initial startup credit, they will have greater difficulty growing their businesses. A study of 
minority entrepreneurs found a positive correlation between level of startup capital and 
future business success; initial funding of more than $5,000 was especially likely to make 
for a successful business (Fairlie & Robb, 2008). Greater availability of credit may also 
increase the entrepreneur’s options, in terms of what industry the entrepreneur chooses to 
enter (Bradford, 2013). Ironically, banks are sometimes unwilling to take on the initial 
risk of financing a new business, only to be much more generous with credit offers once 
the business is established and the risk is lowered (Li & Lo, 2015).  
It should be noted that the literature does not suggest a correlation between the 
type of credit used, separate from the amount, and business survival. J. J. Lee and Zhang 
(2011), looking at data from the Kauffman Firm Survey, found a positive, significant 
relationship between a startup’s obtaining of formal capital and the likelihood of its still 
being in business three years after founding—but that relationship disappeared after the 
authors controlled for human capital. Rather than formal capital influencing business 
survival, they concluded, the data suggested the opposite: that startups already more 
likely to survive were more likely to obtain formal capital. Again, the literature suggests 




3.4 Ethnic Enclaves and Social Networks 
 
3.4.1 Immigrant Entrepreneurs’ Strategies 
It would be a mistake to minimize the difficulties faced by immigrants looking to 
start a business. It would also be a mistake to think of immigrant entrepreneurs as passive 
in the face of repeated difficulties. As Table 3.2, below, adapted from Boissevain et al. 
(1990), shows, immigrant entrepreneurs have been observed to employ multiple different 
strategies to overcome problems.  
Table 3.1: Observed Strategies Used by Immigrant Entrepreneurs (after Boissevain et al., 1990) 
 
 
Of course, not every strategy will be employed by every immigrant or every 
immigrant group in every situation. Marriage alliances, for example, were a strategy 
Problem Observed strategy
Cultivate direct and indirect ties with coethnic 
communities
Reinforce social ties and develop networks through 
"ritualized occasions" such as church attendance
Cultivate specialized coethnic associations
Subscribe to or support specialized coethnic/colinguistic 
media
Use unpaid labor of immediate family
Employ coethnics through apprenticeships
Offer informal, general services through business, such 
as ad-hoc counseling
Serve coethnic customers more personally and non-
coethnics more impersonally
Use "self-exploitation" (i.e., work longer hours)
Expand business horizontally, by establishing new 
locations, or vertically, by producing product elsewhere 
in the supply chain
Create or join formal trading associations
Increase family wealth through marriage alliances
Bribe officials
Manipulate or dodge regulations
Social, legal, cultural, religious, 
and/or linguistic barriers to 
interacting more with majority 
group
Lack of formal financial resources
Need for coethnic community 
support of business
Increased competition




deployed by Romani in European countries, as a way of establishing and extending 
trading rights between different groups (Boissevain et al., 1990). Koreans in the United 
States were more likely to form business alliances, especially through existing social 
connections such as shared churches, whereas Latinos in the Midwest may be more 
reluctant to extend trust without the assurance of a known and trusted third party (Welch, 
2010). Approaches to family labor and customer bases will also vary by social and 
cultural expectations. 
As an example of strategizing in action, Chang, Memili, Chrisman, Kellermanns, 
and Chua (2009) surveyed 85 Latino entrepreneurs in Massachusetts who’d completed a 
course in small business management. Their study group reported being influenced by 
“family social capital”—the willingness of family members to support the venture, in 
terms of nonfinancial resources. This is in line with the research of Boissevain et al. 
(1990), who found that family support, particularly in the form of unpaid labor, was 
employed as a strategy by ethnic entrepreneurs (and small business owners in general, for 
that matter) across multiple industries and host countries. 
Separate from individual strategies are the strategies that arise out of many 
immigrants of the same ethnic and linguistic background, linked (usually) by living in the 
same or adjoining neighborhoods, pursuing business investment in related industries, so 
that often business owners will have co-ethnic employees and buy from and sell to co-
ethnic suppliers. Such a concentration is generally referred to as an “ethnic enclave,” and 
it has been the subject of a great deal of immigrant-entrepreneurship research. 
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3.4.2 Defining the Ethnic Enclave 
The idea of the “ethnic enclave”—popularization of the term being often 
attributed to K. L. Wilson and Portes (1980)—has occurred repeatedly in the literature: 
Koreans and Korean-Americans in Los Angeles (Light & Bonacich, 1991), New York 
(Park, 1997), and Chicago (Yoon, 1997); Portuguese and Portuguese-Canadians in 
Toronto (Teixeira, 1998); and Greek-Americans in Boston (Halter, 1995), to give just a 
few examples. Zhou (2004) has summarized the two main aspects of what makes a 
concentration of co-ethnics an ethnic enclave. First, the ethnic group must maintain 
ownership of economic activity; second, the ethnic group must control the employment 
network. Thus, say, a group of Latinos all working for the same food-processing plant 
would not be an ethnic enclave until there was sufficient capital in the community for 
multiple Latino-owned businesses to open, and for Latinos to be able to offer jobs to co-
ethnics in competition with the food-processing plant. 
Generally, an ethnic enclave is supposed to be spatially concentrated. Although 
the rise of geographic analyses of immigrant entrepreneurship, to be covered later in this 
chapter, has challenged the assumption that all ethnic enclaves are set in areas of spatial 
concentration, it is generally assumed that physical proximity enhances the social 
exchanges that make up the enclave. For example, one could say that the analysis 
conducted by Kalnins and Chung (2006) of Gujarati hotel owners was not of a proper 
enclave, since their study area was the entire state of Texas. Yet their tests revealed that 
Gujarati-owned hotels tended to cluster spatially (65% of all the unbranded motels in 
their sample were located in the vicinity of a branded Gujarati-owned hotel) and that 
proximity to more prosperous Gujarati-owned hotels enhanced survival rates for the 
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motel owners. Even if it would be wrong to speak of an “enclave” of Gujarati hotel 
owners the size of Texas, the interactions of participants resembled the behavior of 
immigrant entrepreneurs within established, geographically identifiable enclaves. 
While the “middleman minority” frequently sells to the larger, majority audience, 
immigrant entrepreneurship in the United States has also featured immigrant 
entrepreneurs selling specifically to their co-ethnic audience. Aspiring minority 
entrepreneurs, including immigrant entrepreneurs, responding to the Panel Survey of 
Entrepreneurship Dynamics (PSED) in the mid-2000s, were more likely to be planning to 
target a niche market than were their white counterparts (Liu, 2012a). 
Choi (2010) offers a detailed example of how the Korean-American co-ethnic 
entrepreneurial social network works in Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Korea Times 
publishes an annual business directory; churches function as hosts for informal 
networking meetings; pastors openly encourage “Christian businesses.” Similar 
religiously-encouraged business networking occurred within the Korean-American 
community in Queens, New York City (Park, 1997). Social and business networks also 
reinforced each other through the creation of rotating credit associations, which were 
often about friendship as well as mutual aid and investment (Park, 1997). 
The term “ethnic enclave” was batted around for a bit after its conception, a series 
of arguments summarized by Waldinger (1993). Part of the question was whether an 
ethnic enclave designated a space in which co-ethnics could participate as employees for 
higher wages. Eventually Light, Sabagh, Bozorgmehr, and Der-Martirosian (1994) 
proposed a distinction between the broader “ethnic economy” and the “ethnic enclave 
economy,” the latter of which belongs specifically to the hypothesis that, after adjusting 
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for human capital, wages for co-ethnic participants in the ethnic enclave are higher than 
for those in the primary labor market. Thus the idea of the ethnic enclave is slightly 
different from that of the ethnic economy, as defined by Kaplan and Li in the introduction 
to their 2006 book Landscapes of the Ethnic Economy. In addition to the concentration of 
the enclave, they suggest that the ethnic economy can be distinguished by spatial 
concentration of co-ethnic economic activity; specific appeals to the co-ethnic market; 
co-ethnic proprietorship and employment; and integration, in which co-ethnics also act as 
suppliers.  
But to discuss co-ethnic concentrated business activity solely in the context of 
economy misses important overlaps: “the interconnections of ethnic economies, ethnic 
neighborhoods, and ethnic institutions mark such places as ethnic communities in their 
most complete form.” (Kaplan & Li, 2006) “Ethnic economy” is thus an inadequate term 
to sum up the various aspirations nurtured within the geographic concentration. “Ethnic 
community” has the virtue of being less specific but could equally apply to a physically 
concentrated group of immigrants lacking the economic power that would help them start 
their own formal businesses. Thus, the term “ethnic enclave” has drifted away somewhat 
from its initial association with wages and become more encompassing of social 
relations. For example, the research by Shin (2017) on how living in an “ethnic enclave” 
affects immigrants’ travel behavior discusses the idea of the enclave in terms of 
concentration of a co-ethnic population, in terms of the built environment, and in terms of 
social networks, but not in terms of business ownership or co-ethnic employment. 
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3.4.3 How the Ethnic Enclave Supports Entrepreneurs 
Ethnic enclaves support participating entrepreneurs by providing a space for 
mutual aid, either through direct financial intervention or through exchanges of 
information (Light & Bonacich, 1991). Qadeer (1999) laid out a trajectory of how 
immigrants become entrepreneurs based on interviews with a sample of Chinese and 
South Asian merchants in the Toronto metropolitan area. His respondents tended to focus 
on the co-ethnic market, in some cases because they were more easily able to identify a 
need in the market, in some cases because it allowed them to trade goods or services they 
were already familiar with. More than half of the businesses in his sample were located 
near other co-ethnic enterprises. “Overall,” he concluded, “ethnic enclaves help draw 
customers, provide bases for the cultural imagibility of a commercial area and invest an 
economic value in social and linguistic characteristics.” 
Bailey and Waldinger (1991) present the benefits of the enclave in greater detail. 
They start with the assumption that training is relatively risky, for both employer and 
employee: risky for the employee, who is training for a job she might in the long run not 
get to do; risky for the employer, who is investing in an employee who may walk out the 
door before any return (in the form of skilled labor) can be realized on that investment. 
Ethnic enclaves reduce the risk to both parties by increasing their mutual knowledge of 
each other prior to entering into the contract, allowing both employer and employee to 
make a more informed decision about whether to enter into the potentially risky 
transaction of agreeing to train / agreeing to receive training (since the training period 
frequently comes with lower wages attached).  
Bailey and Waldinger illustrated their theory by looking at the New York City 
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garment industry, which at the time was shifting from a primarily Jewish- and Italian-
dominated set of firms to a Chinese-dominated enclave. The firm owners from the 
previous generation complained that they had no information about the potential new 
hires and little way to get it. The immigration flow had changed on the garment industry, 
the authors noted, breaking the shared mutual legibility of owner and employee: in fact, a 
shift from a Jewish/Italian to a Chinese workforce ended up decreasing mutual legibility. 
In the case of two competing enclaves, rather than one, “[r]ather than strengthening 
training structures, ethnicity undermines them” (Bailey and Waldinger, 1991). 
In 1990s Boston, Dominican and Puerto Rican entrepreneurs relied on friends and 
family members for loans, technical assistance (such as working in the shop), and 
information about nearby vacant storefronts; they also, on occasion, had bought their 
stores from Latinos (Levitt, 1995). Immigrants located in or near co-ethnic communities 
also appear to have an easier time finding jobs in times of higher unemployment (Zhu, 
Liu, & Painter, 2013). Meanwhile, immigrants who specialize in real estate, construction, 
and property development can have an outsized role in directing the creation of an 
enclave. As Light (2002) observes, “Koreatown [in Los Angeles] was being built without 
American banks and without American entrepreneurs”—the developers who encouraged 
settlement and business formation in Koreatown were almost exclusively Korean and 
Chinese. 
The formation of the enclave, and the actions of those contributing to the enclave, 
can be explained by the sociological concepts of “bounded solidarity” and “enforceable 
trust,” both of which lead to the formation of social capital (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 
1993). “Bounded solidarity,” an idea derived from Marx, arises when a group of people 
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facing similar adversities are able to forge a collective sentiment alongside, and 
sometimes more dearly held than, their own individual self-interest. Portes and 
Sensenbrenner cite an example from Glazer (1954): immigrants from Sicily who prior to 
emigrating had thought of themselves as Sicilians, not Italians, but came to re-define 
themselves and find a new solidarity with immigrants from northern Italy. The enclave, is 
thus supported by the entrepreneurs who see their role as not only economic but social 
and community-minded: they have a “stake” in the community and thus an obligation to 
contribute to it (Zhou, 2004). (Again, this is in contrast to the idea of the middleman-
minority entrepreneur, whose focus is more personal and short-term.) 
Levanon (2014) offered some more recent empirical testing of the “bounded 
solidarity” idea, testing it and two other group characteristics (collective socioeconomic 
advantage and enforceable trust) versus four external conditions (local labor market 
conditions, support for refugees, “social distance” between the minority group and the 
dominant majority, and competition within the local labor market from other minority 
ethnic groups) on 2000 Census data. The results were mixed: socioeconomic advantage, 
particularly in the form of language proficiency, came out as the most potentially 
significant factor. 
If the community that emerges has “enforceable trust,” that means that it can 
compel individual actors to shape their behaviors as demanded by the community’s web 
of networks. The combination of the two—a loyalty to a larger community, and a 
willingness to opt in to shared behaviors—can help create an ethnic enclave, as 




3.4.4 Disadvantages Outside and Within the Enclave 
There are potential disadvantages to operating outside of the ethnic enclave, 
namely distance from a potential co-ethnic market; from fellow co-ethnic entrepreneurs 
who may otherwise function as sources of information, supplies, and funding; and from 
potential co-ethnic employees (Fong, Chen, & Luk, 2007). The literature thus usually 
portrays participation in an ethnic enclave as beneficial. Valdez (2008) has offered a 
similar critique: her comparison of earnings from black-owned, white-owned, Korean-
owned, and Mexican-owned businesses led her to conclude that, while higher levels of 
social capital can make entrepreneurship easier, higher levels of social capital did not 
lead to greater business success; social capital could not be used as a substitute for human 
or financial capital. 
Meanwhile, as Fong, Anderson, Chen, and Luk (2008) point out, not every 
minority-owned business has the same relationship to co-ethnic employees or customers. 
A manufacturing firm, for example, may not need to be accessible to a co-ethnic 
customer audience as would a retail shop or a restaurant. Smaller firms may also be more 
likely to locate in the enclave than larger firms (Fong, Chen, & Luk, 2012). A second 
case study, of owners of Latino-cuisine restaurants in Cobb County, Georgia, found that 
the businesses adapted to a more geographically far-flung Latino population by relying 
less on a co-ethnic clientele (Hoalst-Pullen, Slinger-Friedman, Trendell, & Patterson, 
2013). Similarly, Shinnar, Aguilera, and Lyons (2011), surveying Korean-American, 
Mexican-American, and African-American firms, found that minority-owned firms with 
more diverse client bases outperformed similar firms serving a primarily co-ethnic 
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audience. They reiterate Fong et al.’s point that co-ethnic client bases will be more 
valuable in some industries than in others. 
Another problem with emphasizing ethnic enclaves is that not every enclave is 
going to be similarly equipped with information and resources. A comparison of Polish 
and Somali immigrant communities in Toronto found that entrepreneurs in the former 
group, which had been in Toronto longer and was more firmly established, had more 
access to startup capital and information (Lo, Teixeira, & Truelove, 2003). Portes and 
Landolt (1996) made the same point more broadly: “When social capital and the benefits 
derived from it are confused, the term merely says that the successful succeed.” Thus the 
mere presence of an ethnic enclave does not guarantee greater economic and 
informational resources for participants in the enclave. 
The third caveat while emphasizing the role of the ethnic enclave as a resource for 
immigrant entrepreneurs is that not every immigrant will have equal access to the 
benefits offered by the enclave. Immigrants of a different ethnicity might be deliberately 
excluded by enclave practices, as Li (1998) found with Indonesians working for Chinese 
immigrants in the San Gabriel Valley.15 The large role played by Protestant churches in 
supporting Korean-American enclaves implies more limited access for non-Protestant 
Korean immigrants. Even co-ethnicity does not guarantee access to an existing enclave. 
                                                 
15 Another, albeit non-academic, example of research on the exclusion of non-co-ethnic workers is the 2015 
New York Times article “The Price of Nice Nails,” which described the poor treatment of workers, mostly 
Chinese and Latina immigrants, at New York City nail salons. The article described an “ethnic caste 
system” in an industry where 70% of salons had Korean or Korean-American owners: “In general, Korean 
workers earn at least 15 percent to 25 percent more than their counterparts, but the disparity can sometimes 
be much greater, according to manicurists, beauty school instructors and owners…. Many Korean owners 
are frank about their prejudices.” (Maslin Nir, 2015) 
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Cubans who arrived in Miami in the wake of the 1980 Mariel boatlifts were regarded 
with some distrust by Cubans who had fled Cuba earlier, the latter group regarding the 
former as insufficiently anti-Castro. The “character loans” that had helped Cubans in the 
pre-Mariel enclave were not extended to the marielitos (Portes & Puhrmann, 2015). In 
fact, this divide had been presaged: a Miami banker speaking to Portes and Stepick 
(1993) told them, 
At the start, most Cuban enterprises were gas stations, then came grocery shops and 
restaurants. No American bank would lend to them. By the mid-sixties we started a 
policy at our bank of making small loans to Cubans who wanted to start their own 
businesses, but did not have the capital. These loans of $10,000 or $15,000 were made 
because the person was known to us by his reputation and integrity… In 1973, the policy 
was discontinued. The reason was that the new refugees coming at that time were 
unknown to us.16  
 
Finally, there is a Marxist line of criticism that describes the ethnic enclave as a 
mechanism by which some entrepreneurs attain financial and class gains at the expense 
of their co-ethnic audience. Light and Bonacich (1991) concluded their study of the 
Korean ethnic enclave in Los Angeles by warning that, although entrepreneurship within 
an enclave might contribute to ethnic solidarity, it also “serves as a profoundly 
conservative force, leaving unchecked the worst consequences of capitalist social 
relations.” This criticism is echoed by Agius Vallejo and Canizales (2016), who accuse 
the Latino and Latina professional entrepreneurs of exploiting the poorer Latinos they 
                                                 
16 Quoted in Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993). It is not clear from the excerpt whether the banker was 
reporting the loans at the time they were given or adjusting for inflation. A $15,000 loan in January 1967 




provided services to, although the interviewees themselves spoke of their work as 
providing services to an underserved market and strengthening the community. 
3.5 Financing and Information Resources 
Thus participation in an enclave is not the solution for every problem an 
immigrant entrepreneur might face; and not every immigrant entrepreneur will have 
access to an enclave. Moreover, not every enclave will be able to support the collective 
trajectory of its participants as did the Cuban enclave in Miami or the Korean enclaves in 
Los Angeles and New York. Waldinger and Aldrich (1990), in their discussion of ethnic 
entrepreneurship in the United States, took some time to discuss why black 
neighborhoods may not be able to support black-owned businesses, citing a lack of 
community wealth exacerbated by declines in employment opportunities.17 Even 
informal financing strategies in successful entrepreneurial communities are not without 
their drawbacks: rotating credit associations, often cited in the literature as a key driver of 
Korean-American entrepreneurship in the 1970s and 1980s, offered high interest rates 
and no legal recourse should a member default (J. Lee, 2007). Therefore there remains a 
need for some kind of formal financing. This section will discuss government-backed 
financing programs aimed at helping disadvantaged entrepreneurs, as well as banks and 
community-based organizations that specifically target particular immigrant groups. 
 
                                                 
17 The literature on black entrepreneurship is rich in its own right, and largely outside the scope of this 
paper. For a more recent example of looking at black entrepreneurship while accounting for factors of 
industry trends, location, social capital, and discrimination while seeking financial capital, see Harper-
Anderson (2017) on black professional-services entrepreneurs in Chicago. 
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3.5.1 Government-Backed Financing Programs 
A 2005 survey of financing options for small enterprises (enterprises with 
$50,000 or less in annual revenue, or five or fewer employees) found the market 
dominated by banks, with borrowers with little credit history and borrowers with 
language or cultural barriers underserved (Grossman, Chen, & Chapel, 2005). Moreover, 
a third of firms less than four years old relied on credit cards (Grossman et al., 2005), 
which suggested that many new entrepreneurs were facing relatively higher interest rates. 
Small businesses’ need for credit has led to multiple government initiatives, such as the 
7(a) loans offered by the SBA. However, as noted earlier, minority entrepreneurs are 
rarely the recipients of such loans; their need for credit is a less tractable problem to 
solve. 
As Fairlie and Robb (2008) point out, there are hundreds of non-profit and 
government-backed groups providing loans, training, or technical assistance to 
disadvantaged entrepreneurs; most of these programs target access to capital. One of the 
most common type of government-backed assistance is that provided by Community 
Development Financial Institutions (hereafter CDFIs), a program begun in 1994 and 
managed by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Designated institutions, including 
banks and nonprofits, can apply for CDFI funding to make loans to underserved 
communities. Although the program was created with economic development as a goal, 
the CDFI Fund is not limited to business loans only; CDFIs can and do make personal 
loans and mortgages. As of 2013, there were more than 800 certified CDFIs nationwide, 
of which two-thirds were loan funds, 22% were credit unions, and 9% were banks or 
thrifts (Swack, Hangen, & Northrup, 2014).  
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Many CDFIs also provide some sort of non-financial aid to their clients, such as 
business or financial training. Patraporn (2015) describes how a CDFI might work with 
an applicant, based on interviews with twelve Los Angeles CDFIs serving a 
predominantly South Asian clientele. The applicant would first have to be screened; if the 
CDFI judged the opportunity viable, its employees would assist the applicant with loan 
paperwork, address any outstanding financial concerns, and provide monitoring and 
further assistance, if necessary, after the loan. On average this could mean 10 to 60 hours’ 
worth of work per client for both the screening and the loan-writing process. Given that 
many of the interviewed organizations’ clients had already been turned down by a bank at 
least once, it is fair to suggest that these CDFIs spend time and cultural resources on their 
co-ethnic clients that mainstream banks might not have, or find worth spending. 
But the CDFI program is very small. Between 2003 and 2012, a group of 333 
CDFIs reported making a total of $2.04 billion in business loans, alongside $1.63 billion 
in home-improvement or home-purchasing loans, $2.03 billion in residential renovation 
loans, and $1.2 billion in commercial renovation loans (Swack et al., 2014). This is in 
contrast to the estimated total $588 billion in outstanding small business loans, only 
counting loans of $1 million or less, at the end of 2012 (U.S. Small Business 
Administration Office of Advocacy, 2013). Participating institutions are only required to 
report transaction-level data for the three years following the awarding of CDFI funds, 
making it difficult to gauge the role CDFI funding plays in lending activity over time. 
Institutional-level data showed that CDFI funds made up about 8.8% of the total equity of 
participating institutions, with other government funding contributing a further 7.9% 
(Swack et al., 2014). 
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Bates (2000a) was pessimistic about the ability of CDFIs to do much in the way 
of helping minority-owned small businesses. Something similar, he argued, had already 
been tried with the Minority Enterprise Small Business Investment Companies (hereafter 
MESBICs). Their customers were, in fact, minorities, including Asian immigrants in Los 
Angeles and New York. Yet as for-profit firms, MESBICs were hard-pressed to act as 
successful incubators for risky small businesses. Some made very few loans; others 
refused to make loans of less than $50,000, which would have been too large for many 
potential borrowers to afford; still others chose to engage in “asset-based” lending, such 
as making loans to New York City cab drivers to buy the famous “medallion” licenses. 
“The industry as a whole is unprofitable,” Bates concluded. In a follow-up article, Bates 
decried CDFIs as “token gestures rather than serious attacks on the causes of economic 
underdevelopment in the inner city,” pointing out that the SBA had not made much effort 
to measure the impacts of MESBICs (Bates, 2000b). But government-backed loan 
programs are, in something of a quandary: to target more disadvantaged lenders means 
risking greater defaults, and greater defaults threaten to whittle away at the political will 
supporting the lending program in the first place (Waldinger, Aldrich, Bradford, et al., 
1990). 
Meanwhile it can also be difficult to gauge how easily immigrant entrepreneurs 
can access CDFI-funded loans. Speaking generally, although the advancement of loans 
onto online platforms (and, more recently, the rise of peer-to-peer and fundraising 
websites18) has given a small number of business owners new options, the vast majority 
                                                 
18 To date there is not a lot of literature to find on how minority entrepreneurs use crowdfunding tools and 
how their experiences might differ from non-minority entrepreneurs. An exception is Younkin and 
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tend to seek loans from banks geographically nearby (Brevoort, Holmes, & Wolken, 
2010). CDFIs in particular tend to operate in central cities (Immergluck, 2008), which 
could make them less accessible to immigrants in suburban neighborhoods, especially in 
new gateways such as Atlanta where so much of the growth in immigrant population has 
been suburban. Moreover, many CDFIs do not collect data on the ethnicity of their 
borrowers (Mudd, 2013), making it difficult to assess how much business they do with 
Latinos. 
3.5.2 Ethnic Banks and Community-Based Organizations 
Immigrant entrepreneurs are often less likely to have a credit history or a 
checking account (Bowles & Colton, 2007). They may be used to thinking of banks as 
untrustworthy, unable to translate their previous banking experiences to a credit history 
legible to American credit-ratings bureaus, or simply unfamiliar with and intimidated by 
the banking system. In 2003 Federal Reserve researchers estimated that a quarter of 
Latino households were “unbanked” (Perry, 2008). But such lack of familiarity or trust 
can be overcome with a strong enough education mechanism. A survey of housekeepers 
and cleaners in Las Vegas, many of them Latina immigrants, found that 78% had a 
checking account and 72% used direct deposit. The researchers noted that the local 
domestic workers’ union had implemented a program to educate its members about using 
checking accounts (Young, Shinnar, & Choi, 2009). 
                                                 
Kuppuswamy (2017), who found that black business founders using crowdfunding websites were less 
likely to get funding than were white business founders offering similar projects; that users were more 
likely to rate black business founders’ projects as of lower quality; and that the effect disappeared when 
information about the race of black founders was hidden. 
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In the literature, banks created specifically to address the needs and customs of 
recent migrants are referred to as “ethnic banks.” The first such bank created specifically 
to support a co-ethnic community, was founded by Japanese-Americans in Los Angeles 
at the turn of the 20th century (Li et al., 2006). As of the early 2010s there were about 200 
minority-owned banks in the United States, of which about half were Asian-owned 
(Hum, 2011). Although such banks are more likely to focus on real-estate lending, 
especially commercial real estate, than business loans, they nevertheless “appear to be 
instrumental actors in an immigrant growth coalition comprised of developers, 
contractors, realtors, and community elites including nonprofit community development 
corporations” (Hum, 2011). They also may sponsor local community events, thus 
reinforcing the geographic and social associations between the ethnic community and the 
ethnic bank (Li, Lo, & Oberle, 2014). 
In an interview, the founder of a Latino-owned bank in Los Angeles summarized 
the distinct role of the ethnic bank in community formation: 
The bank is a critical component of a successful community. Leveraging capital is a 
powerful tool. We have a role to reinvest in the community. When you think about it, the 
role of banks can play a vital role for communities and groups. It is not just about the 
bottom line for us, not just a business imperative but more about how do we build a 
sound and total community. How do I mind that community and be responsive? I mean, 
when we took a look at the community and if you map out the disparities you see that 
there is a lack of community banks and so we had to start our own bank. (Agius Vallejo, 
2015) 
 
Ethnic banks use their connections to the local co-ethnic community to employ 
risk-management strategies not typically used by non-ethnic banks. This can allow them 
to serve co-ethnic customers who lack experience with standard American banks and 
therefore have less credit history. They may be more willing than traditional banks to 
offer alternatives to the standard credit rating, such as having community members serve 
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as background references (Granier, 2006; Li et al., 2014). Some Korean banks, for 
example, are willing to use real estate held in South Korea as collateral for loans made in 
the United States (Zonta, 2012). Borrowers, in turn, may feel a social obligation, as well 
as a financial one, to repay the loan (Patraporn, 2015). Indeed, “relationship banking” can 
be an important feature that the ethnic bank can sell to its co-ethnic community (Li et al., 
2006). But not all ethnic banks are built out of ethnic enclaves; in recent years the Asian-
bank market has included the entry of local branches of larger banks headquartered in 
China or Korea (Li et al., 2014). 
Separate from, but similar to, ethnic banks are the presence of non-profit 
community-based organizations (CBOs) serving local communities. CBOs may offer 
seminars and other resources on financial literacy, homeownership, and business 
creation; like ethnic banks, they may also be in a position to interpret co-ethnics’ 
informal credit histories (Patraporn, Pfeiffer, & Ong, 2010). It should be noted that ethnic 
banks or ethnically-defined CBOs do not have a monopoly on using careful judgment and 
interpersonal relationships to gain information about borrowers in the absence of formal 
credit histories; Servon (1999) describes a non-ethnically-defined microenterprise 
program, the Women’s Initiative, being able to take similar steps for its clients. Ethnic 
banks and ethnically-defined CBOs may, however, find it easier to offer such services to 
their co-ethnic communities than would a well-intentioned (and even well-financed) but 
non-co-ethnic CBO, simply because employees of the former would be more familiar 
with the co-ethnic community’s cultural, linguistic, and social cues. 
But these CBOs can be small themselves. A nationwide survey of 142 
microenterprise programs in 2014, a quarter of which were CDFIs, and found that two-
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thirds had four or fewer full-time employees (The Aspen Institute/FIELD, 2016). These 
programs, 61% of which served Latinos, also saw between themselves wide variations in 
loan loss rates (from 0% to 22%) and total cost recovery rate (0% to 67%, with the 
median at 16%). Like the MESBICs studied by Bates, these organizations are caught 
between the community need to support borrowers whom traditional banks would 
consider too high-risk, and the institutional obligation to keep from making too many 
loans that might not be recoverable.  
 
3.6 Introducing Geographic Variables to Immigrant Entrepreneurship 
Research 
The Chicago School model of settlement had immigrants first settling in a central 
city and only moving out to the suburbs once they had amassed a certain amount of 
wealth and/or become more assimilated into mainstream American culture (Li & Skop, 
2007). But the changes in geographic settlement patterns have required researchers to 
rethink their classification of immigrant settlements. Rising housing prices in traditional 
immigrant destinations, and the availability of cheaper housing in the suburbs of 
expanding metropolitan areas in the southeastern and southwestern United States, helped 
drive immigrant settlement towards suburbs (Li & Skop, 2007; Light & Johnston, 2009). 
The shift in migration patterns towards the suburbs has given rise to the 
“ethnoburb”, as identified by Li (Li, 1998, 2005; Li & Skop, 2007). Like the ethnic 
enclave, the ethnoburb has multi-ethnic communities, including large immigrant or 
previously-immigrant groups, and high levels of self-employment and family-owned 
ventures (Li, 1998); unlike the enclave, the ethnoburb is primarily suburban, rather than 
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urban, and features concentrations of ethnic minorities with substantial financial 
resources and income stability. Early examples cited in the literature include Chinese-
Americans in Los Angeles’s San Gabriel Valley; Filipino-Americans in Daly City, 
California; Indian-Americans in Edison, New Jersey; and Vietnamese-Americans in the 
eastern suburbs of New Orleans (Li & Skop, 2007). In recent years, research on the idea 
of the ethnoburb, and the context for ethnoburbs, has expanded significantly. The 
comparative research done bySomashekhar (2018) looks at ethnoburbs in 28 different 
metropolitan areas featuring nine different ethnic groups: Asian Indian, Chinese, Filipino, 
Korean, Vietnamese, Jamaican, Mexican, Dominican, and Salvadoran. 
Although ethnoburbs lack the spatial density of urban neighborhoods, they are 
generally assumed to include concentrations of co-ethnic economic activity. In their study 
of the increase of ethnoburbs between 1990 and 2000, Wen, Lauderdale, and Kandula 
(2009) use Li’s definition of “ethnoburb,” in which the ethnic community is not only 
highly suburbanized but also relatively wealthy, with median household income at the 
75th percentile or greater of household income across all census tracts nationwide. 
Patterns of entry and income attainment across ethnoburbs suggest that the factors that 
might push immigrants into entrepreneurship exist similarly in urban and suburban 
locations (Somashekhar, 2018).  
Li, Dymski, Zhou, Chee, and Aldana (2002) suggest that Chinese-American 
banks, in their giving of mortgage loans, played a part in concentrating Chinese-
Americans in a particular neighborhood in the San Gabriel Valley. Subsequent research 
in the Los Angeles area showed that Asian aspiring homeowners were more likely to 
work with Asian-owned banks, and that those banks were more likely to approve loans in 
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Asian enclaves (Zonta, 2004). Geographic settlement patterns are thus not necessarily 
something that happens exclusively to minority and immigrant communities, but also 
within and by minority and immigrant communities. Li et al. ended up calling for a “a 
comprehensive reexamination of the trajectory of minority banking from a geographical 
perspective.” 
As the idea of the ethnoburb illustrates, changes in geography and settlement 
patterns and changes in political and economic organization go hand in hand. The idea of 
the ethnoburb draws on the idea of “heterolocalism” (Zelinsky & Lee, 1998), which 
suggests that co-ethnics may be able to create and sustain the idea of an ethnic 
community in the face of spatial dispersion. Rather than held together by geographic 
concentration, these heterolocalist communities are held together by organizations and 
social events, such as churches, business associations, service clubs, and festivals. This is 
in contrast to the assertion of Zhou (2004) that an enclave “requires a physical 
concentration within an ethnically identifiable neighborhood.” 
The implications for these shifts for theories of immigrant settlement and 
entrepreneurship are far-reaching. Spatial theories of assimilation, for example, assume 
that moving to the suburbs will mean immigrants are in closer and more frequent contact 
with the white, native-born population; but with the rise of concentrated immigrant 
populations in the suburbs, that is no longer a given (Liu & Painter, 2012). Moreover, 
different ethnic groups may experience different levels of segregation or contact with 
other groups depending on whether they are at home or at work. A study of the 
residential and work locations of different ethnic groups in Los Angeles found that 
Mexican-origin workers and white workers were more likely to “work together but live 
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apart.” But other immigrant groups, particularly workers of Vietnamese and Iranian 
origin, were more likely to work alongside co-ethnics (Ellis, Wright, & Parks, 2004). 
Since suburbanization sometimes—but by no means always—implies an increased 
distance between home and work, the interplay of suburbanization, work location, 
participation in an ethnic economy, and entrepreneurship is complex and in need of 
greater attention.  
Liu (2012b) suggests four sets of contextual factors to consider when evaluating 
opportunities within a metropolitan area for native-born and foreign-born populations: the 
spatial structure, economic structure, and social environment of the metropolitan area and 
its various neighborhoods, and the amount and spatial pattern of ethnic concentration. A 
co-ethnic group of immigrants in the suburbs, for example, might have a different ability 
to share resources than one in a central city. They may also have different resources to 
begin with: “…in emerging gateways such as Atlanta,” Liu observes, “self-employment 
is not necessarily a way out of poverty among the newly arrived immigrants; rather, it is a 
ladder towards greater economic achievement among the established and advantaged 
immigrants.” 
Similarly, Qingfang Wang, in a series of papers (Q. Wang, 2012, 2013a, 2013b; 
Q. Wang & Li, 2007), has called more generally for immigrant-entrepreneurship 
researchers to incorporate geographic variables into their analyses, and specifically for 
research to take into account these more recent shifts in settlement patterns. Her overall 
critique is that studies of immigrant entrepreneurship have not taken multiple geographic 
scales into account: the immigrant entrepreneur may be studied in the context of the 
family, or the enclave, but not the enclave in relation to the local urban settlement pattern 
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and the city and the metropolitan area. This is particularly important with the rise of “new 
gateways,” since the infrastructure of traditional gateways may be more suited to 
supporting ethnic enclaves (Q. Wang, 2013b), while immigrants in newer gateways may 
lack the spatial concentration to create the business incubators of enclaves elsewhere (Q. 
Wang, 2013a).   
In a sense, the literature on immigrant and minority entrepreneurship has created 
its own biases. Take the emphasis on ethnic enclaves: researchers, assuming that minority 
entrepreneurs are largely marketing to co-ethnics, emphasize enclaves when looking at 
the location of minority-owned businesses, and so minority and immigrant businesses get 
theorized and understood in the context of the enclave (Fong et al., 2008). But this raises 
the question of what strategies immigrants without access to a spatially concentrated 
enclave use. Q. Wang (2013a), contrasting the more established ethnic economy of 
Miami with the relatively new gateway of Atlanta, found that Latino-owned businesses 
were “thriving” in the former but not the latter, and suggested that Atlanta’s Latino 
entrepreneurs were suffering from the lack of a more spatially concentrated community to 
act as a business incubator. 
Examining geographic and spatial differences has opened up a new set of research 
questions. A series of papers on the citing of minority-owned businesses in greater 
Toronto (Fong et al., 2008; Fong et al., 2007, 2012) examined the question of where such 
businesses locate within a metropolitan area. The research suggested a typology of three 
different types of minority neighborhoods: the standard enclave (which, the authors 
emphasize, features a larger proportion of recent immigrants); the “ethnic-clustered” 
neighborhood, neither as concentrated nor home to as many recent arrivals as the enclave; 
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and the “minority” neighborhood, in which most residents are not members of the 
dominant ethnicity, but no one particular minority ethnicity is the majority (Fong et al., 
2008).  
Immigrants trying to start a business in the suburbs might face a different business 
environment than they might in the city, with less foot traffic and greater auto 
dependency among customers, lower rents, and lower-density land use (Liu, 2012b). The 
rise of malls populated with co-ethnic businesses, designed to target a co-ethnic audience 
(Preston & Lo, 2000), is one example of immigrant entrepreneurship adapting itself to the 
local spatial context. Another would be the contrast of Korean banks expanding out of 
initial enclave locations in Los Angeles and New York, in contrast to Washington, D.C., 
where the lack of a previous visible concentrated enclave has made it harder for Korean 
banks to expand (Zonta, 2012). 
Oberle (2006) has called for the further exploration of the small store as not only 
an economic space, but a social one, and an economic and social space whose value 
comes in part from its role as a transnational conduit, helping participants connect with 
each other and with the home country or region. Similar points have been made about 
incorporating social and cultural variables into study of the “new retail geography” (L. 
Wang & Lo, 2007), in which the grocery store sells not only, say, Chinese food, but the 
particular known styles and experiences of Chinese grocery stores. The integration of 
profit-making, creation and support of social spaces, and co-ethnic pride blend into what 
Chacko and Price (2015) call “ethnic sociocommerscapes,” a phenomenon they identify 
as largely suburban. Ethnic sociocommerscapes have inspired such research as Preston 
and Lo’s discussion on how Asian-themed malls differ from other suburban commercial 
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landscapes (2000) or Oberle’s comparison of Latino commercial landscapes in Des 
Moines and Chicago (2015). Oberle’s work is of particular interest in terms of geographic 
and metropolitan comparisons, as he admits that the typology developed in his previous 
work in Phoenix does not graft well onto the storefronts of the Midwest neighborhoods.  
Meanwhile, one research study to look specifically at the question of Latino 
business network formation in the absence of a traditional urban ethnic enclave was that 
of Welch (2010); the setting for this research was Ottumwa, Iowa, which as of 2006 had a 
total of eighteen Latino-owned businesses. More crucially for the purposes of Welch’s 
research, the businesses owners were of varying national origins: Mexican, Salvadoran, 
Guatemalan.  
Finally, one other geographic element of immigrant entrepreneurship that has 
been under-discussed is the role the local government plays in shaping entrepreneurial 
opportunities and commercial investment patterns (Chacko & Price, 2015). Such 
involvement can be explicitly negative, such as the broader anti-immigration policies 
described in the previous chapter, or city development agencies’ bias towards developing 
more “American” firms (Tseng, 1995). Or it might be an incorporation of ethnic enclaves 
and commercial developments into broader commercial and marketing efforts, as 
evidenced in Qadeer’s wry observation about how multicultural cities like to boast about 
the different cuisines they offer (2016). Tourism studies may offer an avenue towards 
examining how immigrant entrepreneurship and ethnic enclaves are marketed by 
agencies outside the enclave itself, such as in Rath (2007). Liu, Miller, and Wang (2014) 
point out that the role of ethnic businesses in shaping, and often revitalizing, local 
86 
 
communities has largely gone unappreciated by local economic development agencies, 
even as such agencies promote small business development and local entrepreneurship. 
 
3.7 The Literature on Latino Entrepreneurs 
While the immigrant entrepreneurship literature prior to 1980s rarely mentions 
Latinos in the United States, the increase in the Latino population has prompted greater 
attention from researchers. As is true for immigrant-entrepreneurship as a whole, a large 
portion of that research has come in the form of case studies. The best-known case of 
Latino entrepreneurship in a particular metropolitan area is that of Cuban emigrants to 
Miami, first explored by K. L. Wilson and Portes (1980) and later the foundation for 
Portes and Sensenbrenner’s proposal of “bounded solidarity” arising in an ethnic enclave 
(1993). But case studies have also been published on Dominican and Puerto Rican 
entrepreneurs in Boston (Levitt, 1995), Latino business owners in Las Vegas (Shinnar & 
Young, 2008), Mexican and Mexican-American entrepreneurs in south and central Texas 
(Ballesteros, 2017; Pisani, Guzman, Richardson, Sepulveda, & Laulié, 2017) and in 
Chicago (Bond & Townsend, 1996; Raijman & Tienda, 2000b; Tienda & Raijman, 
2004), Colombian entrepreneurs in New York and New Jersey (Gaviria Duque, 2012), 
and Latino entrepreneurs in Iowa (Welch, 2010).  
This section will highlight findings from the literature to date on Latina/o 
entrepreneurs from this prior research, guided by the motifs of the general immigrant-
entrepreneurship literature previously reviewed. Thus it will look at: why Latinos become 
entrepreneurs; how Latino entrepreneurs enter ethnic enclaves; how community 
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development often occurs as a goal of Latino entrepreneurship; and the particular 
informational and financial challenges faced by Latino entrepreneurs.  
3.7.1 Latinos: Pushed or Pulled into Entrepreneurship? 
One question frequently investigated by researchers into Latino entrepreneurship 
is whether the entrepreneurs being studied were responding to opportunity or acting out 
of necessity. Gaviria Duque (2012) examined the push-pull question via a case study of 
Colombian and Colombian-American entrepreneurs in greater New York City. She 
distinguished between the decision to emigrate to the United States and the decision to 
start a business: the Colombians she interviewed frequently felt pushed to leave their 
home country, but once in the United States, were pulled to start businesses instead of 
seek wage employment. However, since Gaviria Duque was working with an 
organization set up to help Colombian entrepreneurs, there may have been some selection 
biases, in that the entrepreneurs who participated in her study may have been particularly 
motivated both to start a business and to seek help for it. Of the Latino immigrant 
entrepreneurs in greater Las Vegas interviewed by Shinnar and Young (2008), more than 
half gave “pull factor” reasons for starting a business, such as wanting to make more 
money or wanting greater flexibility; half had previously owned a business. Another poll 
found high support for pull factors among both entrepreneurs of Mexican origin and not 
of Mexican origin (Shinnar, Cardon, Eisenman, Zuiker, & Lee, 2009). Again, though, the 
risk of selection bias remains an issue: entrepreneurs answering a researcher’s questions, 
regardless of their economic or ethnic background, may find it psychologically easier to 
talk about themselves as being pulled, rather than pushed, into their current work.  
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By contrast, several of the Latinos from New York and New Jersey interviewed 
by Edgcomb and Armington (2003) engaging in informal work, frequently piecemeal, to 
supplement their regular incomes, expressed a desire for steady well-paying wage work 
instead. This series of structured interviews is one of the few documented and 
undocumented entrepreneurs, highlighting how the employment options of the latter were 
considerably more limited; that group was, not surprisingly, more likely to cite push 
factors in their decision to self-employ. 
Meanwhile, Mora and Dávila (2006) looked at the push-pull question for a 
different group of Latino immigrant entrepreneurs: Mexican immigrants in towns near 
the U.S.-Mexico border. They hypothesized that this group would be subject to both push 
factors (high local unemployment and low wages) and pull factors (lower transaction 
costs in addressing Mexican and Mexican-American demand). They found some support 
for the push explanation: self-employment levels among Mexican immigrants were 
higher in border-adjacent towns with higher unemployment rates. But, they noted, it was 
possible that Mexican immigrants were staying in border towns and self-employing 
rather than venturing further into the United States in search of work.  
Finally, Pisani et al. (2017), like Mora and Dávila, focused on entrepreneurs near 
the U.S.-Mexico border; but whereas Mora and Dávila used quantitative data, Pisani et al. 
conducted interviews with 298 business owners in four Texas counties: Cameron, 
Hidalgo, Starr, and Willacy. These four, they note, are not only majority-Latino, but one 
of the poorest areas in the continental United States; 43% of their interviewees had 
household incomes of less than $25,000. Half the respondents reported having started 
their business out of necessity. But even within this group, the opportunity-driven 
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entrepreneurs were more likely to be fully documented (12% of respondents were not), to 
use English at the business, and to have more family connections within the United 
States. “The greatest monetary rewards for Latino entrepreneurs in South Texas,” the 
authors conclude, “go to fully documented operating opportunity-driven firms.” 
Similarly, the entrepreneurs interviewed by Ballesteros (2017), also in south and central 
Texas, largely said they were pulled into entrepreneurship. But Ballesteros’s respondents 
were, as a whole, much wealthier than those interviewed by Pisani et al.; all but three ran 
employer firms, as opposed to only 48% of the border-adjacent respondents; all were 
found via Hispanic Chambers of Commerce in Austin, San Antonio, and Corpus Christi; 
and Ballesteros conducted all her interviews in English. Even within Latino 
entrepreneurs, differences in English comfort level, education, and access to financial 
capital will affect whether a given entrepreneur is pushed or pulled into starting a 
business. 
3.7.2 Latino Entrepreneurs in Ethnic Enclaves 
The literature on Latinos in ethnic enclaves is mixed. As discussed earlier, studies 
of Cubans and Cuban-American in Miami contributed significantly to the development of 
the idea of the ethnic enclave overall; and there are other examples in the literature of 
Latinos benefiting from participation in an enclave. More generally, separate from 
entrepreneurship, there is evidence that living in an enclave helped Latinos to find 
employment more quickly during the Great Recession (Zhu et al., 2013). Enclave 
participation might then help mitigate necessity entrepreneurship. Q. Wang (2013a) 
compared Latino-owned businesses in Miami to those in Atlanta and found that the 
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former were “thriving” while the latter lacked a concentrated co-ethnic community to 
serve as a business incubator. 
Raijman and Tienda (2000b) have described how Little Village’s Mexican-origin 
enclave facilitated entrepreneurship. Eighty-three percent of the businesses reported 
hiring employees from Little Village; half were described as family businesses, though 
70% employed at least one non-family member. Nearly half of the owners who had 
previously worked for a co-ethnic said that their previous firm was in Little Village, 
indicating that the enclave offered at least some opportunities for aspiring entrepreneurs 
to learn from current business owners. But Raijman and Tienda found this training base 
“relatively small,” and suggested that informal businesses were also a way for 
entrepreneurs to prepare.  
For recent immigrants with little credit history, the enclave can also offer an 
alternative, in the form of community contacts with co-ethnics willing to vouch for the 
new entrepreneur (Granier, 2006). Aaronson, Bostic, Huck, and Townsend (2004) used 
the extension of credit as a way to measure the strength of social networks between 
business owners and their suppliers. Comparing business owners in Little Village, a 
largely Latino neighborhood of Chicago, with their counterparts in Chatham, a nearby 
black neighborhood, they found that the former group were more likely to receive both 
trade credit and discounts from suppliers than the latter. Co-ethnic relationships seemed 
to facilitate the giving of credit, especially for Latino business owners less proficient in 
English, who were more likely to receive credit if working with a Latino supplier. A 
study of Mexican male immigrants to the United States, based on 2000 Census data, 
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found they were more likely to self-employ if they were in an enclave (Fairlie & 
Woodruff, 2010). 
Enclaves may also help Latino entrepreneurs start transnational businesses. 
Landolt, Autler, and Baires (1999), looking at Salvadoran immigrants to the United 
States in Los Angeles and Washington, D.C.,  identified five different types of 
transnational enterprise: the “circuit” enterprise, embodied in informal couriers who took 
money and correspondence back and forth between El Salvador and the United States; 
“cultural” enterprises selling “Salvadoran-ness” to immigrants, such as Salvadoran 
newspapers and radio stations; “ethnic” enterprises, such as restaurants, that employed 
Salvadorans exclusively but sold to a larger audience; enterprises founded by return 
migrants in El Salvador; and “transnational expansion,” in which existing Salvadoran 
businesses open franchises in the United States. A second survey in New York, 
Washington, Los Angeles, and Providence found that transnationalism was most 
prevalent in retail and business services, and that establishing and sustaining a 
transnationalist business required a certain minimum of resources and stability in the host 
country (Portes, Guarnizo, & Haller, 2002). Transnational businesses also appeared 
among Nicaraguans in southern Florida in the 1990s, although Cervantes-Rodriguez 
(2006) paints this less as an example of opportunity entrepreneurship and more a 
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combination of the migrants’ limited wage-economy opportunities and their desire to 
maintain connections in Nicaragua. 
But the literature is not unanimous that being in an enclave helps Latino 
entrepreneurs. Aguilera (2009) posits a counterargument: what if being in an ethnic 
enclave limits the entrepreneur’s choices? An individual business owner might be 
socially pressured into acting counterproductively, for example, or the number of 
business owners might be greater than the enclave itself can support. Comparing different 
Latino-immigrant enclaves (Cubans in Florida, Mexicans in California and Texas) with 
data from the 2000 Census, he found that self-employed Latinos within the enclave 
actually suffered an income penalty. 
There are scattered hints throughout different studies that Latino entrepreneurs 
have a harder time accessing the support an enclave provides than have Asian-American 
enclave entrepreneurs. For example, Latino entrepreneurs studied by Chang et al. (2009) 
were not influenced by external support systems, such as potential government programs, 
outside their immediate family; such external support was simply not available enough to 
be a contributing factor in their decision-making. A follow-up study (Muñoz et al., 2011) 
recommended providing “out-of-the-box” programs to Latino entrepreneurs growing 
micro-businesses: taking advantage of business owners’ own knowledge by setting up 
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collaboration, or offering personalized aid and building trust by coming to the owners’ 
own place of work. This is the kind of help that would, in an enclave, be provided by 
other business owners, or perhaps institutions created to serve the growing enclave, such 
as ethnic banks. Liu’s study of the PSED (2012a) found that Latino respondents were less 
likely to agree to statements that their community encouraged entrepreneurial risk-taking, 
that community groups provided support for starting a new business, and that community 
leaders often owned their own business. 
Allen and Busse (2016) added some nuance to the question of Latino 
entrepreneurs in enclaves by looking at three different shopping malls in the Minneapolis 
metropolitan area that catered primarily to Latinos. The three varied in the formality and 
language use of their signage; in their layout; in their ownership (one was a cooperative 
organized by the city of Minneapolis and several local non-profit organizations); and in 
their customer base. The authors suggest that the three different shopping centers fulfill 
three different roles within the larger Latino commercial community: one has the 
additional function as a communal, Spanish-speaking social space (including informal 
child care for the store owners); another, where business primarily in English, appeals 
more to native consumers who might be looking for a more distinctly “exotic” or 
“Latino” experience; and the third, with a mix of Spanish and English use, functions 
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more as a transitional space with a greater mix of foreign-born and native-born 
customers.  
Taken together, this literature suggests that Latinos’ ability to benefit from an 
ethnic enclave will be mediated by the local environment, including the composition of 
the enclave and participants’ access to capital. County of origin may also play a factor: 
unlike a predominantly Korean (or Cuban, for that matter) enclave, a “Latino” enclave 
may host entrepreneurs from a dozen different countries, not all of whom necessarily 
speak Spanish as a first language. Differences in country of origin may lead to a lack of 
trust between participants that might otherwise be assumed within the same community 
(Welch, 2010). In Welch’s case study of eighteen Latino entrepreneurs of different 
countries of origin in Ottumwa, Iowa, the business owners were able to develop a 
network over time, but the catalysts for bounded solidarity provided by an enclave—
promotion of existing cultural ties, the possible providing of shared spaces to meet, the 
presence of community-based organizations—were not present; rather, the network had 
to be started by one member facilitating the network based on personal trust and 
facilitating meetings.19 
                                                 
19 Apparently the development of a Latino community in Ottumwa has continued: in 2015 the city hosted 
its first Latino Festival. Explaining the festival to the Ottumwa Courier a year later, David Suarez, 
identified as “Community 1st Credit Union’s bilingual community development manager,” said: “During 
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What is less ambiguous in the literature, though, is the idea of Latino 
entrepreneurs aiming to contribute to the larger community through their business 
ventures. Writers such as Portes and Zhou (Portes & Zhou, 1996; Zhou, 2004, 2014), in 
making the case for ethnic entrepreneurship, have often emphasized the social and 
community-building aspects of entrepreneurial success, including arguing that it should 
be factored into scholarly discussions of financial returns to entrepreneurial activity. 
Latino business owners may go on to become community leaders and elected officials 
(Delgado, 2013). Along similar lines, case studies of three majority-minority 
neighborhoods in Atlanta, Los Angeles, and New York City, detailed how ethnic 
businesses influenced not just the economic and physical but also the social and political 
development of the surrounding communities (Liu, Miller, et al., 2014).  
Latino co-ethnic solidarity as expressed by philanthropy is discussed in more 
detail in a case study by Agius Vallejo (2015) consisting of interviews with 45 middle- 
and upper-class Latino professionals in Los Angeles. Examples of philanthropic, 
community-focused activity given by her interviewees included endowing scholarships 
for low-income Latino students; promoting charter schools in lower-income Latino 
communities; and founding a Latino-owned bank which explicitly seeks long-term 
                                                 
the festival you can see performances from different countries not only from Mexico. It's good to try to 
understand the diversity inside the diversity.” ("Celebration this Saturday: Latino Festival," 2016) 
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relationships with Latino business owners. Even if they themselves were reluctant to 
discuss discrimination in their own histories of upward mobility, they cited observation 
of discrimination and structural barriers faced by co-ethnics as motivating their 
philanthropic efforts. 
Latino-owned businesses also play a role in social network and community 
reinforcement within the business, regardless of what the owner does when not working. 
The tienda is often described as more socially oriented than its non-Latino-owned 
equivalent, the grocery store, with more personal treatment of the customer (Delgado, 
2013; Levitt, 1995). Latino-owned stores may also reinforce communities of sub-groups 
within the larger Latino community, such as advertising a particular hometown, region, 
or cuisine—thus restaurants and carnicerías might not advertise themselves as 
“Mexican” but Sinaloense (Oberle, 2006; Oberle & Arreola, 2008). The idea of the 
community even shows in nascent entrepreneurship surveys, where Latinos—and low-
income aspiring entrepreneurs in general, for that matter—are more likely to cite 
motivations related to “respect” (such as building a business children can inherit, or 
following in the footsteps of someone they admire) than purely financial motivations 
(Liu, 2012a). 
Ethnic enclaves are usually defined by the business activities controlled by co-
ethnics, such as employment, vertical integration (co-ethnic-owned firms operating at 
various points on the supply chain), and concentration in a particular industry. Therefore 
contributing to community development is not the same as forming an ethnic enclave. 
However, this literature shows that the ideas that power the ethnic enclave—co-ethnic 
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solidarity, entrepreneurs’ sense of responsibility, the emphasis on social and non-
monetary rewards of operating a business—also power the environments that lead to 
entrepreneurs making community development a priority.  
3.7.3 Latino Entrepreneurs Facing an Informational Gap 
A recurring theme of the literature on Latino entrepreneurs is their lack of access 
not only to financing but to information that would be helpful for starting and 
maintaining a business. Such information can be broken down into two categories: more 
general business knowledge—such as about attracting customers, keeping track of 
inventory and cash flow, and marketing—that would apply regardless of where the 
business was located, and information about licensing, taxes, and other legal regulations 
that is location-specific. For new migrants, experience of starting a business in the home 
country can provide the first category of business knowledge, even if they are at an 
immediate disadvantage with the second category in the host country. Of the Latino, 
largely Mexican-American, entrepreneurs in Chicago’s Little Village neighborhood 
surveyed by Raijman and Tienda (2000a), 23.7% of the native-born and 33.3% of the 
foreign-born had previously owned a business. The Latino entrepreneurial population, 
like the Latino population as a whole, tends to be younger than the white non-Latino 
population, and correspondingly have less working or managerial experience. The Latino 
nascent entrepreneurs in the PSED survey had an average of 16.71 years of working 
experience and 7.08 years of managerial experience, as opposed to 22.23 years and 12.10 
years, respectively, for the white non-Latino participants (Liu, 2012a).   
The Colombian entrepreneurs interviewed by Gaviria Duque (2012) suffered not 
only from a lack of information about the host country but a lack of social ties that would 
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allow them to pass information among each other. Gaviria was working at the time with a 
group called ProMicro, created as a link between the Colombian consulate general in 
New York and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) helping micro-
entrepreneurs. The ProMicro program explicitly focused on providing its clients with 
information about how to start and maintain a business in the United States, as well as 
with links that would help them obtain capital. Similarly, a survey of entrepreneurs in 
Little Village, a mostly Mexican and Mexican-American neighborhood of Chicago, 
highlighted a lack of both financial capital and information handicapping local aspiring 
entrepreneurs (Tienda & Raijman, 2004).  
Likely suffering from even greater isolation were the Latino entrepreneurs in 
western Arkansas interviewed by Moon, Farmer, Miller, and Abreo (2014), two-thirds of 
whom reported using only Spanish at their business. The respondents named lack of start-
up capital as one of their biggest barriers, but also a lack of understanding of the 
generally accepted process of starting a business (such as banks’ expectation that 
entrepreneurs would include a business plan with their loan application) and a lack of 
knowledge of the regulatory systems and licensing process that applied to their business. 
The study eventually led to a series of informational materials distributed by the 
University of Arkansas in both English and Spanish (Abreo, Miller, Farmer, Moon, & 
McCullough, 2014; Farmer, Moon, Abreo, Miller, & McCullough, 2010).  
The case study conducted by Shinnar and Young (2008) of Latino business 
owners in greater Las Vegas shows how this lack of formal informational understanding 
may play out in action. Only a quarter of those interviewed reported having prepared a 
business plan; half selected the legal definition of their business on their own, without 
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counsel; a fifth had no accountant; only a quarter had a lawyer. Asked for what advice 
they would give aspiring entrepreneurs, a third of respondents recommended getting a 
business plan and 19% recommended getting a lawyer. Following up a year later, the 
research team learned that 11 of the 80 business surveyed had already closed; ten of those 
11 had not had a business plan.  
A second example of Latino entrepreneurs in need of business information comes 
from García-Pabón and Klima (2017), who interviewed Latino entrepreneurs in four 
counties in and near the Seattle metropolitan area. The group of respondents had business 
experience: half of the businesses had been operating for ten years or more. Moreover, 
more than half had a written business plan. But although four-fifths of the respondents 
said they were in need of new customers, almost none were pursuing marketing strategies 
beyond word-of-mouth. Of the third of respondents who said they needed a business 
loan, 64% predicted that they would need help with the paperwork for the loan. “In many 
ways,” the authors conclude, “the problems faced by Latino business owners are no 
different from other small business owners,” but their interviewees “have little or no 
access to capacity building, social capital, and financial resources needed to be 
successful.”  
That is not to imply that Latino-owned businesses are doomed without formal 
business education. Several of the Latino entrepreneurs interviewed by Ballesteros 
(2017), a relatively successful group whose firms were mostly in professional services, 
said they wished they’d had more business training. A 1996 study found that Mexican-
American and “Anglo-American” entrepreneurs used similar decision-making policies 
and considered similar variables (Vincent, 1996). But an unfamiliarity with the customs 
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of small business creation and financing could well work to the disadvantage of the 
aspiring immigrant entrepreneur—who is often already at a disadvantage, as far as 
securing startup capital is concerned. 
3.7.4 Latino Entrepreneurs’ Access to Financing Sources 
Latinos, being generally underbanked and underserved by banks (Delgado, 2013), 
may be especially vulnerable to being shut out of the virtuous credit circle. Perry (2008), 
in a survey of Latinos of varying legal status, country of origin, and time spent in the 
United States, found a significant and negative relationship between daily use of Spanish 
and likelihood of using a formal bank. This would suggest that the Latinos participating 
in her survey had less access to banks with Spanish-fluent staff, familiar with customs of 
banking in Latin American countries.  
Even the Puerto Rican and Dominican business owners, already successful at 
opening and maintaining stores, interviewed by Levitt (1995), reported little contact with 
the formal banking system—and, relatedly, a dearth of options for growing their 
businesses past the small co-ethnic markets. But Latino and black business owners tend 
to start their businesses with less capital in general, and with less personal savings, than 
do their Asian and white counterparts (Carpenter, 2016). 
The work of Bond and Townsend (1996) suggests that informal financing may 
help to fill some of the void left by formal lending discrimination. Their study of the 
Little Village survey found that respondents were more likely to borrow from friends and 
family than from banks, and that such informal loans were not only smaller than bank 
loans but offered lower interest rates. However, Casey (2012), drawing from the Panel 
Survey of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED), found that low-wealth black and Latino 
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entrepreneurs were also at a disadvantage in terms of their social connections: as in, they 
were less likely to be connected to the kinds of people who could offer them informal 
loans.  
The Little Village case is also one of a concentrated neighborhood in a 
historically urban development. In other areas of the country—especially in new 
gateways, which usually feature more suburban and less dense development—geographic 
dispersion may also play a role in hindering Latino entrepreneurs from gaining access to 
information and financial resources. In Harrisonburg, Virginia, Zarrugh (2007) found a 
similarly scattered population of Latino entrepreneurs, whose firms were concentrated 
mainly in restaurants, retail aimed at a co-ethnic audience, and personal services. 
Interviewees reported a lack of capital and repeated rejection by local banks. In the 
absence of the direct network-building witnessed by Welch (and facilitated by an Iowa 
State-based team, including Welch) (2010), assistance tended to come from within 
entrepreneurs’ families rather than from unrelated co-ethnics. 
In contrast to the Chinese-American and Korean-American markets, there has not 
yet been a widespread push from banks originating in Latin American countries to serve 
Latinos in the United States market. Even within Central and South America, banks can 
be reluctant to take on the financing of small and medium enterprises, which are 
frequently informal and may not be able to provide the information necessary to meet 
regulatory standards for loans (Fittipaldi, 2017). Therefore the Latino-entrepreneurship 
market in the United States may not be enough of an incentive for Latin American banks 
to expand northward. A possible exception is Santander, the Spanish bank with one of the 
largest presences in Latin America. It has branches in the northeast United States, 
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particularly New York City, and in October 2017 it announced a five-year “Inclusive 
Communities” plan, which included an expected additional $1.9 billion in small-business 
lending and ten new branches in “low- to moderate income and communities of color” 
(Davis & Orlando, 2017). But this initiative seems to be couched in the language of 
community development and minority entrepreneurship more generally, rather than 
pursuing a specific Latino market. 
Meanwhile, Latino-owned American banks are also not widespread. Table 3.1, 
below, shows the number of Latino-owned banks reported by the Federal Reserve in its 
record of minority-owned depository institutions as of June 30, 2018. Most of the banks 
are small—only nine have more than $1 million in assets—and they are only located in 
five different states. 




Total Assets (in 
thousands) 
Total Deposits (in 
thousands) 
California 3 $3,475,230 $1,135,059 
Florida 10 $10,114,023 $8,579,659 
New 
Mexico 2 $401,299 $359,641 
Oklahoma 1 $165,423 $141,069 
Texas 13 $14,879,260 $11,404,205 
 
There have been calls in the literature for policies “that include a pipeline 
component that creates linkages to community-based, Latino-serving organizations 
engaged in micro-enterprise lending and financial education outreach services” (Robles 
& Cordero-Guzmán, 2007). Although ethnic banks have been, and remain, an important 
part of the history of immigrant-entrepreneurship financing, the literature suggests that 
this option is less available to Latinos than it is to other immigrant entrepreneurial 
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groups. As a result, Latino immigrant entrepreneurs, on average, start their business with 
less startup capital than do non-Latino immigrant entrepreneurs (Fairlie, 2012). A study 
of Mexican entrepreneurs based on 1996 data found their businesses were concentrated in 
industries that didn’t require higher levels of educational attainment or startup capital, 
including retail trade, construction, and repair services (Lofstrom & Wang, 2007). 
Carpenter (2016) failed to find evidence of a negative correlation between smaller 
amounts of startup capital and Latino-owned businesses’ chances of survival. It should be 
noted, however, that his study looked only at Latino-owned businesses with $5,000 or 
more in startup capital, so he was pre-selecting a small percentage of Latino-owned 
businesses. 
3.8 Conclusion: Latino Entrepreneurs and Changing Geographies 
 
A great deal of literature to date has been written on the tendency of immigrants 
to self-employ: what industries they go in to; how they acquire information and capital 
when unable to acquire either through formal channels; the strategies they use to 
overcome obstacles; and how they support each other, through business networks, 
contributions to the greater community, or both. There has also been research done on the 
rise of ethnic banks, community-based organizations, and federally funded programs and 
their role in supporting immigrant entrepreneurs, and, more recently, studies investigating 
the possible effects of different settlement patterns on immigrant-owned firm industry 
choice and business network formation. But as this literature review has shown, Latino 
entrepreneurs as a whole do not necessarily conform to the patterns of prior immigrant 
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entrepreneurs, and therefore their strategies and needs will differ. Some of the most 
striking differences are: 
• The adjective “Latino” covers a number of different groups, varying by 
country of origin, legal status in the United States, birth connections to the 
United States, and comfort level with doing business in English. These 
differences between Latino entrepreneurs can make the formation of a 
traditional ethnic enclave difficult. There are examples of Latino ethnic-
enclave formation in the literature, in cases where the Latino population 
was based in a traditional urban area and dominated by a particular 
country of origin—Cuba, in Miami, and Mexico, in Chicago’s Little 
Village. But such a description fails to cover many Latino settlements in 
the United States. 
• As a group, Latinos consistently report a lack of access to the information 
necessary to start, operate, and maintain a successful business in the 
United States. Differences in language may contribute to this lack, as well 
as lower levels of work experience and formal management experience 
prior to arrival in the United States. 
• Latinos are also more disadvantaged with regards to access to financing 
than have been previous groups of immigrant entrepreneurs, such as 
Korean-Americans. There are fewer ethnic banks available for Latinos to 
draw from, and fewer banking resources from host countries available in 
the United States. Informal financing is largely ad-hoc and family-based. 
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The growth of the expatriate Cuban community in Miami in the 1960s is a 
prominent exception. 
• Latinos place a high value on using their businesses to contribute to their 
local community, although not necessarily in ways that would directly 
form an ethnic enclave. 
There are still a number of questions that remain about how Latino entrepreneurs 
in particular start and build their businesses. First, relatively few researchers have studied 
Latino entrepreneurship in the context of entrepreneurship in the sending country or 
region. An exception is Fairlie and Woodruff (2010), who observe that close to a quarter 
of the workforce in Mexico is self-employed—which would imply that the self-
employment of Mexican immigrants to the United States should be higher than it actually 
is. In general, say Fairlie and Lofstrom (2015), “[t]he relationship between home country 
self-employment experiences and host country self-employment is not well understood.” 
This is especially important for the study of Latino entrepreneurs, given the potential 
variety of differences in entrepreneurial experience between different Latin American 
countries.Moreover, unlike most immigrating groups, Mexicans arriving in the United 
States are coming from a neighboring country; it is thus worth considering whether, and 
how, cross-border trade makes Mexican and Mexican-American transnationalist 
entrepreneurial activity different from those groups whose transnational enterprises 
require air or sea shipments.  
Second, with the exception of Cuban Miami and occasional case studies, such as 
the Little Village surveys (Aaronson et al., 2004; Bond & Townsend, 1996; Raijman & 
Tienda, 2000a, 2000b; Tienda & Raijman, 2004), the role of ethnic enclaves in Latino 
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entrepreneurship and business formation has not been as thoroughly studied as has the 
role enclaves have played in Korean-American entrepreneurship. The literature on Latino 
entrepreneurship offers an opportunity to examine the relationship between the ethnic 
enclave and the larger community: where goals of business development and community 
development might be in harmony, and where they might conflict.   
A third, related set of questions concerns the trajectory of Latino-owned 
businesses. The Latino respondents to the PSED were more likely to cite “build a 
business my children can inherit” as a motivation for entrepreneurship than were white 
non-Latino respondents, but less likely than black non-Latino respondents (Liu, 2012a). 
Another study found that Latino workers were more likely to exit a business ownership 
into wage employment than were non-Latinos; the authors suggest that for Latinos, self-
employment might be an intermediate step between non-employment and paid work 
(Georgarakos & Tatsiramos, 2007). What the idea of an “intermediate step” would look 
like in practice, and what its implications would be for financing businesses, has not been 
explored further in the literature to date. It is worth asking when Latino entrepreneurs 
might think of business formation as a temporary or permanent activity, and how access 
to startup capital shapes their thinking about business formation and exit strategies. 
Increasing individual personal capital, both financial and human, will also change how 
Latinos approach entrepreneurship as a whole, and will also require researchers and 
policy-makers to rethink their assumptions (Robles & Cordero-Guzmán, 2007). 
Finally, one area of Latino entrepreneurship that remains relatively underexplored 
is the effect of gender on entrepreneurial decisions, such as industry choice and family 
employment. A series of life-history interviews with Mexican-origin entrepreneurs in El 
107 
 
Paso found that the male entrepreneurs were able to solicit help from their family, but 
female entrepreneurs often encountered resistance from male family members (Valdez, 
2016). On the national level, among Latino entrepreneurs, industry distribution varies 
significantly by gender (Q. Wang, 2015). Latina entrepreneurs counted in the 1996 and 
2001 national Survey of Income and Program Participation were six times more likely to 
lack a high-school degree than were their white female counterparts; they also earned less 
from their businesses, although the difference disappeared after controlling for difference 
in education levels (Lofstrom & Bates, 2009). A study of 176 Latino business owners 
undergoing in training, half of which were female, found that Latina entrepreneurs had 
smaller social networks and were less likely to seek help from “weak ties” than were their 




Chapter 4 : Comparing Latino-Owned Business Performance 




The previous two chapters established the background for talking about present-
day Latino entrepreneurship in the United States. Increased in-migration since 1980 has 
meant substantial growth for Latino populations throughout the United States, both in 
established “gateways” and in metropolitan areas with little prior history of significant 
immigration populations. This growth in population has led to growth of Latino-owned 
businesses. A significant body of literature exists on the establishment and growth of, and 
obstacles faced by, immigrant entrepreneurs, and this literature can be useful in 
understanding the larger trends among Latino-owned businesses. The literature to date, 
described in its broadest terms, suggests a mutual feedback mechanism between 
immigrant entrepreneurial communities and the metropolitan areas that surround them. 
Factors such as the size and strength of the co-ethnic network, the availability of capital, 
the ability to establish transnational commercial flows, and the opportunities for 
establishment of social and cultural spaces and events will vary from metropolitan area to 
metropolitan area, and from group to group. 
While we have established that there are differences in patterns of Latino 
settlement and entrepreneurial activity between metropolitan areas, and that these 
differences might in turn influence how the resulting businesses perform, we cannot say 
exactly which differences matter for Latino entrepreneurs. One of the purposes of this 
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research is to offer policy suggestions to policy-makers interested in economic and/or 
community development, who have a vested interest in seeing a local Latino community 
strengthen and prosper. But what specific measures should the policy-makers focus on? 
Is it a matter of supporting those industries that tend to attract Latino entrepreneurial 
investment? Should policy-makers offer new sources of information, such as small-
business teaching seminars and networking groups, or concentrate on expanding 
available sources of capital? Or are the factors that most affect Latino-owned business 
performance more a function of the Latino community itself than of the metropolitan area 
in which it happens to be located? 
This chapter explores those questions through a multi-part analysis with both 
quantitative and qualitative elements. It will illustrate the complexity of the question of 
how Latino-owned businesses function within, and interact with, their surrounding 
metropolitan areas. There are limitations to the strength of the conclusions, largely 
imposed by the organization of the relevant data.  
The analysis will occur in three parts, with each part taking place on a slightly 
different scale than the previous. The first part will take data from the 2014 Annual 
Survey of Entrepreneurs (hereafter ASE), presented on a national level, and use it to 
discuss how Latino entrepreneurs differ from their non-Latino counterparts. The second 
part will use data at the MSA level from the 2002, 2007, and 2012 Survey of Business 
Owners (SBO) and the 2007 and 2012 American Community Survey (ACS) to examine 
differences both within and between groups of MSAs—specifically, between the 
“gateways” as previously identified by Singer (Singer, 2004, 2015; Singer et al., 2009). 
The third part, inspired by the second, will zoom all the way down to the street level for a 
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qualitative analysis of two case studies: where are the Latino businesses? Are they 
clustered close together or scattered? Are they near identifiable sources of capital? Are 
there patterns of real-estate development or community organization that can be seen in 
their location choices? This analysis will be drawn primarily from publicly available GIS 
data and from firm-level data available via the Reference USA database. Some 
commentary will be made on all three analyses as they proceed, but most of the 




4.2.1 Determining Dependent and Independent Variables 
The previous research gives us some idea of what to expect when looking at 
metropolitan-area differences. For example, the research of Bates (1990, 2005) suggests 
that acquired human capital, usually measured with the proxy variable of formal 
education, is correlated with business performance. Bates has also contributed to a long 
line of research (Bates, 1997; Bates et al., 2011; Bates & Robb, 2013, 2015; Servon et al., 
2010; Visan, 2012) highlighting the way access to capital, or the lack of such, can help or 
hinder business creation and firm longevity, and how minority entrepreneurs are 
particularly likely to suffer from a lack of capital options (Blanchard et al., 2008; Fairlie, 
2012; Fairlie & Robb, 2008). Another line of research has concentrated on social capital 
generated within ethnic enclaves and shared resources among co-ethnics (Li et al., 2006; 
Li & Skop, 2007; Light, 2002; Zhou, 2004, 2014; Zhou & Logan, 1989), including the 
role ethnic banks and community-focused non-profits play in increasing co-ethnics’ 
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access to capital (Dymski, Li, Aldana, & Ahn, 2010; Li et al., 2006; Li et al., 2002; Li et 
al., 2014; Patraporn, 2015; Patraporn et al., 2010). And more recently a line of research 
has investigated how ethnic entrepreneurs make choices about, and are influenced by, 
local spatial and development patterns (Fong et al., 2008; Fong et al., 2007, 2012; Liu, 
Painter, & Wang, 2014; Painter, Liu, & Wang, 2014; Q. Wang, 2015; Q. Wang & Li, 
2007).  
Not all of these factors translate into independent variables most useful for 
comparing metropolitan areas. Take, for example, the human-capital variable. On the one 
hand, the case studies most prominent in the literature—Korean immigrants in Los 
Angeles, Cuban immigrants in Miami—suggest that immigrants who bring higher levels 
of human (not to mention financial) capital with them when they enter the United States 
will be in a better position to create an economically successful ethnic enclave than will a 
group of immigrants with lower amounts of human capital. Moreover, if we assume that 
higher levels of instruction in, and therefore familiarity with, English is part of formal 
education (acquired either abroad or in the United States), it becomes even easier to see 
how the formal-education proxy variable would be positively correlated with business 
performance.20  
                                                 
20 McManus, Gould, and Welch (1983), studying male Latino workers with data from the 1976 Survey of 
Income and Education, reported on the negative effects of what they called “English-language deficiency”: 
income advantages that would usually come from greater levels of schooling and work experience were 
reduced if the worker was not comfortable speaking in English. More recently, Dávila, Mora, and González 
(2011) noted that foreign-born male Latino workers, particularly those with limited English proficiency 
(LEP), were more likely to work jobs with high fatal and non-fatal injury rates than native-born male 
Latino workers. They were also more likely to receive a wage premium for these higher-risk jobs, although 
the authors lacked evidence to conclude whether or not the premium adequately compensated for the risk. 
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However, human capital may not be a useful variable to examine when looking 
specifically at differences between Latino communities in metropolitan areas within the 
United States. Older entrepreneurs are less likely to have received the majority of their 
formal education within the United States; access to formal education in the sending 
country is more likely to make a difference to human capital among these entrepreneurs 
than would be differences in formal education among MSAs within the United States. 
Looking for differences between MSAs, therefore, may be putting the emphasis in the 
wrong place. To put it another way, Mexicans working in El Paso or San Diego may be 
better educated than their Salvadoran counterparts in Atlanta or their Dominican 
counterparts in Boston, but such a statement would say little about education offerings in 
any of the three MSAs. While it may still be valuable to look at whether differences in 
formal education levels (and, relatedly, levels of professed comfort with English) exist 
between MSAs, it would be less useful to draw conclusions from the human-capital 
variable alone about the MSAs themselves. On the other hand, understanding the 
potential importance of the formal-education proxy variable could help policy-makers 
assess their local Latino entrepreneurial communities and address the needs of those 
specific communities. 
This discussion suggests that the potential independent variables can be classified 
roughly into two categories: entrepreneur-driven variables and MSA-driven variables. To 
distinguish the two, imagine a newly arrived immigrant deciding to start a business: 
which variables would they already know about themselves, and which would they have 
to gather information from their new surroundings? Table 4.1, below, divides some of the 




Table 4.1: Selected entrepreneur-driven verses MSA-driven independent variables 
Entrepreneur-driven MSA-driven 
Gender 
Comfort level with English 
Amount of formal education 
Age 
Prior entrepreneurship experience 
Country of origin 
Amount of personal financial capital 
available 
Social connections / personal social capital 
Industry mix 
Distance to US-Mexico border 
Population 
Percentage of population identifying as Latino 
Latino presence in business-services industries 
Sources of startup capital available to minority 
and/or Latino entrepreneurs 
Poverty level of Latino population 
Homeownership rates of Latino population 
Anti-immigrant laws passed in MSA or state 
 
The dependent variables also need to be determined. How will business 
“performance” be measured? This is not as straightforward a decision as it would first 
seem. The SBO and the ASE, the two Census Bureau surveys on which this analysis will 
rely heavily, both report five separate aggregate business measurements: 
• number of firms;  
• number of employees;  
• number of firms with at least one employee (employer firms); 
•  annual payroll; and  
• total revenue or sales receipts.  
Given that businesses will open and close even in a healthy economy—and given, too, 
Bates’s reminder that not all closed firms are seen as failures by their owners (2005)—the 
sheer number of firms is a poor measure of business performance. Revenue is a similarly 
tricky metric, since the SBO and ASE do not measure costs or net profits. An alternate 
option is to measure the percentage of all firms that have at least one employee, on the 
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grounds that greater numbers of employer firms mean greater business activity. The 
disadvantage of this measure is that it has a built-in bias toward growth: an entrepreneur 
working for herself, satisfied with covering expenses and not inclined to expand, would 
not be counted as evidence of a thriving local economy, however difficult it would be for 
her to achieve that same level of success in an economy not thriving. Using changes in 
annual payroll as the dependent variable is subject to the same criticism: the firm that 
grows slowly contributes less towards overall business performance than does the firm 
that grows quickly, regardless of the owner’s intention or the firm’s other contributions to 
the local economy or the local society—an important caveat to keep in mind, given what 
multiple researchers (Levitt, 1995; Liu, Miller, et al., 2014; Oberle, 2006; Oberle & 
Arreola, 2008) have observed about Latino businesses’ less easily quantifiable 
contributions to their communities as social spaces and cultural transmitters. Finally, 
looking at employer firms as a percentage of all firms in an MSA where lots of new 
businesses are opening can give the impression that Latino-owned businesses are 
performing poorly, when in fact the new business activity may be a sign of a very young 
but promising business community. Given all that, the analysis will discuss multiple 
measures of business performance, and emphasize changes in business performance over 
time, particularly the 2007–2012 time period. 
4.2.2 Methods of Analysis 
For the first analysis, that of the Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs (ASE) data, a 
chi-square analysis will be used. The chi-square test is suitable for a test of statistically 
significant differences between two groups (in this case, Latino and non-Latino 
entrepreneurs) while being nonparametric; thus, no assumptions are necessary about the 
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sampling distribution (Healey, 2004). In some cases the data was presented in a sufficient 
number of categories as to make a chi-square test inapplicable, in which case a one-way 
ANOVA test was used. 
The analysis of the relationship between Latino presence in the construction 
industry in 2007 and subsequent Latino-owned business performance for 2007–12 was a 
linear regression. For the comparison of groups of MSAs by gateway status, a regression 
was also used, but because the comparison is made as to the change in Latino business 
performance along the independent variables over time, the regression is logistic instead 
of linear (Rodríguez, 2007). The case-study analysis, the final part of this chapter, is more 
narrative and less quantitative than its predecessors. However, it is preceded by some 
additional exploratory analysis of the MSAs being studied. 
All statistical analysis was performed using the R programming language (Pathak, 
2014; Peng, 2016; R Core Team, 2018), in the RStudio environment (RStudio Team, 
2015). Primary packages used for data analysis and presentation are listed in Table 4.2, 
below. Some maps were also created in R, while GIS analysis was done in QGIS (QGIS 
Development Team, 2018).  
Table 4.2: R Packages Most Frequently Used in Analysis 
Name of Package Function 
acs (Glenn, 2018) Acquire ACS data from the U.S. Census Bureau 
Application Programming Interface (API) 
censusapi (Recht, 2018) Retrieve ACS and SBO data 
choroplethr (Lamstein, 2018) Create choropleth maps of the United States 
dplyr (Wickham, François, 
Henry, & Müller, 2018) 
More easily and cleanly manipulate data 
MASS (Venables & Ripley, 
2002) 
Conduct stepwise regression 
rmarkdown (Allaire et al., 
2018) 
Record notes and data processes 
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Name of Package Function 
stringr (Wickham, 2018) Manipulate string data, such as names of MSAs 
tidycensus (Walker, 2018) Load attribute data of borders recorded by the U.S. 
Census Bureau 
viridis (Garnier, 2018) Added colors to use in choropleth maps 
 
4.3 How Are Latino Entrepreneurs Different from Non-Latinos? 
Evidence from the Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs 
 
The Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs (hereafter ASE) is a collaboration between 
the Census Bureau and the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, administered for the 
first time in 2014. Unlike the SBO, the ASE sampled only from firms with paid 
employees in 2014, and only with the 50 most populous MSAs, with population numbers 
taken from the 2014 ACS. Tables 4.3, below, and 4.4, following, show the makeup of the 
respondents to the ASE. A slightly higher percentage of Latino respondents were female 
than were non-Latino respondents. 
 
Table 4.3: Firms with Employees Owned by Latino and Non-Latino Respondents to the 2014 ASE (author's 



















male 34,394 11.5% 315,912 12.9% 
Female 72,542 24.3% 499,751 20.4% 




male 706,584 14.6% 6,126,091 11.7% 
Female 983,325 20.4% 8,018,402 15.3% 




Table 4.2 continued 
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male $34,292 10.2% $7,429 9.6% 
Female $53,737 16.0% $13,002 16.8% 




male $926,557 8.6% $190,629 9.1% 
Female $1,266,235 11.8% $264,353 12.6% 
Male $8,531,875 79.6% $1,639,526 78.3% 
 
This difference is actually reflected in Latino versus non-Latino ownership nationwide, 
outside the ASE sample. Table 4.5, below, taken from the 2012 SBO, shows ownership 
categorized by gender between Latino and non-Latino business owners. Setting aside 
those businesses that are equally male- and female-owned, female owners are more 
prevalent among Latinos than among non-Latinos. A chi-square test shows that the 
difference between the two groups is significant (χ2 = 61,317 with one degree of 
freedom). 
 
Table 4.5: Gender of Business Owners, Latino and Non-Latino (author's calculations from 2012 SBO data) 
Gender of owner  Latino Non-Latino 
Female Number 1,469,991 8,402,865 
Percent of total 44.5% 35.4% 
Male Number 1,702,559 13,120,871 
Percent of total 51.5% 55.3% 
Equally male- and 
female-owned 
Number 133,322 704,379 
Percent of total 4.0% 9.3% 
Total Number 3,305,873 23,743,181 
Percent of total 100% 100% 




The value of the 2014 ASE lies in its questions about business ownership similar 
to those asked in the long-form SBO, previously published as a Public User Microdata 
Sample (PUMS) in 2007, such as source and amount of startup capital; reason for owning 
a business; number of hours worked; and reason the business ceased operations. Because 
they were taken from two different sample sets, neither the 2007 SBO PUMS nor the 
2012 SBO PUMS (which was not released) is comparable to the 2014 ASE21; but the 
2014 ASE, looked at in isolation, is still potentially valuable. Unlike the SBO PUMS, 
which presents one response per industry per state, the ASE has a larger aggregate set of 
responses. Some ASE data is also available at the MSA level, albeit only for the 50 most 
populous MSAs as of the 2014 ACS; unfortunately, a lot of the detailed data presented 
here is publicly available at the national level only. 
The following section will present information from the 2014 ASE, broken out 
into Latino and non-Latino categories, with an eye towards seeing where the ASE survey 
responses accord with the conclusions reached by previous literature, and where it 
suggests potential differences. The purpose of this overview is to see where the ASE’s 
sample of Latino entrepreneurs reports statistically significant differences with non-
Latino entrepreneurs over the entire national sample. If the experience of Latinos and 
non-Latinos as to a particular point is statistically similar, that particular independent 
variable looks less promising as a place of investigation at the MSA level. On the other 
hand, if Latinos and non-Latinos differ significantly overall on a particular variable, then 
it might be more useful to look at how differences in that particular variable play out at 
                                                 
21 Some 8.2% of ASE non-respondents had responded to SBO data, so their SBO responses were used to 
impute ASE data. In total roughly a quarter of the ASE’s firm count estimates come from imputed data 
(United States Bureau of the Census, 2017). 
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the metropolitan level. The analysis that follows shows that the population of Latino 
entrepreneurs differs from the non-Latino population significantly in many respects. 
Supplementary tables with detailed analysis can be found in an Appendix following 
Chapter 5. 
4.3.1 Industry 
One of the first questions to ask about the 2014 ASE sample is whether the Latino 
respondents differ from their non-Latino counterparts in terms of industry choice. 
(Remember that the ASE samples from firms with paid employees only.) At first glance, 
the Latino-owned sample seems in line with observations made about Latino-owned 
firms in Chapter 2: relative to non-Latino-owned firms, they are overrepresented in 
construction, transportation and warehousing, and administrative and support services, 
and underrepresented in professional services, finance and insurance, and arts, 
entertainment, and recreation. A chi-squared test reveals that indeed, the two distributions 
are statistically significantly different (χ2 = 27,331 with 19 degrees of freedom). 
That raises the separate question of whether the 2014 ASE sample of Latino-
owned firms is representative of Latino-owned firms as a whole. The SBO data is limited 
to firms with paid employees, in order to match the ASE sample more closely. 
Unfortunately, this comparison also shows significant difference in a chi-squared test (χ2 
= 864.86 with 19 degrees of freedom). The largest difference between the two samples is 
in retail trade (0.76% difference). 
Does this mean it’s not worth the time to analyze the data from the 2014 ASE? 
No; but it does suggest some caution in generalizing too broadly from the ASE’s 
respondents to Latino-owned businesses as a whole. The ASE firms are slightly less 
120 
 
likely to be in industries with relatively lower barriers to entry and lower rates of return, 
such as accommodation and food services, construction, and transportation and 
warehousing. It may be that the entrepreneurs represented in the ASE data are, if 
anything, able to create greater profits and more firm security than Latino entrepreneurs 
as a whole.  
4.3.2 Citizenship Status at Birth 
52.4% of the Latinos were not born as US citizens, as opposed to just 13.6% of 
non-Latinos. A chi-squared test shows a statistically significant difference between the 
two populations (χ2 = 337,260 with one degree of freedom). 
4.3.3 Age of Owner 
The Latino owners in the sample tended to be much younger than their non-
Latino counterparts, as shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Almost half of the non-Latino 
respondents were 55 or older, as opposed to only 31.7% of the Latino respondents. A chi-
squared test shows that the difference in age distribution between the two groups is 






Figure 4.1: Distribution of Age of Non-Latino Respondents to 2014 ASE (author's calculations) 
 
 




4.3.4 Formal Education  
Figure 4.3 shows the percentages of Latino versus non-Latino owners in terms of 
the highest level of formal education reported. Greater percentages of Latino owners 
reported having a high school diploma or GED or less, and smaller percentages reported 
having a bachelor’s or post-bachelor’s degree. This is in line with previous research about 
Latino formal education levels more generally and Latino entrepreneurs. A chi-squared 
test finds the differences between the two groups is statistically significant (χ2 = 97,891 
with eight degrees of freedom). 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Highest level of formal education reported by respondents to the 2014 ASE (author's calculations) 
 
4.3.5 Reason for Starting a Business 
One of the questions asked on the ASE is the reason the owner started a business. 
For each of the ten possible reasons listed, respondents were asked to choose one of three 
classifications: “Very Important,’ “Somewhat Important,” and “Not Important.” 
Respondents could list as many reasons as “Very Important” or “Not Important” as they 
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wished. Figure 4.4 shows the percentage of respondents who ranked each of the ten given 
reasons as either “very” or “somewhat” important, as grouped by ethnic self-
identification. To see if Latino and non-Latino respondents varied in their choice of 
classifications, a one-way ANOVA test was conducted on the percentage of respondents 
choosing “Not Important” for each reason. The test showed a statistically significant 










Figure 4.5: Results of One-Way ANOVA on Latino vs. Non-Latino Respondents' Choosing "Not Important" (author's 
calculations from 2014 ASE data) 
 
Two caveats about this data should be noted. First, as previously noted, the 2014 
ASE was sent only to employers with paid employees, so it should not be taken as a 
portrait of all entrepreneurs, Latino or not. Second, a higher percentage of Latinos 
marked every reason given as “very” important as compared to non-Latinos, so the data 
may be skewed simply by Latinos’ greater willingness to describe something as very 
important. That having been said, the data do show a greater percentage of Latino 
respondents citing the most obvious push factor—failure to find wage work—as 
important to their having started a business: 30% versus 22% for non-Latinos. But more 
than four-fifths of Latino respondents cited the pull factors of having a long-standing goal 
of entrepreneurship, wanting to be their own boss, or pursuing greater income.  
4.3.6 Prior Self-Employment Experience  
The Latino respondents were less likely to report previous self-employment. A 
chi-squared test indicates a statistically significant difference between the two groups (χ2 
= 1,722.4 with one degree of freedom). 
4.3.7 Number of Hours Worked Per Week on Business 
Figure 4.6 shows the number of hours owners reported working on their business, 
segmented by ethnicity. A slightly greater percentage of Latino owners (66%) than of 
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non-Latino owners (61%) reported spending 40 or more hours per week on their business. 
A chi-squared test shows that the difference between the two groups is statistically 
significant (χ2 = 4,777.8 with five degrees of freedom). 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Reported Hours per Week Worked on Primary Business by 2014 ASE Respondents (author's calculations) 
 
4.3.8 How Business Was Acquired 
78.9% of the Latino owners responding founded their business, as opposed to 
70.0% of the non-Latino owners. The Latino owners were also less likely to report having 
acquired their business through purchase, inheritance, transfer, or gifting. Taken together, 
this difference between the two groups is statistically significant (χ2 = 942,470 on three 





Figure 4.7: Respondents Identifying How Business Was Acquired, 2014 ASE (author's calculations) 
 
4.3.9 Age of Business 
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 show the ages of businesses in the sample. As a group the 
Latino-owned firms are younger than the non-Latino-owned firms; 44.9% of the Latino-
owned firms had existed for five years or less, as opposed to only 31.6% of the non-
Latino-owned firms. A chi-squared test shows that the difference between the two groups 







Figure 4.8: Age of Firms Owned by Non-Latino Respondents, 2014 ASE (author's calculations) 
 
 




4.3.10 Intellectual Property Holdings 
Latino-owned firms are less likely to own trademarks, copyrights, or patents than 
are non-Latino firms. Again, the difference between the three groups is statisically 
significant, according to a chi-square test (χ2 = 1,132.7 on four degrees of freedom). This 
suggests that Latino-owned firms are less likely to have filed for IP holdings than non-
Latino businesses. The smaller number of firms with equal Latino and non-Latino 
ownership, meanwhile, were more likely to hold copyrights or trademarks than both the 
Latino and non-Latino firms: 4.8% of the equally Latino/non-Latino owned firms held a 
copyright and 7.5% a trademark. This may point to a difference in what kinds of firms are 
more likely to have equally Latino- and non-Latino owners, as opposed to sole Latino or 
non-Latino ownership. 
4.3.11 Operations Outside the United States 
Even allowing for the fact that the ASE sample consists solely of employer firms, 
very few firms reported having operations outside the United States: 2.5% of Latino-
owned firms, 1.3% of non-Latino-owned firms, and 1.2% of equally Latino- and non-
Latino-owned firms. This difference was statistically significant (χ2 = 2,030.4 on one 
degree of freedom), so it is possible to state that, within the ASE sample, Latino-owned 
firms were more likely to have operations outside the United States. But the percentage 
of firms involved in such activities is small enough that they should not be assumed to 
represent Latino-owned firms without caution. 
4.3.12 Language Spoken at the Business 
96.1% of all Latino-owned firms in the ASE sample reported using English at the 
business, with 66.9% reporting using Spanish. Among non-Latino-owned firms, more 
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than 99% reported speaking English and just 11.6% reported speaking Spanish. (That 
was, however, the second-most common language spoken at non-Latino-owned firms.) 
Among equally Latino- and non-Latino-owned firms, 98.8% reported English use and 
41.1% reported Spanish use. Again, these differences proved statistically significant, both 
for English and Spanish use. 
4.3.13 Family Ownership 
Although stereotypes of immigrant-owned enterprises often rely on the idea of 
family ownership or family involvement, a smaller percentage of the Latino-owned firms 
(24.9%) in the ASE were family-owned than of the non-Latino-owned firms (28.7%). 
This difference is statistically significant (χ2 = 1,347.3 on one degree of freedom). It may 
be that Latino-owned firms are less likely to formally structure so that family members 
share ownership, instead relying on informal agreements if family labor contributes to the 
business. 
4.3.14 Source and Amount of Initial Startup Capital 
Nearly half of the Latino-owned firms (45%) were started with $25,000 in startup 
capital or less, as opposed to 35.4% of the non-Latino-owned firms and 34.6% of firms 
equally Latino- and non-Latino-owned. A one-way ANOVA test finds that the difference 
between Latino and non-Latino firms in terms of amount of startup capital is statistically 
significant to p = 0.001 (F = 41.09) (see Figure 4.11, below). Figure 4.10 compares initial 
startup amounts among Latino-owned firms, non-Latino-owned firms, and those firms 









Figure 4.11: Results for One-Way ANOVA for Initial Startup Capital (author's calculations) 
 
Meanwhile, in terms of the source of the startup capital, the contrast between 
Latino-owned and non-Latino-owned firms is in line with the findings of past research. 
Latino-owned firms were less likely to be financed with a formal bank loan and more 
likely to be financed with a personal credit card or the owner’s own savings. This 
difference is statistically significant (χ2 = 12,169 on 13 degrees of freedom). 
4.3.15 Negative Impacts on Business 
Respondents were given a list of potential circumstances and asked whether those 
particular circumstances had a negative impact on their business. Latino owners were 
more likely than non-Latino owners to report a negative impact from access to or cost of 
financial capital, slow business or lost sales, and late or no payment from customers, and 
less likely to report a negative impact from taxes. A chi-squared analysis between the 
number of Latino and non-Latino owners who cited a negative impact for each 
circumstance found a statistically significant difference between the two groups (χ2 = 
13,148). 
4.3.16 Success in Establishing New Funding Relationships 
The ASE also asks whether respondents tried to get new funding for their 
business in 2014, and if so, whether they were able to get the full amount requested. As 
with the initial funding, a smaller percentage of Latino-owned firms applied to banks or 
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credit unions, and of those who did, only three-fifths of requesters got the full amount of 
requested funding (as opposed to almost three-fourths of non-Latino-owned firms 
applying for capital from banks). The largest percentage of fully funded requests from 
Latino-owned firms came from credit cards; the second-largest was trade credit. Once 
again, a chi-squared test on the two groups resulted in a statistically significant difference 
(χ2 = 15,846 on 37 degrees of freedom) 
4.3.17 Profitability 
A higher percentage of non-Latino-owned firms reported profits in 2014 than did 
Latino-owned or equally Latino/non-Latino-owned firms. A chi-squared comparison 
between the Latino and non-Latino groups show the difference between the two is 
statistically significant (χ2 = 2,857.2 on 2 degrees of freedom). 
4.3.18 Business Operating Status and Causes of Shutdown 
The ASE also asks whether the business being asked about is still in operation, 
and if not, what reason did the owner have to cease operations. Of the Latino-owned 
firms, 93.9% were still in business; 93.0% of the non-Latino-owned firms were still in 
operations. For those businesses that had closed, Table 4.26 breaks down the reason 
given for the ceasing of operations. The Latino-owned firms were considerably less likely 
to stop operating because of the owner’s retirement, whereas lack of credit or cash flow 
seems to have plagued more of the Latino-owned than the non-Latino-owned firms—
37.5% of ceased Latino-owned firms closed due to credit or cash issues, as opposed to 
28.2% of non-Latino-owned firms. The difference between the two groups is statistically 
significant (χ2 = 2,766.5 on 10 degrees of freedom).  
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4.3.19 Projected Future of the Business 
Finally, the ASE contains the question, “Where would the owner(s) like to be in 
five years?” (Note that the question is for the desired size rather than the expected size.) 
There is a greater collective hope for growth on the Latino-owned than on the non-
Latino-owned side, and the difference is statistically significant (χ2 = 5,054.6 on 3 
degrees of freedom). 
4.3.20 Summary of Conclusions from the 2014 ASE Data 
The evidence shows that Latino owners, and Latino-owned firms, as presented in 
the 2014 ASE differ substantially from their non-Latino-owned counterparts. A 
comparison of the Latino and non-Latino respondents finds statistically significant 
evidence of difference between the two groups for more than twenty different points of 
comparison. It is clear that the Latino entrepreneurs who answered the 2014 ASE are, as 
a group, different from non-Latino respondents. They skew younger, as do their firms. 
They are less likely to have made money in the year prior to answering the survey, but 
more likely to predict their business will be larger in five years. They are more likely to 
have founded the business, and work longer hours, but less likely to own intellectual 
property connected to the firm. And finally, in a theme that repeats throughout the ASE 
as well as throughout the literature, they have difficulties with credit that their non-Latino 
counterparts do not: credit issued to Latino entrepreneurs comes in smaller amounts and 
is more expensive, and yet lack of credit is more often cited as a cause of business 
closure. 
As noted before, there are differences between the group of Latino respondents to 
the 2014 ASE and Latino entrepreneurs as a whole, so the experiences of the 2014 ASE 
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cohort may not be typical. But the ASE results fall largely in line with what the previous 
literature has found about immigrant entrepreneurship in general and Latino 
entrepreneurs’ experiences in particular. 
Unfortunately, while the ASE collected data for the top 50 MSAs, the responses 
discussed above (about credit use, aspirations for the business, and so on) are not publicly 
available at the MSA level. Therefore, other data is necessary to answer the question of 
how the performance of Latino-owned firms might differ at the MSA level. 
 
4.4 Differences in Latino-Owned Business Performance by MSA 
The best source for information about Latino-owned business performance at the 
MSA level, on a national scale, is the Survey of Business Owners (SBO), which is 
administered every five years. The analysis that follows will draw primarily from the 
2002, 2007, and 2012 SBO, although some caution has to be used in comparing the 2002 
SBO to the other two: whereas in 2007 and 2012, “Hispanic or Latino” was classified as 
an ethnicity separate from race, the 2002 SBO treated “Hispanic or Latino” as one of 
several racial categories. Therefore it is possible that business owners who would not 
have identified themselves as Latino in the 2002 survey did so in 2007. 
This analysis will begin with an overview of shifts in Latino-owned business 
performance between 2002 and 2012 and will then compare variables by metropolitan 
area. It will test the power of several potential predictive variables, such as the percentage 
of Latino-owned firms in construction, and then examine whether the “gateway” 
typology of MSAs discussed earlier is useful when looking at firm performance, by 
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comparing metropolitan areas classified as “re-emerging” gateways to metropolitan areas 
classified as “minor-emerging” gateways. 
4.4.1 Latino-Owned Business Performance Between 2002 and 2012 
Table 4.6 gives an overview of Latino-owned business performance between 
2002 and 2012, using data from the 114 MSAs for which data was available for both 
years.22 
 
Table 4.6: Mean and Median Statistics for Latino-Owned Firm Performance by MSA, 2002-12 (author's calculations 
from 2002 and 2012 SBO data)  
Mean Median 
Total number of Latino-owned firms, 2002 11,886.1 1,694.5 
Total sales and receipts of Latino-owned firms (in 
thousands), 2002 
$2,113,749 $346,600 
Total number of Latino-owned employer firms, 2002 1,446.9 291.5 
Total sales and receipts of Latino-owned employer 
firms (in thousands), 2002 
$1,698,780 $295,963 
Total employees of Latino-owned firms, 2002 11,072.8 1,974.5 
Total payroll of Latino-owned firms (in thousands), 
2002 
$348,176 $59,353 
Total number of Latino-owned firms, 2012 24,730.9 4,682.5 
Total sales and receipts of Latino-owned firms (in 
thousands), 2012 
$3,252,630 $696,498 
Total number of Latino-owned employer firms, 2012 2,108.6 425.5 
Total sales and receipts of Latino-owned employer 
firms (in thousands), 2012 
$2,554,077 $509,832 
Total employees of Latino-owned firms, 2012 16,433.2 3,697.0 
Total payroll of Latino-owned firms (in thousands), 
2012 
$502,835 $92,431 
Percent change in number of Latino-owned firms, 
2002-12 
167.7% 141.3% 
                                                 
22 All 2002 numbers have been adjusted for inflation. Throughout this chapter, in comparing the 2002, 
2007, and 2012 SBOs I used the following calculation to account for inflation: $1.00 in January 2002 






Percent change in sales and receipts from Latino-
owned firms, 2002-12 
127.5% 76.3% 




The large differences between the mean and median number of Latino-owned 
firms suggest that these firms are concentrated in particular MSAs. Meanwhile, the 
period 2002–12 saw growth in Latino-owned firms nationwide. But the growth was not 
evenly spread: some smaller MSAs saw large increases in their Latino presence, while 
other MSAs saw their existing Latino business communities adversely affected by the 
Great Recession.23 Not surprisingly, the largest concentrations of Latino-owned business 
activity are in some of the nation’s largest cities: Los Angeles, New York, Miami, 
Houston. The largest percentage increases came in MSAs with previously small 
immigrant populations, such as Reading, Pennsylvania, and Fayetteville, Arkansas; 
meanwhile, the largest drops in Latino-owned business activity occurred in MSAs where 
the Latino population may not have been increasing quickly enough to mitigate the 
economic damage wrought by the Great Recession. 
4.4.2 Share of Latino-Owned Firms in Construction as a Potential Independent Variable 
One variable that might help explain differences between MSAs is the share of 
Latino-owned businesses in construction and related industries. A large share of Latino-
owned business activity takes place in construction: the industry accounted for 14% of all 
Latino-owned firms and 12% of all Latino-owned revenue nationally in 2012 (see Figures 
                                                 
23 A table comparing MSAs in selected categories of SBO data can be found in the Appendix. 
Table 4.6 continued 
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2.4 and 2.5). Construction has relatively low barriers to entry in terms of its formal-
education requirements, making it potentially more attractive to aspiring entrepreneurs 
blocked from higher-barrier industries. It would have been an especially attractive 
industry to enter in new-gateway metropolitan areas whose overall populations were 
rapidly growing in the 1990s and 2000s. Moreover, the Great Recession, which hit the 
construction industry particularly hard, might have disproportionately affected Latino 
business communities heavily dependent on construction firms. So one possible 
hypothesis is that MSAs with a higher share of Latino-owned businesses in construction 
saw a sharper decline, or smaller increase, of Latino-owned business activity during the 
2002–12 time period. Table 4.7 shows descriptive statistics for the MSAs in the study; 
the mean share of Latino-owned firms in construction was 13.8%, similar to the national 
percentage. 
 
Table 4.7: Descriptive Statistics, including for Share of Latino-Owned Firms in Construction, of MSAs in Study 
(author's calculations from 2012 SBO and 2012 1-year ACS) 
Percentage (2012) Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Percentage of all Latino-owned 
firms in the MSA in construction 
13.8% 15.7% 0% 50.6% 
Percentage of all Latino-owned 
firms that have employees 
11.1% 10.6% 0.01% 50.4% 
Percentage of all Latino-owned 
firms with employees in 
construction 
13.8% 12.9% 0% 50.6% 
Percentage of population 
identifying as Latino 
16.3% 9.3% 0.1% 95.4% 
Percentage of the Latino 
population in the MSA that 
speaks English only or English 
“very well” 
72.8% 72.6% 38.8% 98.4% 
Percentage of the Latino 
population that had an income 
under the poverty level in the 
previous 12 months 
28.0% 27.8% 0.08% 47.3% 
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Percentage (2012) Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Percentage of the Latino 
population over age 18 that were 
not citizens 
32.9% 33.0% 2.7% 75.8% 
  
But what would a higher share of Latino-owned firms in construction indicate 
about an MSA? Perhaps there is a correlation between higher share of population self-
identifying as Latino and higher share in the construction industry. That correlation, 
however, when tested, turns out to be fairly weak. Figure 4.12, following, shows the 
graph of 226 MSAs, with percent population Latino (from the 2012 1-year ACS) on the 
X axis and percent Latinos in construction on the Y axis (from the 2012 SBO). The 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the two variables is 0.315, which would indicate that 
about 10% of the variation in share of Latino-owned businesses in construction can be 
explained by share of the population that self-identifies as Latino. Limiting the test to 
firms with paid employees makes for an even weaker correlation (Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient = 0.282). 




Figure 4.12: Share of Population Self-Identifying as Latino vs. Percent of Latino-Owned Firms in Construction, 2012 
(author's calculations from 2012 SBO and 2012 1-year ACS data) 
 
Perhaps there exists a correlation between the percentage of Latino businesses in 
construction and the percentage of Latinos in the MSA who are comfortable speaking 
English. “Comfortable” is a subjective term; in this case it is defined as the ACS’s 
estimations of the Latino population who report either speaking English alone or, if 
speaking Spanish, speaking English “very well”. Table 4.30, above, shows that for 350 
MSAs, both the mean and the median percentage of Latinos reporting speaking English 
only or speaking English “very well” were about 73%. One might guess an inversely 
proportional relationship between construction firms and English-speaking comfort level: 
the greater the percentage of Latinos comfortable with English, the smaller the share in 
construction, as more Latino entrepreneurs have the English fluency necessary to feel 
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comfortable opening firms in higher-barrier industries. However, as shown in Figure 




Figure 4.13: Percent of Latinos Comfortable Speaking English in the MSA vs. Percentage of Latino-Owned Businesses 
in Construction, 2012 (author's calculations for 222 MSAs from 2012 SBO and 2012 1-year ACS data) 
 
There is a statistically significant, weakly negative relationship between percent 
of Latino population holding a high school degree or greater and percentage of all Latino-
owned firms in construction, as illustrated in Figure 4.14, below. The slope of the line is 
–0.11, with a p-value of .00516 but the R2 for the regression is 0.03335, suggesting, 
again, that the explanatory power of education on construction share is small. If the 
dependent variable is changed to percentage of all Latino-owned employer firms in 




Figure 4.14: Formal Education Attainment of Local Latino Population vs. Percent of all Latino-Owned Firms in 
Construction, 2012 (author's calculations from 2012 SBO and 2012 1-year ACS data for 204 MSAs) 
 
That leaves the question of whether share of Latino-owned firms in construction 
can be used to predict future business performance. For 41 MSAs, data is available for 
both overall number of firms in 2002 and 2012 and construction firms in 2002. Plotting 
the percentage of firms in construction in 2002 against the percentage change in number 
of firms between 2002 and 2012, as in Figure 4.15 below, fails to yield a statistically 
significant relationship. The same is true if the dependent variable is changed to change 





Figure 4.15: Share of Latino-Owned Firms in Construction, 2002, vs. Percent Change in Number of Latino-Owned 
Firms in the MSA, 2002-12 (author's calculations from 2002 and 2012 SBO data) 
 
Share of local Latino-owned businesses in construction may still be a useful 
variable for an economic development planner, as it may be correlated with lower levels 
of formal education. It may be that Latino entrepreneurs who would rather work in a 
different industry are instead “pushed” into a lower-barrier industry such as construction. 
But by itself the construction-share variable does not give enough information to shed 
light on how MSA-level factors affect Latino-owned businesses. 
4.4.3 Why Credit Availability Is a Difficult Independent Variable to Measure 
Ideally, any comparison of MSAs would include determining whether certain 
MSAs made credit more easily available to Latino entrepreneurs than did others. The 
leitmotif of credit availability—more specifically, the lack thereof—recurs throughout the 
literature on immigrant entrepreneurs and minority entrepreneurs, and the ASE survey 
data indicates obtaining sufficient credit remains a problem for Latino entrepreneurs 
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nationwide. Moreover, as the literature on ethnic banks suggests, credit availability is a 
problem that can be addressed for and by minority business communities at the local 
level. It stands to reason that MSAs might differ by credit availability, and that this 
difference might result in differences in subsequent business performance. 
Unfortunately, obtaining reliable quantitative data on credit availability at a 
comparative MSA level is difficult. There are several different approaches to collecting 
information about credit solicitation, reception, and use: 
• The Survey of Business Owners asks about credit use. For the 2007 SBO, a 
selection of answers were reported (one firm per industry per state)24 in the Public 
User Microdata Sample (PUMS). However, data was not reported at the MSA 
level.  
• Like the SBO, the Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs collects information about 
credit use and availability, including whether an inability to acquire credit 
negatively impacted profits, as discussed earlier. However, while the ASE data is 
available on both a national and an MSA level, data on credit use is not broken 
down by ethnicity at the MSA level, making it impossible to compare how Latino 
entrepreneurs in particular fared when trying to obtain credit in different MSAs. 
• Another potential source of credit data comes from the Department of the 
Treasury’s annual reports on Community Development Financial Institutions 
(CDFIs). However, not every participating CDFI is required to report transaction-
                                                 
24 In order to further protect firm and owner privacy, some smaller states were treated as one state: Alaska 
and Wyoming; Delaware and the District of Columbia; North Dakota and South Dakota; Rhode Island and 
Vermont (Bureau of the Census, 2012). 
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level data every year; when CDFIs do report transaction-level data, reporting the 
borrower’s ethnic self-identification is optional, not required. This skews the 
resulting data in two ways: one, it makes it impossible to tell whether a non-
reporting CDFI loaned to Latinos or not, and two, it suggests that those CDFIs 
that do collect ethnic self-identification data do so because they specialize in 
lending to Latinos or otherwise have reason to believe that ethnic self-
identification is an important variable to track. The institutional-level data 
collected from CDFIs does require the CDFI to specify whether or not it made 
loans to Latinos in the previous year, but that is the extent of the institutional-
level collection; there is no data gathered in such reports as what percentages of 
loans were made to Latinos, or how large these loans were, or to what purpose. 
 
For these reasons, a quantitative examination of credit availability for Latinos at 
the MSA level is a topic for future research. Credit availability will be explored at the 
individual MSA level in Section 4.5, which is a more qualitative set of observations.  
 
4.4.4 Using the “Gateway” Typology to Understand Latino-Owned Business 
Performance 
The idea of the immigration “gateway” has been used to illustrate trends in 
immigrant settlement patterns at the metropolitan level, particularly to highlight 
differences between metropolitan areas such as New York and San Francisco, which 
began receiving immigrant populations in the 19th century, and metropolitan areas that 
had little to no immigrant population prior to 1990. Singer (2015) classified the 104 
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largest metropolitan areas (which, at the time of her writing, housed 86% of the national 
immigrant population) into seven types of gateway, plus an eighth category, “low-
immigration metro areas.”25 The gateway classification system may be useful in 
illuminating differences between metropolitan areas with regard to Latino 
entrepreneurship, in that history of immigrant settlement may have an effect on the local 
immigrant-run business environment. As Singer (2004) wrote: 
Established gateways such as New York, San Francisco, and Chicago are in many ways 
well positioned to receive and serve immigrant newcomers. After all, their long history of 
immigrant settlement frequently has evoked an organizational, service delivery, and 
advocacy infrastructure familiar with the needs of immigrants and their families. For 
many continuous and post-World War II gateways, moreover, immigration is part of their 
identity and a source of local cultural pride…. The picture is quite different, by contrast, 
in fast-growing emerging gateways like Atlanta, Las Vegas, Denver, and Raleigh-
Durham. Here immigrants are very recent arrivals on a scene that is already stressed by 
the pressures of rapid population growth. Consequently, the institutional structures that 
can assist in the integration of immigrants—both community-based and governmental—
are still being developed and strengthened. 
 
To some degree the value of the “gateway” classification lies in its ability to 
highlight larger trends—for example, of migration to the “emerging” gateways. But does 
such a classification shed light on how Latino-owned businesses fare within the classified 
MSAs? There are, after all, a number of confounding variables that could reduce the 
utility of talking about gateways—New York and Chicago are both major-continuous 
gateways, for example, but they are also two of the oldest and most successful 
commercial centers in the country. Table 4.8, following, illustrates the differences 
between the different types of gateways by presenting the mean number of Latino-owned 
firms and growth of Latino-owned firms between 2002 and 2012. The average major-
                                                 
25 A detailed table of classifications is available in the Appendix. 
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continuous MSA had more than 70,000 Latino-owned firms in 2012, as opposed to an 
average of 1,500 Latino-owned firms in the minor-emerging MSAs. 
Table 4.8: Selected Descriptive Statistics of 104 MSAs Classified by Gateway Status (author's calculations from 2002, 














Number of MSAs 
in count 4 4 10 6 7 5 6 24
Mean number of 
Latino-owned 
firms, 2002 2,844 70,990 14,719 72,647 8,985 11,500 1,481 1,604
Mean number of 
Latino-owned 
firms, 2007 3,633 88,538 20,397 103,589 14,169 19,389 3,716 2,634
Mean number of 
Latino-owned 
firms, 2012 6,128 126,555 30,086 159,442 20,313 34,555 5,823 3,869
Mean number of 
Latino-owned 
employer firms, 
2002 481 7,899 1,867 8,543 1,506 1,552 260 297
Mean number of 
Latino-owned 
employer firms, 
2007 461 9,322 2,074 10,581 2,077 2,079 492 377
Mean number of 
Latino-owned 
employer firms, 
2012 535 11,928 2,441 13,157 2,214 2,455 564 433
Mean number of 
people employed 
by Latino-owned 
firms, 2002 4,700 63,173 13,483 56,072 11,595 12,951 1,886 2,342
Mean number of 
people employed 
by Latino-owned 
firms, 2007 5,314 61,084 18,093 76,246 14,774 17,707 3,737 2,985
Mean number of 
people employed 
by Latino-owned 
firms, 2012 6,674 71,710 25,614 95,079 17,005 21,390 4,444 3,619
Mean percentage 
change in total 
number of firms, 
2002 to12 107.1% 89.1% 107.3% 126.8% 130.1% 231.4% 303.2% 182.9%
Mean percentage 
change in total 
sales/receipts, 2002 
to 2012 109.9% 73.3% 119.4% 139.6% 107.5% 138.3% 223.8% 269.0%
Mean percentage 
change in sales per 
firm, 2002 to 2012 2.9% -8.6% 8.6% 7.8% -5.6% -28.0% -13.4% 33.1%
Mean percentage 
change in 
employees, 2002 to 
2012 92.7% 16.7% 97.3% 86.3% 68.3% 83.4% 163.5% 127.3%
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Comparing between less starkly opposed gateway groups may for a better 
evaluation of the gateway classification system as a whole; comparing within gateway 
groups helps pinpoint the specific issues that might drive differences in Latino-owned 
business performance between MSAs with similar characteristics of population and 
immigrant settlement. Additionally, the major-continuous gateways create so much 
economic activity in general that it would be hard to isolate the effect of being a gateway. 
In other words, some benefits a Latino entrepreneur might receive from being in New 
York or San Francisco might be from being in a metropolitan area with more than a 
century’s worth of immigrant settlement, but it would be difficult to separate those 
benefits from the benefits of being in New York or San Francisco. This section will thus 
feature both an explicit comparison between two different gateway groups and then a 
consideration of differences between MSAs within the particular groups. The groups in 
question will be the re-emerging MSAs (n = 9) and the minor-emerging MSAs (n = 9), 
which are similar in terms of their immigration-settlement patterns since 1960 (which is 
to say, low immigration 1960–1990 and then immigration growth considerably faster 
than the national average 1990–2010) but differ in terms of their history of receiving 
immigration, in that the re-emerging gateways had higher immigrant populations in the 
early 20th century and the minor-emerging gateways did not. If history of immigrant 
settlement, an important factor in the gateway classification, does lead to metropolitan 
areas being better prepared for and more supportive of immigrant entrepreneurship, then 
Latino-owned businesses should fare better in re-emerging MSAs than in minor-
emerging MSAs. 





Figure 4.16: Map of Re-Emerging and Minor-Emerging MSAs (author's creation from Census Bureau TIGER GIS 
data) 
 
Tables 4.9 and 4.10, below, list the re-emerging and minor-emerging MSAs, 
respectively, in terms of percentage of population self-identifying as Latino in 2007. 
Table 4.9: Re-Emerging Gateway MSAs and Their Respective Latino Populations, 2007 (from 2007 ACS) 









Baltimore-Towson, MD 2,668,056 83,593 3.13% 
Denver-Aurora, CO 2,466,591 544,308 22.07% 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, 
MN-WI 3,208,212 147,062 4.58% 
Orlando-Kissimmee, FL 2,032,496 455,592 22.42% 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, 
PA-NJ-DE-MD 5,827,962 372,863 6.40% 
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-
WA 2,174,631 219,274 10.08% 
150 
 










CA 2,091,120 385,813 18.45% 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 1,803,549 479,637 26.59% 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 3,309,347 240,398 7.26% 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 2,723,949 388,272 14.25% 
 
Table 4.10: Minor-Emerging Gateway MSAs and Their Respective Latino Populations, 2007 (from 2007 ACS) 









Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL 590,564 101,531 17.19% 
Columbus, OH 1,754,337 49,951 2.85% 
Durham, NC 479,624 46,740 9.75% 
Greensboro-High Point, NC 698,497 46,702 6.69% 
Indianapolis-Carmel, IN 1,697,964 78,507 4.62% 
Lakeland, FL 574,746 89,507 15.57% 
Nashville-Davidson-Murfreesboro-
Franklin, TN 1,521,751 80,403 5.28% 
Raleigh-Cary, NC 1,049,674 91,846 8.75% 
Salt Lake City, UT 1,095,693 166,707 15.21% 
 
Table 4.11 shows the percentage of the Latino- and non-Latino population in each 
of the minor-emerging and re-emerging MSAs living in a single housing unit, either 
attached or detached, as of the 2012 ACS. Single housing units here are offered as a very 
rough proxy for measuring suburbanization, more of a feature of newer gateways than the 
best-known major-continuous gateways. Although the two groups are not identical in 
their housing patterns, they are all more suburbanized than New York, the quintessential 
major-continuous gateway; in all of the minor-emerging and re-emerging MSAs, 65% or 
Table 4.9 continued 
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greater of the non-Latino population lives in a single housing unit. An average of 54.8% 
of Latinos in minor-emerging MSAs and 57.5% of Latinos in re-emerging MSAs live in 
single housing units, as opposed to 22.5% of Latinos in New York. 




Since economic data was not available for all the MSAs in 2002, this comparison 
will be done between 2007 and 2012. Tables 4.12 through 4.15 give the numbers of 
firms, employer firms, and revenue in the re-emerging and minor-emerging gateway 
MSAs for 2007 and 2012, respectively.Table 4.16, following, shows the re-emerging and 
minor-emerging MSAs’ Latino-owned firm performance in terms of difference from the 
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same MSA’s non-Latino-owned firm performance—in other words, if the number of 
Latino-owned firms grew by 33% over a five-year period while the number of non-
Latino-owned firms shrank by 2%, the difference is given as 35 percentage points. In 
most of the MSAs in both gateway categories, the number of Latino-owned firms rose 
faster than non-Latino-owned firms over the same time period (which usually meant a 
smaller share of employer firms, as the number of all firms grew faster than the number 
of employer firms) but total revenue rose less dramatically, and in some cases decreased 



















































Table 4.13: Comparing Latino-Owned and Non-Latino-Owned Businesses in Minor-Emerging Gateway MSAs, 2007 













Table 4.15: Comparing Latino-Owned and Non-Latino-Owned Businesses in Minor-Emerging Gateway MSAs, 2012 





Table 4.16: Selected Changes in Latino-Owned (Relative to Non-Latino-Owned) Firm Performance, 2007-12 (author's 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Now the question is whether there are differences in particular independent 
variables that would help explain differences between the two groups. Drawing from the 
literature, this analysis will test the following independent variables: 
• Percent of the MSA identifying as Latino in 2007. It still makes sense to 
hypothesize that MSAs with larger Latino populations will, all other things being 
equal, have more successful Latino businesses. 
• Percent of Latinos living in a home they owned in 2007. This might be related 
to business performance in that homeowning Latino entrepreneurs would have a 
line of credit to draw from that non-homeowning Latino entrepreneurs would not. 
• Percent of Latinos living above the poverty level in 2007. This would speak to 
both the relative purchasing strength of Latinos in the MSAs and the potential of 
Latino entrepreneurs to use personal savings in starting their businesses. 
• Percent of Latinos holding US citizenship in 2007. Latinos holding US 
citizenship could be presumed to be more familiar with American business laws 
and customs; even if any given individual Latino entrepreneur were not a citizen 
themselves, they might still benefit from being in close proximity to citizens who 
could offer formal or informal guidance. 
• Percent of Latinos who could speak English “well” or better in 2007. As with 
the previous four independent variables, this is hypothesized to be directly 
correlated with business performance: Latinos with greater English fluency 
should have an easier time navigating American business regulations and 
establishing and maintaining their own businesses. 
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• Percent of Latinos with a high school diploma or greater level of formal 
education, 2007. As previously noted, there seems to be a correlation between 
business success and higher levels of formal education. Higher levels of formal 
education also increase the number of potential industries the entrepreneur can 
enter. 
• Presence in the MSA of a CDFI that made loans to Latinos and minority-
owned firms, 2003–2007. This is a dummy variable generated from the 
Institution-Level Reports made publicly available (Community Development 
Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund, 2015). If the MSA contained a CDFI that 
reported it had made loans to Latinos between the fiscal years for 2003 and 2007, 
the MSA received a 1, otherwise a 0.26 The hypothesis is that Latino-owned firms 
in MSAs with a CDFI present will, on average, have better business performance 
than Latino-owned firms that lack access to such a loan source. 
• Legal expression of anti-immigrant sentiment in the MSA. Unlike all of the 
independent variables previously listed, this variable would be expected to vary 
inversely with Latino-owned business performance: as in, Latino businesses 
would be expected to be doing worse in MSAs with anti-immigrant sentiment 
strong enough to be translated into legal expression. As Walker and Leitner’s 
(2011) research suggested, anti-immigrant sentiment can vary geographically and 
have multiple levels of expression. Two dummy variables can be used to measure 
anti-immigrant sentiment in the MSAs. The first is a dummy variable as to 
                                                 
26 One caveat is that the CDFI is not required to report whether the loans it made to Latinos were for 
business or personal (including home-buying) purposes. 
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whether the MSA included a law enforcement agency that had signed a 287(g) 
agreement with the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) division as of January 2009 (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)).27 The second 
is a dummy variable based on the compilation by Monogan (2013) of state 
legislation passed between 2005 and 2011. Monogan’s analysis is incomplete for 
analysis at the MSA level because it deals only with state-based legislation. 
Nevertheless, this analysis is valuable because it encompasses both the tone 
(“welcoming” or “hostile”) and the seriousness of the legislation: on a four-point 
scale, a symbolic measure received one point; one that affects a small subset of 
immigrants received two points; a law affecting many immigrants substantially, 
three points; and a law that directly affected immigrants’ right to live in a state, 
four points (Monogan, 2013). Table 4.17 lists Monogan’s scores for those states 
housing the re-emerging and minor-emerging gateway MSAs, from most negative 
(most hostile) to most positive (most welcoming). 
 
Table 4.17: Minor-Emerging and Re-Emerging Gateway MSAs by Score of State Legislature, 2005-11 (from Monogan, 
2013) 





Franklin, TN  
Minor-emerging Tennessee -0.66 
Durham, NC  Minor-emerging 
North 
Carolina -0.61 
                                                 
27 In two cases (Denver and Nashville), ICE signed a memorandum with a state agency (the Colorado 
Department of Public Safety and the Tennessee Highway Patrol, respectively), and the MSA listed is the 
capital city of the state and thus the location of the state agency’s main office. Since the aim was to capture 
broad anti-immigrant sentiment rather than track specific city legislation, both Denver and Nashville were 
counted as playing host to 287(g) agreements. 
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Greensboro-High Point, NC  Minor-emerging North 
Carolina 
-0.61 




Salt Lake City, UT  Minor-emerging Utah -0.59 
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-
WA  
Re-emerging Oregon -0.45 
Indianapolis-Carmel, IN  Minor-emerging Indiana -0.2 
Denver-Aurora, CO  Re-emerging Colorado -0.14 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, 
MN-WI  
Re-emerging Minnesota -0.05 
Orlando-Kissimmee, FL  Re-emerging Florida 0.37 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL  Re-emerging Florida 0.37 
Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL  Minor-emerging Florida 0.37 
Lakeland, FL  Minor-emerging Florida 0.37 
Columbus, OH  Minor-emerging Ohio 0.79 
Baltimore-Towson, MD  Re-emerging Maryland 0.98 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-
NJ-DE-MD  
Re-emerging Pennsylvania 1.24 
Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, 
CA  
Re-emerging California 1.41 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA  Re-emerging California 1.41 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA  Re-emerging Washington 1.41 
 
Tables 4.18 and 4.19, below, show the differences between the individual MSAs 
in terms of the non-dummy independent variables, based on numbers taken from the 2007 
1-year ACS. The re-emerging MSAs are larger than the minor-emerging MSAs. 
Compared to the re-emerging MSAs, the Latino population of the minor-emerging MSAs 
are less likely to be US citizens, to own their own homes, to describe themselves as 
speaking English well or better, and to have a high school diploma or greater. 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.20 shows the MSAs in terms of the three dummy variables, one on CDFI 
presence and two on anti-immigrant sentiment. To make the dummy variable based on 
legislative evaluation act similarly to that based on 287(g) agreement signing, a 1 was 
assigned to any MSA in a state with a total negative score (see Table 4.40, above) and a 0 
assigned to any MSA in a state with a total positive score. 
 
Table 4.20: Dummy Variables for Re-emerging and Minor-emerging MSAs (author's assignments) 
 
 
Finally, Table 4.21 gives the results of the logit regression analysis done on nine 
minor-emerging MSAs and eight re-emerging MSAs (data for Seattle was not available). 
Statistically significant results where p < 0.1 or less are bolded. 
Dummy for 
legislative score by 
Monogan (2013) (<0 




2009 (1 = yes, 
0 = no)
Dummy for 
presence of CDFI 




Baltimore-Towson, MD 0 0 0
Denver-Aurora, CO 1 1 1
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 1 0 1
Orlando-Kissimmee, FL 0 0 1
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 0 0 1
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA 1 0 1
Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA 0 0 1
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 0 0 1
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 0 0 1
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 0 0 0
Minor-emerging MSAs:
Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL 0 0 0
Columbus, OH 0 0 1
Durham, NC 1 1 1
Greensboro-High Point, NC 1 0 0
Indianapolis-Carmel, IN 1 0 1
Lakeland, FL 0 0 0
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN 1 1 1
Raleigh-Cary, NC 1 0 0




Table 4.21: Logit Regression Analysis on Re-emerging and Minor-emerging MSAs (. = p <0.1, * = p < 0.05, ** = p 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Of the hypothesized relationships, only one—percent of the population 
identifying as Latino—shows statistical significance across multiple dependent variables, 
and then mostly for the re-emerging MSAs only. It is possible that the importance of the 
size of the Latino population varies with the size of the MSA, or that a Latino population 
needs to reach a certain minimum size before its impact can be measured in business 
statistics. There is some evidence of a correlation between growth in number of Latino-
owned firms and share of the local Latino population holding US citizenship, but again, 
the effect seems limited to the re-emerging MSAs—a counterintuitive finding; one would 
expect to find that citizenship would matter more in the minor-emerging MSAs, where 
smaller percentages of Latinos, generally speaking, are citizens. The three dummy 
variables fail to generate much in the way of predictive value. 
While this analysis does suggest some potential differences between the groups of 
gateways, its main result is to suggest that aggregate business performance, at least as 
measured by the SBO, is not the most useful measurement when looking at Latino-owned 
firms. Shifts in migration and business formation are happening so rapidly that a five-
year time frame fails to capture much of the activity, and an MSA-level view makes it, 
understandably, difficult to understand how individual Latino entrepreneurs experience 





4.5 Further Testing of the Gateway Typology and Metropolitan 
Business Environments 
An alternative explanation is that the SBO data, although the best source of firm-
level data grouped by metropolitan area, is not suited to this kind of analysis. An alternate 
approach was used by Q. Wang (2015, 2018) in analyzing minority entrepreneurship, 
first in multiple metropolitan labor markets and then in different parts of Los Angeles: 
hierarchical-level modeling, using both individual-level and metropolitan-area-level 
variables taken from the five-year ACS and cross-tabulated by IPUMS (Ruggles, 
Genadek, Goeken, Grover, & Sobek, 2017). Hierarchical-level modeling needs to be used 
with caution: Q. Wang (2018) warns, “[I]t is impossible to provide a causal relationship 
between PUMA characteristics and individual business ownership in the current 
analyses.” But this more recent research does suggest a potential alternative method of 
comparing different metropolitan areas with the aim of understanding the utility of the 
gateway typology. 
 This analysis will now move from comparing two sets of gateways to comparing 
the 57 metropolitan areas classified in the gateway typology as receiving, or previously 
having received, immigrants. It will look at a variety of independent variables, including 
one specific to the gateway typology, to measure the effects on Latino self-employment. 
Since its focus is broader than the previous analysis, it will include variables that speak to 
the economic health of the MSA as a whole, not just its Latino population. This time the 
data will primarily come from the 5-year 2010–14 ACS, in this case the 2009–14 5-year 
ACS in order to avoid selecting for the beginning and ending of a recession, and to avoid 
duplication of earlier efforts. 
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 The dependent variable will be percentage of Latinos self-employing, as 
generated in a cross-tabulation via IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2017). Table 4.22 lists the 
independent variables. 
Table 4.22: Independent Variables Used in Comparing Gateway MSAs (source is 2010–14 5-year ACS data unless 
otherwise stated) 
Variable Code Variable Description Source 
PCT_SE_NOT_LAT Percentage of non-Latino labor force 
reporting self-employment 
IPUMS cross-tabulation 
PCT_LAT_LABOR Percentage of the labor force 
identifying as Latino 
IPUMS cross-tabulation 
PCT_UNEM Percent unemployed in the MSA Table S2301 
PCT_FB Percentage of the MSA population 
born outside the United States 
Table S0501 
PCT_125POV Percent in the MSA living at 125% 
of the poverty level or below 
Table S1701 
HIST_DUM A dummy variable to represent 
history of immigrant settlement in 
the MSA (major-emerging and 
minor-emerging gateway MSAs = 0, 
all other gateway MSAs = 1) 
Author’s calculations based 
on Singer (2015) 
ANTI_DUM A dummy variable to represent 
immigrant-welcoming or immigrant-
hostile legislation passed at the state 
level, based on Monogan (2013) (1 = 
more welcoming, 0 = more hostile) 
Author’s calculations 
PCT_PRO_IND Percentage of the total labor force in 
the MSA working in professional 
services  
Table S2407 
PCT_CONST_IND Percentage of the total labor force in 
the MSA working in construction 
Table S2407 
CDFI_MEAN_DUM A dummy variable to represent 
presence of CDFIs making loans to 
Latinos in the MSA, 2010–14 (1 = 
greater than mean CDFI presence per 
Latino worker, 0 = less) 
CDFI institution-level data 
from the Department of the 
Treasury and IPUMS cross-
tabulation 
CDFI_MED_DUM A dummy variable to represent 
presence of CDFIs making loans to 
Latinos in the MSA, 2010–14 (1 = 
greater than median CDFI presence 
per Latino worker, 0 = less) 
CDFI institution-level data 
from the Department of the 





4.5.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 4.23 shows the percentage of the eligible workforce, both Latino and non-
Latino, reporting self-employment by gateway category. The gateway typology would 
suggest that Latino self-employment would be higher in those gateways with a longer 
history of immigrant settlement, particularly Latino immigrant settlement. In support of 
that hypothesis, the gateway group with the highest level of Latino self-employment is 
the post-World War II group, which includes Miami, Los Angeles, and Houston. The 
post-World War II gateways are also the only group where Latinos self-employ at a 
higher rate than do non-Latinos. But the gap between Latino and non-Latino self-
employment is particularly high in the major-continuous, minor-continuous, and re-
emerging gateways. 
Table 4.23: Gateway Categories by Percent of Workforce Reporting Self-Employment (author's calculations from 
2010–2014 5-year ACS data, cross-tabulated by IPUMS) 
  Mean Percent Self-Employed 
Gateway Category Total Latino Non-Latino Difference 
Former 4.4% 2.7% 4.6% -1.9% 
Major-continuous 5.9% 4.0% 6.3% -2.3% 
Minor-continuous 5.3% 3.8% 6.1% -2.3% 
Post-World War II 5.3% 5.4% 5.3% 0.1% 
Major-emerging 5.5% 4.4% 6.0% -1.6% 
Minor-emerging 5.3% 3.4% 5.6% -2.2% 
Re-emerging 5.7% 3.7% 6.0% -2.3% 
 
Table 4.24 breaks down Latino self-employment in the gateway groups by 
country or place of origin: Mexico, Puerto Rico, Cuba, or a Latin American place not 
included in the previous three categories. Workers of Mexican and Puerto Rican 
background consistently self-employ at lower rates than do their counterparts of Cuban 
and “other” backgrounds. Workers of all backgrounds, including non-Latinos, self-
employ at lower rates in former gateways than in other gateways. 
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Table 4.24: Self-Employment by County or Place of Origin by Gateway Group (author's calculations from 2010–14 
ACS data, cross-tabulated by IPUMS) 
Gateway Type Mean Percent Self-Employed 
  Mexican PR Cuban Other Not Latino 
Former 2.5% 2.1% 3.6% 3.8% 4.6% 
Major-continuous 3.9% 2.5% 5.1% 5.5% 6.3% 
Minor-continuous 3.7% 2.8% 6.7% 5.5% 6.1% 
Post-World War II 2.9% 2.6% 3.9% 4.4% 5.6% 
Major-emerging 3.9% 3.2% 5.6% 5.7% 6.0% 
Minor-emerging 4.6% 3.9% 6.3% 6.9% 6.6% 
Re-emerging 3.3% 3.1% 5.5% 5.1% 6.0% 
 
Table 4.25 shows the workforce of the gateway groups by median percentage 
Latino and median country or place of origin. It reflects the higher numbers of Puerto 
Rican settlement in such former gateways as Cleveland, where the Latino workforce is 
57% Puerto Rican, and Buffalo, where it is 69% Puerto Rican. Latinos of Mexican origin 
make up a higher percentage of the Latino population in the minor-continuous and post-
World War II gateways. The major-continuous gateways are the most diverse in terms of 
their Latino populations, with a median of 42% of Latinos having places of origin outside 
Mexico, Puerto Rico, or Cuba. 
Table 4.25: Workforce by Latino Status and Country/Place of Origin by Gateway Group (author's calculations from 





Latino Median Percent of Latino Workforce 
    Mexican Cuban Puerto Rican Other 
Former 4.4% 37.3% 2.2% 25.5% 17.6% 
Major-continuous 21.6% 40.6% 1.8% 18.3% 42.2% 
Minor-continuous 39.7% 89.6% 0.4% 1.9% 8.8% 
Post-World War II 36.0% 78.1% 0.8% 2.1% 20.0% 
Major-emerging 28.4% 67.2% 3.3% 5.9% 23.1% 
Minor-emerging 10.1% 61.5% 2.0% 9.0% 24.9% 




4.5.2 Variables and Hypotheses 
Table 4.26 repeats the list of independent variables, along with hypothesizing about their 
effect on Latino entrepreneurship. 
Table 4.26: Hypothesized Effects of Independent Variables on Latino Self-Employment 
Variable Code Hypothesized Effect 
PCT_SE_NOT_LAT Positive; suggests that the MSA is generally supportive of self-
employment efforts 
PCT_LAT_LABOR Positive; indicates a larger potential co-ethnic market and more 
opportunities to form co-ethnic networks or enclaves 
PCT_UNEM Negative; used as a proxy for MSA’s economic health 
PCT_FB Negative, since the literature suggests that self-employment is 
more difficult for those born outside United States 
PCT_125POV Negative; used as a proxy for MSA’s economic health 
HIST_DUM Positive; gateway typology is based on the idea that MSAs with 
greater history of immigrant settlement are more hospitable 
ANTI_DUM Positive; idea that immigrant entrepreneurs will be more 
successful in MSA with more welcoming legislation 
PCT_PRO_IND Negative, since Latinos are less likely to be represented in 
professional-services entrepreneurship  
PCT_CONST_IND Positive, since Latinos are more likely to self-employ in lower-
skills industries 
CDFI_MEAN_DUM Positive, since a greater CDI presence suggests greater 
resources for potential Latino entrepreneurs seeking capital 
CDFI_MED_DUM Positive, since a greater CDI presence suggests greater 
resources for potential Latino entrepreneurs seeking capital 
 
For all independent variables except the dummy variables, values were calculated 
from the 2010–14 5-year ACS. The HIST_DUM variable was created by classifying all 
gateways with some history of immigrant settlement—that is to say, all gateways save 
major-emerging and minor-emerging—as 1, and major-emerging and minor-emerging as 
0. The ANTI_DUM variable was calculated by applying the scores calculated by 
Monogan (2013) to legislation at the state level to each MSA; a table giving the score for 
each MSA can be found in Table A.26 in the Appendix.28 The percentage of workers in 
                                                 
28 Washington, D.C. was considered part of Virginia for the purposes of this analysis. 
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professional services was calculated by adding together the number of workers in 
“Information” and the number in FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate) and dividing 
by total workers. Note that, for poverty, unemployment, professional-services 
employment, and construction employment, the sample was for the entire MSA, not just 
Latino workers. 
 As in the previous section, a dummy variable was created to reflect the presence 
of a CDFI in the MSA. However, since the comparison now covers all 57 MSAs 
identified by the gateway typology, there is a wider range of CDFI activity. Table 4.27, 
below, shows that the number unique CDFIs reporting loans to Latinos between 2010 and 
2014 within a given MSA varies from 35 in New York City alone to none at all in 
thirteen MSAs, or 23% of all the MSAs.  
Table 4.27: CDFIs Reporting Loans to Latinos by Gateway MSA, 2010-14 (data from U.S. Department of the 
Treasury) 
Number of CDFIs 
Reporting Having 
Loaned to Latinos, 
2010–14 
Name of MSA 
35 New York 
16 Chicago 
14 Minneapolis-St. Paul 
13 Los Angeles 
9 Washington, D.C. 
8 Milwaukee; Boston; Philadelphia 
6 Portland (OR); Honolulu 
5 Durham-Chapel Hill; Austin 
4 El Paso; Miami; Phoenix; San Francisco; Seattle 
3 Denver; Nashville; Atlanta; Providence; Rochester (NY); St. Louis; 
San Jose 
2 Dallas; Detroit; Hartford; McAllen; Bridgeport; Sacramento; Salt 
Lake City; San Antonio; San Diego 
1 Fresno; Indianapolis; New Haven; Baltimore; Charlotte; Orlando; 
Pittsburgh; Raleigh; Tucson; Worcester (MA) 
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Number of CDFIs 
Reporting Having 
Loaned to Latinos, 
2010–14 
Name of MSA 
0 Greensboro (NC); Houston; Lakeland (FL); Las Vegas; Modesto; 
Bakersfield; Buffalo; Cape Coral; Cleveland; Oxnard; Riverside; 
Stockton; Tampa-St. Petersburg 
 
 To take this range into account, the dummy variable is altered slightly. Instead of 
simply assigning 1 for the presence of a CDFI and 0 for its absence, the number of CDFIs 
was divided by the size of the Latino workforce for each MSA, and the mean and median 
of the resulting quotients were taken. Then a “mean dummy” and a “median dummy” 
were calculated: the MSA was given a 1 if its ratio of CDFI presence to Latino labor 
force population was greater than the mean or median, respectively, and a 0 if its ratio 
was less than the mean or median, respectively. Table A.27 in the Appendix shows the 
calculation of the two dummy variables. Finally, Tables A.28 through A.32 provide the 
raw data for all variables calculated. 
4.5.3 Results and Discussion 
Figures 4.17 and 4.18 show the results for the linear regressions, run once with 
the median CDFI dummy (CDFI_MED_DUM) and once with the mean CDFI dummy 
(CDFI_MEAN_DUM). The results in both cases are very similar. 




Figure 4.17: Regression Results with Median CDFI Dummy (author's calculations) 
 
 
Figure 4.18: Regression Results with Mean CDFI Dummy (author's calculations) 
 
 The only independent variables that show a statistically significant impact on the 
dependent variable is percentage of the MSA workforce in professional services 
(PCT_PRO_IND) and percentage of the MSA population born outside the United States 
(PCT_FB). The latter would suggest that the gateway typology is useful in pointing to the 
size of the MSA’s immigrant population. However, the dummy for history of immigrant 
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settlement is not significant, reinforcing the tentative conclusion of the previous analysis 
that history of immigrant settlement does not a large impact on Latino entrepreneurial 
activity. 
 A stepwise analysis (in both directions) was then applied to both equations to 
determine the independent variables that contributed the most to the model. Figures 4.19 
and 4.20 show the results of those analyses. 
 
Figure 4.19: Results of Stepwise Regression with Median CDFI Dummy 
 
 




Finally, Figure 4.21 shows the results of the regression when only the three 
independent variables suggested in the stepwise analysis (ANTI_DUM, PCT_PRO_IND, 
and PCT_FB) are used. 
 
Figure 4.21: Results of Regression Using Only ANTI_DUM, PCT_PRO_IND, and PCT_FB as Independent Variables 
 
 In this equation, R2 equals 0.3978, suggesting that the three variables together 
account for about 40% of variation in Latino entrepreneurship between metropolitan 
areas. Of the three independent variables, the association between Latino self-
employment rates and the dummy representing attitudes towards immigration in state 
legislation is the most tentative, since the independent variable itself is not significant. 
The variable of percentage of the MSA labor force in professional services is significant 
to p < 0.01, and the variable of percentage of the MSA population that is foreign-born 
(not limited to Latinos) is significant to p < 0.001. In both cases of statistical significance, 
the effects of the independent variable are positive, which proves the earlier hypothesis 
about the relationship between Latino self-employment rates and foreign-born population 
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presence in the MSA, but disproves the hypothesis that a greater share of the labor force 
in professional services would mean smaller levels of Latino self-employment. 
 This analysis suggests several possible conclusions about Latino entrepreneurship 
in the gateway metropolitan areas. The first is that, even though not all Latino 
entrepreneurs are immigrants, there is an overlap between Latino entrepreneurial activity 
and immigrant or foreign-born entrepreneurial activity as a whole. Latinos, regardless of 
place of birth, may be more likely to self-employ in metropolitan areas where foreign-
born residents make for a larger share of the population for several possible reasons. One 
is that the legal, political, and social structure of the metropolitan area may be more 
flexible and comprehensible for residents for whom English is a second language, 
regardless of their entrepreneurial aspirations, and that in such a structure Latinos find it 
easier to start businesses. Another is that a greater share of foreign-born population may 
mean increased competition for wage work among residents who have difficulty 
accessing higher-skilled jobs, due to lack of formal qualifications or sufficient comfort 
with English use. In that case, Latino self-employment would be less a reflection of 
greater entrepreneurial activity in the metropolitan area and more a case of more Latinos 
getting pushed into self-employment. 
 The positive correlation between share of the population in professional services 
and Latino self-employment is also open to interpretation. Since entrepreneurs, Latino or 
not, benefit from access to business services such as insurance and real estate, a higher 
share of the population in professional services may make for greater entrepreneurial 
opportunities in the metropolitan area more generally. Given the repeated examples found 
in the literature of Latino entrepreneurs reporting a lack of access to financing and 
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business information, however, it would be a mistake to assume that the Latino 
entrepreneurs are connected to larger professional-services networks.  
 The analysis presented here also continues to call into question the frameworks 
used so far to examine Latino entrepreneurship: the gateway typology and the idea of 
increased entrepreneurship through co-ethnic clustering, often in the form of an ethnic 
enclave. Although percentage of the MSA population born outside the United States had 
a statistically significant correlation with Latino self-employment rates in the MSA, 
percentage of Latinos in the local labor force (including self-employed Latinos) did not. 
If Latino entrepreneurship in these MSAs was dependent on ethnic enclaves, we would 
expect to see a significant, positive correlation between Latino presence in self-
employment and Latino presence in the labor force more generally. (Recall both that 
many entrepreneurs were wage workers in the years before formally launching their 
businesses, making wage workers potential contributors to the growth of 
entrepreneurship in a community, and that part of the definition of an ethnic enclave is 
co-ethnic employment.) The dummy variable of whether the MSA had a history of 
immigrant settlement or not was also not statistically significant. Further investigation is 







4.6 A Qualitative Comparison of Latino-Owned Business Activity: 
Looking More Closely at Denver and Durham 
 
This section will consist of a more intensely focused look at Latino-owned 
business activity in one re-emerging MSA, Denver-Lakewood-Aurora, Colorado 
(hereafter Denver), and one minor-emerging MSA, Durham-Chapel Hill (hereafter 
Durham),North Carolina. This comparison could be done with any two MSAs from the 
two different groups, but Denver and Durham make for a particularly illuminating 
contrast. Durham offers a particularly striking example of how fast the immigrant 
population has grown in the minor-emerging MSAs: in 1990 the population was just 4% 
foreign-born and 1% Latino (Latino Migration Project, 2013). By that point Denver, with 
a much longer history of Latino settlement, had already elected its first Latino mayor, 
Federico Peña. Meanwhile, the Latino settlement trends in the two MSAs reflect their 
respective gateway categories: Durham’s Latino population is, as a whole, less 
comfortable with English, less likely to have received a high school diploma or greater, 
and less likely to have received United States citizenship than Denver’s. Given this, and 
given Denver’s longer history of immigrant settlement in general and Latino settlement in 
particular, gateway classification would predict that a Latino business would fare better 
in Denver than in Durham. But, as shown in Table 4.28, that was not the case for the time 









Table 4.28: Selected Statistics for Denver and Durham Metropolitan Areas (author's calculations from 2007 1-year 
ACS and 2007 and 2012 SBO) 
Characteristic of Latino 
population 
Denver Durham  
Percentage with U.S. 
citizenship, 2007 
73.2% 41.9% 
Percentage living above the 
poverty level, 2007 
76.0% 77.2% 
Percentage who speak 
English “well” or better, 2007 
77.9% 54.4% 
Percent with a high-school 
diploma or greater level of 
formal education, 2007 
63.8% 47.5% 
Percent change in total 
number of Latino-owned 
firms, 2007–12 
61.8% 44.1% 
Percent change in total sales 
by Latino-owned firms, 
2007–12 
-19.2% 37.3% 
Percent change in percentage 
of Latino-owned firms with 
paid employees, 2007–12 
-21.0% 30.8% 
Percent change in total 




Some of this difference may simply be that Denver as a whole was hit harder by 
the Great Recession than was Durham, and took longer to recover. But Durham’s Latinos 
would still seem to be at a relative disadvantage even in a growing economy. The 
comparison between these two MSAs suggest that there is more to Latino 
entrepreneurship than is covered by the gateway classification. 
In order to understand the forces driving, and perhaps inhibiting, Latino business 
formation and success in Denver and Durham, this section will examine both 
metropolitan areas more closely using street-level data. It will concentrate on 
neighborhoods with larger concentrations of Latino residents, in order to see if any sort of 
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enclave activity can be detected. It will also consider the role of financial institutions and 
community-development organizations in the two metropolitan areas. 
 
4.6.1 Denver: Overview of Latino-Owned Business Activity 
In 2012 22.4% of the Denver MSA’s population of 2.55 million identified as 
Latino. Figure 4.22 shows a map of the Denver MSA (and the Denver city/Denver 
County area, inset) by raw count of Latino population in 2012. 
 
Figure 4.22: Denver MSA Latino Population, 2012 5-year ACS (author's calculations from ACS data and Census 
TIGERLine shapefiles) 
 
The Denver MSA is home to an above-average presence of Latino-owned firms in 
professional, scientific, and technical services—11.4% of all Latino-owned businesses in 
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2002. This percentage had fallen to 9.91% by 2012, likely because few of the new firms 
opening up between 2002 and 2012 were in professional services. Table 4.29, below, 
contains summary statistics for business activity in the Denver MSA between 2002 and 
2012. 
 
Table 4.29: Summary Statistics for Denver MSA, 2002, 2007, 2012 (author's calculations from 2002, 2007, and 2012 
SBO) 





Total population  2,466,591 2,645,209  7.24% 
Latino population  544,308 602,660  10.72% 
Percent Latino  22.07% 22.78%  3.24% 
Total number of firms 226,736 268,242 277,002 22.17% 3.27% 
Number of Latino-
owned firms 13,041 18,804 30,707 135.47% 63.30% 
Percent of all firms 
Latino-owned 5.75% 7.01% 11.09% 92.74% 58.14% 
Number of Latino-
owned employer firms 2,106 2,244 2,441 15.91% 8.78% 
Percent of Latino-owned 
firms with employees 16.15% 11.93% 7.95% -50.78% -33.39% 
Total employees 1,120,426 1,123,970 1,110,086 -0.92% -1.24% 
Total employed by 
Latino-owned firms 19,352 21,284 22,604 16.80% 6.20% 
Percent employed by 
Latino-owned firms 1.73% 1.89% 2.04% 17.89% 7.53% 
Percent of Latino-owned 
firms in construction 17.86% 21.08% 21.31% 19.35% 1.13% 
Percent of Latino-owned 
firms in professional 
services 11.43% 11.02% 9.91% -13.24% -10.04% 
 
4.6.2 Denver: Focus on the Globeville-Elyria-Swansea Neighborhoods 
The two combined neighborhoods of Globeville and Elyria-Swansea (hereafter 
GES) lie in the northeast section of the Denver MSA, in what is historically referred to as 
north Denver. The northern border of the two neighborhoods is the county line separating 
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Denver and Adams counties. Figure 4.23, below, shows GES in the context of Denver 




Figure 4.23: Map of Neighborhoods of the City of Denver, featuring Globeville and Elyria-Swansea (author's creation 
from GIS data from City of Denver and Adams County) 
 
The three neighborhoods have a history of immigrant settlement almost as old as 
the city itself: Globeville was founded in the 1880s, mostly by immigrants from eastern  
and south-eastern Europe (Denver Department of Planning and Community 
Development, 2008). More recently, all three neighborhoods have drawn a large Latino 
population: by 2012 three-quarters of Globeville residents and more than 80% of Elyria-
Swansea residents identified as Latino. 
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The three neighborhoods also have a history of being more sinned against than 
sinning, with regards to planning and development choices in the city and MSA of 
Denver. All three were bisected by the construction of Interstate 70, running east-west; in 
addition, Globeville was split in half by the north-south Interstate 25. An additional set of 
railroad tracks on Globeville’s western border further contributed to the relative isolation 
of the three neighborhoods. In addition, Globeville’s and Elyria-Swansea’s histories of 
hosting heavy industry, and the intermingling of industrial and residential zoning close 
together, has led to concerns of insufficient cleanup (Denver Department of Planning and 
Community Development, 2008). This in turn has depressed property values and 
encouraged neglectful landlords, a frequent cause of complaint by residents (Denver 
Department of Planning and Community Development, 2008). “People in different areas 
of the city might not even know that we’re in Denver, right?” a resident mused to an NPR 
reporter in 2014. “And if people know that we are part of Denver, you know, it’s really 
easy to make fun of us.” (Heffel, 2014)  
Not surprisingly, the mean GES resident has a lower income than the state 
average. As shown in Table 4.30, below, they are also more likely to speak Spanish at 
home, to lack employment, and to live below the poverty level, and less likely to have 
completed education beyond high school. 
Table 4.30: Selected Statistics for Census Tracts 15 and 35 and the State of Colorado, 2012 (author's calculations from 
2012 5-year ACS data) 
Demographic Information Census Tract 15 
(Globeville) 
Census Tract 35 
(Elyria-Swansea) 
Colorado 
Percent of residents living below 
poverty level 
36.6% 41.2% 12.9% 
Unemployment rate (population 
aged 16 years and over) 
15.0% 17.6% 5.5% 
Percent of residents who speak 
Spanish at home 
47.3% 72.7% 11.9% 
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Demographic Information Census Tract 15 
(Globeville) 
Census Tract 35 
(Elyria-Swansea) 
Colorado 
Percent of residents identifying as 
Hispanic or Latino 
75.4% 81.8% 20.6% 
Percent of residents (aged 25 and 
over) holding a bachelor’s degree 
or greater 
7.2% 10.5% 36.6% 
Median household income (in 
2012 dollars) 
$23,750 $32,390 $58,244 
 
More recently redevelopment has prompts fears of gentrification and 
displacement of the current residential base. A report published in 2017 by the non-profit 
Globeville Elyria-Swansea Coalition Organizing for Health and Housing Justice (GES 
Coalition) explained:  
The high concentration of marijuana grows and dispensaries in our neighborhood, the 
redevelopment of I-70, National Western Center, Brighton Boulevard, and four new RTD 
rail lines are having the most detrimental effects on families that have long-resided in 
these historically marginalized communities… In Globeville and Elyria-Swansea, the 
majority of our families are “rent or mortgage stressed,” and have become extremely 
vulnerable to involuntary displacement. (Globeville Elyria-Swansea Coalition Organizing 
for Health and Housing Justice, 2017) 
 
 
The initial impression of GES is thus not of an area where residents have a lot of 
opportunities, or general encouragement, to go into business for themselves. Yet the GES 
Coalition’s report includes sidebars on three longtime residents, two of whom are Latina 
and one Latino—and all three of whom are described as “micro-entrepreneurs.” In 2016 
the local non-profit Focus Points opened Comal Heritage Food Incubator, a lunch 
restaurant with a rotating menu designed to give GES residents, many of whom also 
identify as micro-entrepreneurs, workforce and entrepreneurial training (Focus Points; 
Shunk, 2016). This suggests a potential source of new entrepreneurs, properly 
supported—but how many actual Latino business owners are there serving GES? 
 
Table 4.30 continued 
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4.6.3 Denver: Latino-Owned Businesses in Zip Code 80216, 2012 
The Reference USA database lists 2,121 businesses operating in zip code 80216 
in 2012. Of those, 1,392—slightly more than half—include the last name of an executive 
identified with the business. Not all of those executives are owners: titles in the database 
include “General Manager,” “Administrator,” “Office Manager,” and “Senior VP.” When 
the search is limited to those executives whose title implies control over the business 
(“Owner,” “President,” “CEO,” or “Principal”), the number of businesses available to 
identify drops to 913. Applying a surname analysis based on the Spanish-origin surnames 
table prepared in conjunction with the 2000 Census (United States Bureau of the Census, 
2014)29 matches 85 businesses that can be confidently said to be Latino-owned. Table 
4.31 presents summary statistics on these 85 businesses. 
 
Table 4.31: Selected Characteristics of 85 Businesses Presumed Latino-Owned in Zip Code 80216 (author's 
calculations from Reference USA historical business data) 
Description Number Percentage of Total 
Business is home-based 4 4.7% 
Executive identified as female 11 12.9% 
Business had fewer than 10 
employees 
66 77.6% 
Business had more than 50 
employees 
4 4.7% 
Annual sales of less than $500,000 40 47.1% 
In Denver City/County 60 70.6% 
In Adams County  25 29.4% 
Business is a single location 84 98.8% 
Business is a branch of a larger firm 1 1.2% 
 
                                                 
29 Only last names for which 70% or greater of the bearers identified as Latino, according to the 
database, were used in the surname analysis. 
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Figure 4.24 shows the breakdown of all businesses in zip code 80216 by industry versus 
the 85 businesses identifiable as Latino-owned. The Latino-owned sample is 
overrepresented in accommodation and food services and other services; in many 
categories—arts, entertainment, and recreation; health care and social assistance; FIRE—
there are no businesses in the sample. 
 
 
Figure 4.25 shows the locations of all the businesses found in zip code 80216, 
with the businesses identified as Latino-owned in red. It also includes identifiable banks 
and financial institutions within the zip code and selected prominent non-profit 
organizations, which are listed in Table 4.32. 
 
Figure 4.24: Businesses in Zip Code 80216 by Industry, 2012 (brown = Latino-owned, yellow = all businesses) 




Figure 4.25: Businesses in Zip Code 80216, 2012 (author's creation from Reference USA historical business data and 




Table 4.32: Selected Prominent Non-profits in GES 
Globeville: 
Globeville Recreation Center, 4496 Grant St. 
Clínica Tepayac, 5075 Lincoln St. 
 
Elyria-Swansea: 
The GrowHaus, 4751 York St. 
Focus Points, 2501 E. 48th Ave. 
Project VOYCE, 3455 Ringsby Ct. 
 
It should be noted that the disadvantage of surname analysis is that it fails to take 
into account those businesses that do not have a contact name included in the Reference 
USA database. Table 4.33, below, lists businesses in the database for zip code 80216 in 
2012 that might, based on the name of the business, be Latino-owned, but lack any 
information about ownership. 
 
Table 4.33: Selected Businesses Lacking a Contact Name in the Reference USA Historical Database30 for Zip Code 
80216, 2012 
Armondo Used Auto Parts LLC 
Ciancio Liquor Store 
El Paso Trading Post 
El Patron Mexican Grill 
El Rinconcito Mini Market 
Gomez on Park Avenue 
Iglesia De Cristo Mi-El 
Iglesia Del Dios Vivo 
La Favorita Wholesale Mfg 
Martinez Tire Repair Shop 
                                                 




Tacos El Gordo 
Transportes Y Enlaces 
 
Of the financial institutions in the Reference USA database as being in zip code 
80216 in 2012, three were check-cashing services, two were commercial real-estate loan 
specialists, three were credit unions, and two were traditional banks. (Of the three credit 
unions, by 2018 one had apparently closed and another had been acquired.) Of the two 
traditional banks, one is Colorado Business Bank, which advertises itself as specializing 
in small-business lending: as of April 2018 the bank’s website was touting it as being 
named “Colorado’s SBO 7(a) Small Lender of the Year” multiple times (Colorado 
Business Bank). But Colorado Business Bank’s website is not available in Spanish and 
does not otherwise suggest a business specialization in the Latino business-loan market. 
The same is true of American National Bank, the second bank, which as of 2018 had two 
Denver locations, neither of which was at the 80216 address listed for the branch in 2012. 
Considering its population of more than 10,000 (in 2010), the area covered by zip 
code 80216 is underserved commercially. In 2012 it had five small grocery stores with 
names suggesting a Spanish-language market, of only twenty-one such stores total—no 
supermarkets. The evidence does not suggest a Latino enclave; but it also does not 
suggest that the Latino population’s needs are being fully met, in the absence of such an 
enclave, by non-Latino-owned businesses. 
Table 4.33 continued 
191 
 
The reason for this underdevelopment lies in GES’s particular history of industrial 
concentration. The problem lay not only in costs of having industry nearby31 but in 
neighborhood zoning, which often put industry next to residential neighborhoods with 
very little space for commercial activity in between. The history of zoning in GES has 
been not just heavily slanted towards industry, but chaotic, with multiple revisions and 
delays; uncertainty over zoning even provided a reason for banks to refuse to make home 
loans in GES (Gardner & Slaby, 2014). Figure 4.26 again shows a map of businesses in 
zip code 80216, but this time with a layer showing the zoning codes of Denver and 
Adams Counties. It should be noted that in 2012 44.1% of Globeville residents reported 
having a commute to work of 30 minutes or greater, a higher share than for all Colorado 
(33.6%) or nationwide (35.6%), although the share of such commuters in Elyria-Swansea 
(34.1%) was closer to the state and national percentages. This also suggests that GES, 
and Globeville in particular, is commercially underdeveloped.  
                                                 
31 One of the multiple environmental lawsuits for which the smelting company Asarco has paid out 
damages was set in Globeville. In 1993 the company agreed to help finance a $22 million remediation 
project in the Globeville neighborhood; cleanup operations began in 1994 and continued through early 




Figure 4.26: Businesses and Zoning Laws Covering GES and Zip Code 80216 (author's creation from Reference USA 




Thus, while the two neighborhoods making up GES offer a spatial concentration 
of Latinos in a metropolitan area (and state) whose population is a fifth Latino, in 
addition to more than a century’s worth of history of immigrant settlement, there is not a 
lot of evidence to suggest the formation of an ethnic enclave. While the population is 
disadvantaged relative to the Denver MSA, poverty alone does not guarantee the failure 
of an ethnic enclave to coalesce. Rather, GES seems to have two relatively uncommon 
disadvantages. One is its relative geographic isolation from the rest of Denver, created 
and exaggerated by the placement of I-25 and I-70. The other is the patchwork of zoning 
ordinances, heavily slanted towards industrial use, that limit the availability of 
commercial space. The combination of the two unfortunate circumstances may have 
negated whatever advantages GES offered to aspiring entrepreneurs as a neighborhood 
with a history of immigrant settlement. 
 
4.6.4 Durham: Overview of Latino-Owned Business Activity 
The rapid rise in Latino populations in many North Carolina cities—Charlotte, 
Raleigh, Durham—has been much noticed and well-documented. The city of Durham 
went from 1% Latino in 1990 to over 10% by 2010, and has been forecast to be almost 
20% by 2020 (Latino Migration Project, 2013). As can be seen in Table 4.34, below, 
Latino population in the Durham MSA grew by almost a quarter between 2007 and 2012, 







Table 4.34: Summary Statistics for Durham MSA, 2002, 2007, 2012 (author's calculations from 2002, 2007, and 2012 
SBO) 





Total population   479,624 463,789   -3.30% 
Latino population   46,740 59,037   26.31% 
Percent Latino   9.75% 12.73%   30.62% 
Total number of firms 35,549 43,133 47,553 33.77% 10.25% 
Number of Latino-owned 
firms 620 1,271 1,968 217.42% 54.84% 
Percent of all firms Latino-
owned 1.74% 2.95% 4.14% 137.29% 40.45% 
Number of Latino-owned 
employer firms 172 146 270 56.98% 84.93% 
Percent of Latino-owned firms 
with employees 27.74% 11.49% 13.72% -50.55% 19.43% 
Total employees 212,848 216,253 221,309 3.98% 2.34% 
Total employed by Latino-
owned firms 674 671 1,829 171.36% 172.58% 
Percent employed by Latino-
owned firms 0.32% 0.31% 0.83% 160.99% 166.35% 
Percent of Latino-owned firms 
in construction N/A N/A 21.49% N/A N/A 
Percent of Latino-owned firms 
in professional services 19.35% 19.51% 12.09% -37.52% -38.02% 
 
Figure 4.27, following, shows the Latino population in the context of the Durham 
MSA. The areas of greatest Latino population concentration are primarily on the east side 
of the city of Durham. While there are pockets of Latino concentration in Orange County, 





Figure 4.27: Latino Population in the Durham MSA, 2012 (author's creation from 2012 5-year ACS data; GIS data 
from US Census Bureau, City of Durham, and City of Chapel Hill) 
 
The Durham MSA is something of an anomaly for the presence of not one but 
two nationally prominent research universities and a number of research-oriented firms. 
That may account for the more prominent presence of non-profits and community 
organizations focusing on the local Latino community. The Institute for the Study of the 
Americas at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill hosts the Latino Migration 
Project, which studies the impacts of Latino migration to North Carolina; its projects 
include a series of Latino oral histories and a planning program designed to help North 
Carolina cities plan for the needs of new immigrant residents (Latino Migration Project). 
The Latino Migration Project also keeps a list of more than a dozen service projects, 
based at the university, aimed at helping local Latinos: they range from general advocacy 
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to English-language tutoring to free swim classes (Latino Migration Project, 2016). Local 
non-profits in Durham and Chapel Hill include El Centro Hispano, founded in 1992; El 
Futuro, which focuses on providing mental-health support to Latinos; the Tomorrow 
Fund for Hispanic Students, a scholarship program running from 2009 to 2020; and La 
Isla, a series of educational programs targeted at Latino elementary schoolers and their 
families.   
That reach of community organizations extends to banking. The most prominent 
example of such an organization is the Latino Community Credit Union, which was 
founded in Durham in 2000 and now has eleven branches. It claims that, of its 72,000 
members, 65% were previously unbanked (Latino Community Credit Union). Self-Help 
Credit Union also opened its first offices in Durham, in 1982, and the majority of its 
branches are in North Carolina; although it is not explicitly Latino-focused, it includes in 
its literature an emphasis on underserved communities (Self-Help Credit Union). Both 
credit unions have participated in the federal CDFI program. 
All this is not to imply that Latino life in Durham is easy. Less than half of 
Durham’s Latino residents in 2012 held United States citizenship; less than a third lived 
in a house they owned. Moreover, in recent years the North Carolina state government 
has passed several laws targeting the state’s immigrant population, including outlawing 
sanctuary-city measures (including one passed by Charlotte in 2015) and stamping 
driver’s licenses with “No lawful status” (Misra, 2015). The number of Latino-focused 
volunteer efforts in Durham may be as much a reaction to harsh state policies as to the 
burgeoning Latino population itself. 
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There does not appear to be a group in the Durham MSA that focuses specifically 
on Latino entrepreneurs or Latino-owned businesses, although the North Carolina 
Hispanic Chamber of Commerce is headquartered in nearby Raleigh and the North 
Carolina Society of Hispanic Professionals in Cary, also nearby. Although Self-Help 
Credit Union offers a variety of business loans—including SBA 504 loans, which can be 
used to purchase machinery; child-care business loans; and New Market Tax Credit 
loans—it does not appear to offer resources in Spanish or otherwise target Latino 
business-loan customers, and Latino Community Credit Union does not offer business 
loans at all.  
 
4.6.5 Durham: Latino-Owned Businesses in Zip Codes 27703 and 27704, 2012 
Unlike Denver, Durham has few well-defined neighborhoods, and zip codes cover 
several residential areas. Although the Latino Community Credit Union is located in zip 
code 27701, in downtown Durham, zip codes 27703 and 27704 have a higher number of 
Latinos in residence. In 2012 there were 3,263 businesses in the two zip codes combined 
in the Reference USA historical database. Of those, 2,196 had a contact person with a 
surname recorded; and of those records, 867 had that contact person listed as “Owner,” 
“CEO,” “President,” or “Principal.” But comparing those names to the Spanish-surname 
list created by the Census Bureau yielded only 29 businesses that could be said to be 







Table 4.35: Selected Characteristics of 29 Businesses Presumed Latino-Owned in Zip Codes 27703 and 27704, 2012 
(author's calculations from Reference USA historical business data) 
Description Number Percentage of Total 
Business is home-based 6 20.7% 
Executive identified as female 5 17.2% 
Business had fewer than 10 
employees 
25 72.4% 
Business had more than 50 
employees 
0 0% 
Annual sales of less than $500,000 18 62.1% 
Business is a single location 27 93.1% 
Business is a branch of a larger firm 2 6.9% 
 
Table 4.36 shows the industry mix of both the 29 businesses identified and all 
businesses in the two zip codes. With such a small sample, it is difficult to make any 
generalizations about the Latino-owned businesses. It can be said, however, that the mix 
does not suggest that the Latino business owners included are not unrepresentative of the 
Latino populations of northeast Durham. (If, by contrast, many of the 29 businesses had 
been in management or arts and entertainment, that would suggest a mismatch between 
the local Latino residents and the business owners.) 
 
Table 4.36: Industry Classification of All Businesses and Identified Latino-Owned Businesses in Zip Codes 22703 and 
27704, 2012 (author's calculations from Reference USA historical business data) 






Not Given 0 9 0 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 11 4 0 
Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas 
Extraction 
21 2 0 
Utilities 22 2 0 
Construction 23 227 4 
Manufacturing 31-33 202 7 
Wholesale Trade 42 104 2 
Retail Trade 44-45 354 4 
Transportation and Warehousing 48-49 72 2 
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Information 51 43 0 
Finance and Insurance 52 140 0 
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 53 154 1 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical 
Services 
54 230 1 
Management of Companies and 
Enterprises 
55 1 0 
Administrative and Support and Waste 
Management and Remediation Services 
56 107 2 
Educational Services 61 65 0 
Health Care and Social Assistance 62 951 0 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 71 47 0 
Accommodation and Food Services 72 153 3 
Other Services (except Public 
Administration) 
81 398 7 
Public Administration 92 46 0 
Other 99 45 1 
 
As with the analysis of businesses in zip code 80216, some of the businesses in 
zip codes 27703 and 27704 that lacked any information about the owner nevertheless 
were named in a way that suggested a focus on the local Latino market. Table 4.37, 






















Table 4.36 continued 
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Table 4.37: Selected Businesses with No Contact Name in Reference USA Historical Business Data for Zip Codes 
27703 and 27704, 2012 
El Atoron 
El Cuscatleco Restaurant II 
El Pequeno Atoron 
Flores Inc 
Hernandez Auto Repair 
Joyeria El Tesoro 
La Estrella 
La Hispano America Store 
La Monarca Michocana Ice Cream32 
Las Palmas Mexican Restuarant 





Servicios Latinos Multiples 
Tienda La Nortena 
 
Figure 4.28, f, shows the 29 businesses on a map of the Durham MSA, as well as 
El Futuro, El Centro Hispano, and Latino Community Credit Union (in green stars), and 
banks in the two zip codes.  
                                                 
32 According to a 2016 article in Indyweek, a local independent weekly, La Monarca Michoacana is a 
franchise of a Mexican paletería (ice-cream shop) chain. The owners are all from Michoacán, a region of 




Figure 4.28: Selected Latino-Owned Businesses in Zip Codes 27703 and 27704, 2012 (author's creation from 
Reference USA historical business data and GIS data from US Census Bureau and City of Durham) 
 
Again, the paucity of evidence generated from the surname analysis makes it 
difficult to generalize about Latino-owned businesses in Durham. There may have been a 
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developing cluster of Latino-owned businesses close to where the three zip codes meet, 
northeast of downtown Durham, but a more thorough on-the-ground study would be 
required to determine how many Latino-owned businesses are there and how they might 
relate spatially to each other. It can at least be observed, however tentatively, that the 
Latino-owned businesses cluster near larger roads, and that in at least some cases it is 
advantageous to be close to the center of the city. The Latino business owners also seem 
to have some access to banks, especially in 27704. It should be noted that all of the banks 
represented by red dots are branches of larger, non-ethnic banks such as Bank of 
America33 and BB&T34. But are local Latinos less likely to use non-ethnic banks when 
the Latino Community Credit Union is available? Or are they better prepared to apply to 
the non-ethnic banks for business capital? The potential relations between the Latino 
Community Credit Union, local non-ethnic bank branches, and the local Latino customer 
base would make for a valuable case study, which does not seem to exist yet in the 
literature. The Latino Community Credit Union was featured in a case study of ten 
banking institutions identified as successful in reaching the Latino community, but the 
study focused primarily on remittances, and the interviews were conducted in 2002 (Bair, 
2005).  
It appears, from this initial case study, that entrepreneurship is less of a focus for 
organizations serving the Latino community in Durham than it is in other areas, including 
GES. Neither El Futuro nor El Centro Hispano offers programs targeted at aspiring 
                                                 
33 These may previously have been Nationsbank branches. Nationsbank, the product of two banks founded 
in Charlotte in the late 19th century, acquired Bank of America in 1998 and changed its name, although the 
post-merger bank continues to keep its headquarters in Charlotte. 
34 Headquartered in Winston-Salem. 
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entrepreneurs. While both Duke University and the University of North Carolina-Chapel 
Hill have business schools with organizations representing Latino students and 
community-service programs, neither seems to have a community-service program 
dealing specifically with local Latino businesses. A 2004 case study published by Duke 
University’s Fuqua School of Business suggests a deliberate division between the Self-
Help Credit Union, which offered business loans, and the nascent Latino Community 
Credit Union: 
Durham based Self-Help Credit Union explored the possibility of expanding to provide 
retail services to the Latino population, but it determined it did not have the expertise to 
do so. Self-Help provided wholesale services to businesses and homebuyers, serving a 
different segment of the Latino population, and neither its product offering nor its 
physical structures were outfitted to support a retail operation. Most important to the 
Latino community, Self-Help was run by non-Latinos and served all minority groups, so 
there was concern that Latinos would not get the specialized attention they needed. Self-
Help’s leaders felt that a retail operation within Self-Help could mean the continual 
exclusion of Latinos from the U.S. financial system, even though other minority groups 
would benefit. In 1998, it became clear that a community-based financial institution 
would be the most effective way to bridge language and cultural barriers, as well as 
barriers of trust, so Latino leaders began planning for what would eventually be a new, 
immigrant-supported credit union. (Abad & Elboim, 2004) 
 
 
The question thus remains: when Latinos in Durham want to start a business, 
where do they go for money? It may be that the availability of organizations such as El 
Centro Hispano and the Latino Community Credit Union has spillover effects of a sort, in 
that aspiring Latino entrepreneurs have greater resources to start a business even in the 
absence of programs designed specifically to address their needs. It may be that Latino 
aspiring entrepreneurs are underserved in the Durham MSA. Both may be true. 
Determining the process of entrepreneurship, specifically capital acquisition, for Latinos 
in Durham would require more rigorous and specific field work. From this distance it can 
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at least be said that the entrepreneurs of Durham do not have the particular, and 





This chapter has looked at Latino entrepreneurs first at the national level; then at 
the MSA level; and then at the street level for zip codes in two MSAs. The national-level 
data confirms the literature’s finding that Latino entrepreneurs, as a whole, are younger 
than their non-Latino counterparts, less likely to have been born U.S. citizens, and less 
likely to have a bachelor’s or post-bachelor’s degree. Their businesses are also younger 
than those started by non-Latino entrepreneurs, less likely to be owned by family, started 
with less startup capital, and more vulnerable to interruptions in cash flow. The overall 
picture is that Latinos generally start their businesses from a more precarious position 
than do non-Latinos. The Latino respondents to the 2014 also give some evidence of 
being more likely to be pushed into entrepreneurship than non-Latinos, as a greater 
percentage of Latinos cited “couldn’t find a job” or “wanted greater income” as reasons 
to start a business. 
The next set of analyses looked specifically for ways to tease out differences 
between metropolitan areas for Latino entrepreneurs. Latino participation in construction 
is an appealing potential proxy variable, because it is a lower-skill industry that might be 
easier for Latino entrepreneurs with lower levels of formal education to enter, and 
because it is a particularly visible employer of Latinos, especially in new-gateway 
metropolitan areas. But the data is not robust enough to support any strong correlations 
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between share of firms in construction and subsequent performance. The analysis then 
turns to the proposed “gateway” classification, which has been used frequently to discuss 
shifts in immigration settlement and general demographics.35 If the gateway classification 
is useful for Latino entrepreneurship, then there should be a difference between how 
businesses perform in metropolitan areas with longer histories of immigrant settlement 
and those with little or no history of hosting an immigrant population. The evidence for 
such a difference is hard to see, and even harder when taking to account the specific cases 
of Denver and Durham, one a re-emerging MSA whose Latino population in the 
Globeville and Elyria-Swansea neighborhoods nevertheless seems to be having difficulty 
forming any sort of supportive ethnic enclave, the other a minor-emerging MSA in a state 
notably hostile to immigrant integration that nevertheless has a more extensive financial 
support network for local Latinos. 
  
                                                 
35 According to Google Scholar, Singer (2004) has been cited more than 700 times, and the book 
Twenty-First Century Gateways: Immigrant Incorporation in Suburban America (Singer et al., 2009) has 
been cited more than 400 times. 
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Chapter 5 : Conclusion 
 
5.1 Introduction and Summary 
 
The previous four chapters focused on the question of finding which 
metropolitan-area level factors might affect the formation and performance of Latino-
owned businesses. The first chapter introduced the problem and explained its importance, 
both in terms of expanding the literature on immigrant entrepreneurship and in terms of 
introducing the consideration of such factors to local practitioners, especially planners. 
Chapter 2 showed how patterns of Latino immigration have shifted since 1990, and what 
that implies for Latino entrepreneurship and for the economies and politics of the 
metropolitan areas which have seen significant, and unforeseen, surges in Latino 
population. Chapter 3 reviewed the relevant literature on immigrant entrepreneurship: 
why immigrants might decide to found businesses; how their surrounding environment, 
including proximity to co-ethnics, might influence their decision and the subsequent 
focus of, and performance of, their business; how immigrant entrepreneurship is often 
intertwined with community formation and community development; what obstacles 
immigrant and minority entrepreneurs often face, and which of those obstacles are most 
likely to be encountered by aspiring Latino entrepreneurs; and what research has been 
done to date looking at immigrant entrepreneurship with an emphasis on different 
geographic scales. Finally, Chapter 4 used analysis at three different scales to 
demonstrate the differences between Latino and non-Latino entrepreneurs and their firms, 
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and to test methods of uncovering how those differences might be reduced or exaggerated 
in different metropolitan areas. 
This final chapter will consider the implications of this previous research. The 
question “Which metropolitan-level factors affect Latino-owned business performance?” 
is not easily answered with the present data available. However, when combining the 
literature and the multiple analyses presented here, it is possible to draw conclusions that 
have implications for researchers, policy-makers, and economic development and 
community development professionals. 
 
5.2 Implications for Data Collection 
 
Comparative, quantitative research of Latino-owned business performance is a 
contribution to the literature because it is relatively rare: much of the past research on 
immigrant entrepreneurship was sociological in origin, qualitative in nature, and case-
study in form. This dissertation is meant to follow the lead of researchers such as Liu 
(2012b, 2014); Liu and Abdullahi (2012); Liu and Painter (2011, 2012), Q. Wang (2012, 
2013a, 2013b, 2013c); Q. Wang and Li (2007); and the team led by Fong (Fong et al., 
2008; Fong et al., 2007, 2012; Fong, Luk, & Ooka, 2005) in examining immigrant 
entrepreneurship with an emphasis on spatial variables. In doing so, it has demonstrated 
where current data collection efforts may be impeding researchers from assessing the 
relationship between business performance and the metropolitan context, and making 
comparisons between metropolitan areas. 
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Part of the challenge for researchers derives from studying businesses, which 
means including privately-owned as well as publicly-owned firms; and privately-owned 
firms disclose less than do publicly-owned firms. Similarly, the economic impacts of 
larger firms are easier to see and measure than those of smaller firms. This creates the 
potential for an understandable but unhelpful bias when talking about business 
performance from an economic development perspective. As an example of how this bias 
might affect policy decisions and discussions, it may be easier to plan for and promote 
the potential jobs brought by a second Amazon headquarters (even if those predictions 
turn out to be quite wrong) than it would be to plan for and promote the potential jobs 
created by twenty local businesses, because Amazon’s quarterly filings and annual 
reports provide a concrete numerical peg for the discussion.  
Acquiring data for comparative research is an even greater challenge. The 
advantages of the Survey of Business Owners are that it is administered nationwide, in 
multiple metropolitan areas, and standardized, reducing some uncertainty in making 
comparisons between MSAs. The 2007 and 2012 SBOs have the additional advantage of 
treating ethnicity and race as separate questions, preventing conflation between Latino 
self-identification and racial self-identification.  However, the Survey of Business 
Owners is a snapshot of business activity taken once every five years.36 Therefore it is 
difficult to assess year-over-year business performance, and assess whether greater 
numbers of small businesses, as is true for Latino communities in many MSAs, indicate 
                                                 
36 In June 2018 the Census Bureau announced plans to replace the SBO, the ASE, and the Business 
Research and Development and Innovation Survey for Microbusinesses (BRDI-M) with one new survey, 
the Annual Business Survey (ABS). The ABS survey questionnaire is very similar to that of the ASE, 
although it adds sections on “Innovation” and “Research and Development.” The first ABS data is not 
scheduled to be released until December 2019 at the earliest (United States Bureau of the Census, 2018). 
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recent new entrepreneurial growth or a collective difficulty in growing businesses beyond 
a certain size. Furthermore, comparing 2007 to 2012, the two most recent SBO iterations 
available, obscures the economic tumult of the Great Recession; a metropolitan area with 
similar business numbers in both surveys might have looked very different had one of the 
surveys taken place in 2009 or 2010. Finally, the Survey of Business Owners identifies its 
sample from federal tax records, meaning it is less likely to include smaller and informal 
businesses.  
This research also used privately held data from Reference USA, available to the 
street address. The chief disadvantage of the Reference USA historical data is that it has 
no information as to the business owner’s ethnic identity, requiring the use of surname 
analysis. But not every record has a name attached, and in many cases the person whose 
name is associated with the business in the Reference USA database may not be the 
owner. In short, while address-level data is useful for discerning spatial patterns, future 
research would benefit from drawing from additional methods of determining Latino-
owned businesses when examining a particular area, such as field work and direct 
observation, the use of secondary sources such as the local Páginas Amarillas, or local 
administrative records related to taxes, zoning requests, or health inspections. 
Going forward, there are two aspects of research design to consider: the type of 
data collected and aggregated, and longitudinal versus snapshot data. Longitudinal data 
can show what happens to a particular cohort of businesses over a period of time, giving 
the researcher more opportunities to distinguish trends among expected business churn. 
Useful longitudinal surveys on entrepreneurship include the Panel Survey of 
Entrepreneurial Dynamics, which began screening in 1998 and conducted surveys 2005 
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through 2011, and the Kauffman Firm Survey, which ran from 2004 to 2011. Latinos are 
unfortunately underrepresented in the latter survey, which emphasized technology firms. 
Meanwhile, the current Stanford Latino Entrepreneurship Initiative is in the process of 
assembling a nationwide database of Latino business owners, which could lead to future 
opportunities for longitudinal studies.  
But even with a longitudinal study, the metrics for measuring business 
performance have to be chosen carefully. Year-over-year growth is the most obvious 
choice, but a lack of growth, as discussed earlier, does not necessarily imply the business 
is not meeting its owner’s goals (and growth itself does not guarantee profitability).  The 
researcher has to ask the question: successful for whom? From the standpoint of the local 
economic development authority, a large business that employs more people may be 
preferable to several small ones. But a particular business might be helping or harming 
the local community in ways not captured in a simple profit-and-loss or tax-revenue 
calculation—as might Latino entrepreneurs in their community-organization efforts, such 
as helping to sponsor local festivals, or in positioning their stores as social spaces. 
One potential alternate approach to data collection, then, is explicitly problem-
driven: the researcher first answers the question, “Successful for whom?” and then 
chooses metrics from there. If the “whom” is the metropolitan area, then such metrics as 
tax revenue and number of employees would be more useful. If the focus is on the 
entrepreneurs themselves, then the data gathered may have more to do with credit 
acquisition, loan repayment, business longevity, and business growth. A study more 
concerned with the employees of locally started businesses, then the focus would be on 
such factors as payroll and commute time. This does imply a greater emphasis on local 
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and bottom-up, rather than national and top-down, data collection efforts. Locally 
collected data runs the risk of making comparisons more difficult, as the data collection 
and presentation may not be standardized. 
There remain, however, multiple promising new avenues for data collection in 
regards to Latino entrepreneurship and/or immigrant entrepreneurship more generally. 
Microdata from underutilized sources, such as restaurant-licensing and health-inspection 
data (Hoalst-Pullen et al., 2013) could be used to locate and track Latino-owned 
businesses. School-enrollment data could be used to observe migration patterns and 
distinguish Latino communities by country or place of origin and first language spoken. 
Finally, given the emphasis on community-building through philanthropy among 
successful Latino entrepreneurs (Agius Vallejo, 2015), charitable-contribution data and 
publicly-disclosed data from non-profit organizations could add to our understanding of 
the interplay between entrepreneurship, community-building, and neighborhood 
formation, particularly in neighborhoods with higher concentrations of native-born 
Latinos. 
 
5.3 Implications for Theory and Future Research 
Hand in hand with the problems of data presentation goes the question of what 
scale is the most appropriate for studying Latino entrepreneurship. Given the 
disadvantages of the data collected at the metropolitan-area level, discussed in the 
previous section, many researchers understandably eschew higher-level quantitative data 
in favor of conducting their own smaller surveys or case studies. This research is valuable 
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but can be hard to apply for comparative purposes. As an example, take Young et al. 
(2009) on the financial behaviors of Latino (largely Latina) immigrants in Las Vegas. As 
they note, the local hospitality-services union had mounted a successful campaign to 
educate its members on the benefits of participating in traditional banking services, to the 
point that over three-fourths of survey respondents had a checking account. As a case of a 
non-governmental third party providing financial education to Latino immigrants, this is 
an encouraging case, worth studying; but how unique is it? Is financial education a 
common union benefit? Did the hospitality workers in Las Vegas respond differently than 
might, say, transportation workers in Savannah or Long Beach or food-service workers in 
New York City? The Young et al. study does not say, and is not designed to say. It does 
not take anything away from that study to wish that it had a twin, focusing on a different 
subgroup of Latino immigrants or a different industry or metropolitan area. 
One methodological approach worth considering, then, is the comparative case 
study, of two different metropolitan areas or two different ethnic groups in the same area. 
A model for such research in economic development literature is Saxenian (1996), which 
compares technological development and work cultures in Silicon Valley and the Route 
128 corridor in Massachusetts over a period of decades. By focusing closely on two 
cases, Saxenian is able to highlight differences in the decisions made by entrepreneurs in 
both areas, while still being able to point out commonalities that might also be found in 
areas well outside Silicon Valley and Route 128. Immigrant-entrepreneurship literature is 
not bereft of such cases: examples include Lo et al. (2003) comparing Polish and Somali 
immigrant groups in Toronto and Q. Wang and Li (2007) comparing Latino 
entrepreneurs in three American cities. But for the most part the literature comes from 
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broader surveys or from case studies based on one group in one area. A comparative 
study, such as the brief overview of neighborhoods in Denver and Durham presented 
here, can present more opportunities to note where Latino entrepreneurs’ experiences are 
similar across metropolitan areas, and where differences might be attributable to specific 
local policies. 
Another option is the embedded case study, which focuses not on the 
metropolitan area, or even the street, but the firm. Studying a particular firm over a period 
of time allows the researcher to illustrate the effects of the local business environment on 
an aspiring entrepreneur through examples and narrative. A well-known example of the 
embedded case study in planning literature is Flyvbjerg’s book-length description of the 
planning process surrounding accessibility to the city center of Aalborg, Denmark (1998). 
Firm-based embedded case studies have also contributed to management literature: a 
particularly thoughtful example is Weeks (2004). But they are much rarer in planning 
literature, because the unit of planning study is generally the city, region, or 
neighborhood, rather than the firm. Furthermore, a firm-based embedded case study 
requires a considerable amount of empathy and cultural sensitivity (not to mention 
fluency in the primary language or languages spoken within the business), and implies a 
certain amount of risk on the part of the researcher should the business fail before 
sufficient research can be gathered. An aspiring researcher might mitigate that risk by 
embedding with two or three firms—which, again, points back to the potential usefulness 
of the comparative case study. 
A few more specific points can be made from this research: 
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The “gateway” typology is less useful for describing Latino entrepreneurship 
and Latino-owned business activity than it is for describing shifts in immigrant 
settlement patterns. Sections 4.4.4 and 4.5 used the gateway typology to compare 
Latino-owned business performance in two different sets of MSAs. Specifically, Section 
4.4.4 tested re-emerging and minor-emerging gateways, to determine how the difference 
between the two might affect Latino-owned business performance, while Section 4.5, in 
comparing MSAs in different gateways, included a dummy variable for history of 
immigrant settlement. The “gateway” typology relies on two different measurements: 
immigration rates prior to 1990 and immigration rates post-1990. If a metropolitan area’s 
history of receiving immigrants makes a difference to how current immigrant-owned 
businesses perform, then a comparison of these two groups—the re-emerging gateways 
having hosted immigrant populations at the start of the 20th century, a history the minor-
emerging gateways lacked—should have shown differences in Latino-owned business 
performance. The first analysis, comparing the minor-emerging and re-emerging MSAs, 
failed to show this difference, while the history dummy in the second, broader analysis 
was not statistically significant. 
Any comparison of metropolitan areas remains subject to confounding variables. 
To give just one example in the case of the minor-emerging and re-emerging MSAs, the 
former group is clustered mostly in the southeastern United States, with traditionally 
lower housing costs; the latter group includes Seattle, Portland, and San Jose, three 
metropolitan areas known for high housing costs. The Latino populations settling in the 
two sets of MSAs appear to differ, in terms of likelihood of citizenship and comfort level 
with English; these factors can be expected, in turn, to influence Latino business 
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formation, although given the data available they did not have particular predictive 
power. As such, while the idea of the gateway might provide a useful demographic and 
political framework for describing immigrant settlement patterns, the variables it 
emphasizes—immigration history in particular—may not be the most useful ones when 
looking for metropolitan-level differences specifically with regard to Latino 
entrepreneurship. 
Local factors matter. The Denver and Durham case studies further cast doubt on 
the utility of the “re-emerging” category in particular with respect to Latino business 
activity. In both northeastern Durham and the Globeville / Elyria-Swansea 
neighborhoods, Latinos faced common disadvantages, chiefly lower incomes and lower 
levels of formal education than the majority population. But although Globeville and 
Elyria-Swansea have over a century of history of immigrant settlement and immigrant 
community formation, a history not available to Durham neighborhoods, there seem to be 
more resources available to the Latino community in Durham than in the Denver 
neighborhoods. In this particular case, heavy industry presence and geographic isolation 
following the building of I-70 and I-25 seem to have limited entrepreneurial prospects in 
Globeville and Elyria-Swansea. In fact, one could say that in this particular case, 
Denver’s history as a re-emerging immigrant gateway worked to the disadvantage of its 
current residents: the very industrial plants that provided employment from immigrants 
from central and eastern Europe at the end of the nineteenth century left behind a zoning 
footprint that continues to impact GES residents’ lives in the twenty-first, even though 
industrial production is no longer a potential major employer in the area. 
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Durham, meanwhile, saw its Latino-owned businesses grow dramatically from 
2007 to 2012, in the midst of an economic downturn. Admittedly, this growth was from a 
small start, but it is still remarkable, given the national economic circumstances of the 
time and given the anti-immigrant sentiment expounded by the North Carolina state 
legislature. As a university town in the midst of a “Research Triangle” where both public 
policy and private actors encourage the recruiting of high-tech businesses, Durham does 
not at first glance look like a metropolitan area that would be hospitable to low-skilled 
business formation. But the presence of two major universities in the metropolitan area 
means opportunities for nonprofit formation and application, creating an environment for 
such efforts as the Latino Community Credit Union to succeed. A different typology 
might separate Durham and Columbus, Ohio—another minor-emerging metropolitan area 
with a large research university present—from minor-emerging gateways such as 
Lakeland-Winter Haven and Cape Coral-Fort Myers, Florida, which do not. 
The link between Latino entrepreneurship and the construction industry 
should not be over-emphasized. Latino entrepreneurship is stereotypically associated 
with the construction industry, in part because of the role Latino immigrant workers 
played in constructing the houses of the late-1990s and early-2000s boom. And 
construction was one of the largest industries for Latino entrepreneurship, construing 
16% of all Latino firms in the 2012 SBO. Yet testing showed little value for share of 
Latino firms in construction as a predictive variable. Moreover, in the regression analysis 
of 57 different metropolitan areas, the percentage of the local labor market working in 
construction did not have a statistically significant relationship with the percentage of 
Latinos reporting self-employment. 
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This suggests several possibilities for future research. One is to look more deeply 
about Latino entrepreneurship in construction, particularly to the role labor by 
undocumented Latinos, and informal businesses, play in this industry. If Latino 
immigrants are pushed into construction (or service) work because lack of documentation 
makes it difficult for them to start businesses in other fields, it may be that undocumented 
workers’ limited options act to distort the market, providing a artificially large source of 
workers. Another possible line of research is to survey Latino entrepreneurs who have 
built more than one business to see whether they change industries; it could be that 
entrepreneurs do not stay in construction but rather use it as an initial entry into 
entrepreneurship. A third possibility is that Latino entrepreneurship in construction was 
the exception, driven by the housing boom, rather than the rule, and that to associate 
Latino entrepreneurship with construction is to fail to recognize that Latino entrepreneurs 
might be adapting to changing economic circumstances and market demands. All of this 
is speculation; but it serves to emphasize that the relationship between Latino 
entrepreneurship and the construction industry is not as clear-cut as the stereotypes would 
have it. 
The relationship between Latino-owned business performance and local 
political activity regarding immigrant settlement requires further research. The case 
study of Durham, in a state whose legislature has recently passed some of the most 
restrictive anti-immigrant legislation in the country, failed to settle the question: did the 
small number of identified Latino-owned businesses in the metropolitan area reflect anti-
immigrant hostility? Again, scale is an issue. Communities in cities such as Durham—
and Charlotte, where lawmakers’ efforts at passing sanctuary-city legislation was 
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deliberately targeted and outlawed by the state legislature (Misra, 2015)—may 
deliberately position themselves as pro-immigrant; and yet the immigrants living in those 
communities have to balance the state threats against the city opportunities. County 
governments offer another layer of potential welcoming or potential hostility. Chapel 
Hill, in Orange County, is in the Durham MSA; one county west is Alamance County, 
which in 2012 was actually expelled from the 287(g) program because the Justice 
Department found its enforcement efforts too obviously anti-Latino (Willets, 2017).37  
Common sense says that, by limiting the ability of undocumented Latino 
immigrants to engage in normal day-to-day activities, more restrictive immigration 
enforcement cuts into Latino businesses’ co-ethnic customer base. Having conducted a 
survey of small businesses in eleven different markets across the country, the National 
Association for Latino Community Asset Builders (NALCAB) found similar results: 
Since early 2017, policy changes and increased immigration enforcement have created 
uncertainty and fear within immigrant communities across the country, and have 
triggered a significant market disruption. There are grave concerns about how increased 
enforcement impacts family and social cohesion, and economic impacts are already being 
felt by entrepreneurs, who have seen a decline in consumption of their goods and services 
as their customers prioritize remittances to their home countries. Entrepreneurs are also 
less willing to take on debt or participate in asset building activities for fear of 
deportation, raising serious concerns about economic vitality in urban and rural 
communities where immigrants have played a key role in fostering vibrant economies. 
(National Association of Latino Community Asset Builders (NALCAB), 2017) 
 
One question for future research is whether the wrong correlation was tested: does 
greater Latino-owned business activity lead to greater anti-immigrant legislation? In this 
                                                 
37 In November 2017 Alamance County re-applied for 287(g) participation (Willets, 2017). As of late April 
2018 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement lists six North Carolina counties participating in the 
287(g) program, including Mecklenburg County, which covers the city of Charlotte. Alamance County is 
not listed (U.S. Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 2018).  
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hypothesis, greater success on the part of Latino business owners, and greater visibility of 
Latino business activity, is interpreted as a threat to the white, native-born majority. But 
looking at examples of recent scholarship on the sources of anti-immigrant sentiment 
give little support to this hypothesis. Fetzer’s (2011) survey of factors influencing public 
attitudes in Europe and the United States does not discuss entrepreneurs or small 
businesses. Sabia (2010), studying nativist beliefs in Georgia, which like North Carolina 
had little history of Latino settlement before the 1990s, does mention economic fears, but 
only in the sense of white and African-American native-born workers fearing job loss to 
the Latino newcomers. Greater visibility did seem to arouse native-born hostility, though, 
in the form of Spanish-language radio stations, billboards, and advertisements—all of 
which would suggest greater wealth and business activity on the part of the local Latino 
community. 
Therefore it remains possible but not proven both that native-born communities 
respond to increased Latino entrepreneurship with hostility, and that anti-immigrant 
legislation affects Latino-owned firms. Future comparative research will have to examine 
whether differences in legislation directed at recent immigrants passed by counties and 
states, welcoming or hostile lead to differences in the health of those areas’ business 
communities. 
While the gateway typology does emphasize the historical receptivity of certain 
gateways toward immigrant settlement, it has not been updated to reflect more recent 
differing reactions to immigrant settlement in newer gateways. Two different 
metropolitan areas in the same gateway classification might have two different local and 
political reactions to a growth in local immigrant population. In fact, given the earlier 
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observations about 287(g) enforcement jurisdictions and sanctuary cities overlapping 
each other within the same metropolitan areas (exemplified in the case of Durham), any 
one gateway may well have a multitude of local and political reactions to a growth in 
local immigrant population.  Which is to say: if a “gateway” reacts with anti-immigrant 
legislation, and fails to put in policies to support those new residents, should it really be 
called a “gateway”? What if a gateway reacts with anti-immigrant legislation and puts in 
policies to support new residents? The gateway classification may be more useful if it can 
be expanded to include the formation and effects of particular efforts directed at 
immigrant populations, either to support or to repel. Very recent research on the idea of 
the “welcoming city” (Huang & Liu, 2018; McDaniel, Rodriguez, & Kim, 2017) may 
help expand understanding of the relationship between new immigrant populations and 
the sociopolitical environments that greet them. 
Latino business owners, particularly in new gateways, may not form 
traditional ethnic enclaves in the manner of previous immigrant communities in 
more urbanized metropolitan areas. Both of the case studies failed to show significant 
clustering of Latino-owned businesses. While that may be a reflection of the limited 
street-level data, it also reflects the greater suburbanization of Latino and immigrant 
communities in metropolitan areas outside the best-known urban major-continuous 
gateways. Here it is important to remember that not every suburban immigrant 
community is an “ethnoburb.” Since the beginning (Li, 1998) ethnoburbs have been 
discussed as concentrations of higher-than-average personal incomes. Ethnoburbs are 
also defined by residential concentration, rather than business concentration. As a result, 
a co-ethnic concentration in a suburban area does not guarantee an ethnoburb. The 
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contrast of Latino-owned businesses doing well in Miami, known for supporting an 
ethnic enclave, and less well in Atlanta, where Latino in-migration is considerably more 
recent and scattered throughout a large metropolitan area (Q. Wang, 2013a), suggests that 
suburbanization may impede the formation of ethnic enclaves that could support Latino-
owned business growth, particularly for Latino immigrants. 
The creation of enclaves is made easier by spatial proximity and higher levels of 
enforceable trust, both of which may be harder in find in less dense neighborhoods. 
(Auto-dependent urban design may also hinder networking, especially in metropolitan 
areas where Latinos are particularly worried about being harassed by police while 
driving.) Business networks can be facilitated; in the absence of such facilitation they 
may be less likely to occur, and their benefits to their participants may be fewer. Which 
leads to the last point: how policy-makers can take the research presented here and 
translate it into actions to aid Latino business owners. 
 
5.4 Implications for Planning Practice 
 
The research, both in previous literature and the quantitative data presented here, 
is unequivocal: Latino entrepreneurs suffer from particular disadvantages when compared 
to their non-Latino peers. The most frequent disadvantage is limited access to business 
capital: Latinos have fewer ways to acquire it, start their businesses with less of it, and 
are in greater danger of having to close their businesses due to the lack of it. A second 
potential lack is not business capital but business knowledge, such as how to create a 
business plan, how to apply for a loan, and how to keep abreast of tax and health 
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regulations. In both these areas, plus the related areas of marketing and networking, lie 
clear opportunities for planning practitioners working in economic development to help 
facilitate the growth of local Latino entrepreneurship. 
Networking and marketing facilitation are common business-development 
practices, as discussed by Leigh and Blakely (2013). In a 2014 survey of city- and 
county-based economic development practitioners, three-quarters reported having a local 
business publicity program in their toolkit, 84% conducted surveys of local businesses, 
and 83% engaged in some kind of tourism promotion (International City-County 
Management Association, 2014). Therefore economic development professionals should 
be able to extend their marketing efforts to local Latino-owned businesses. Depending on 
the mix of local firms, such promotions could come as part of general marketing 
strategies, as part of a specific effort promoting business diversity, or both.  
Local Latino business owners and aspiring entrepreneurs might also benefit from 
networking events. Non-Latino economic development professionals should understand 
that networking, even among co-ethnics, does not happen automatically. It would be a 
mistake to read Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) and jump to the conclusion that ethnic 
communities automatically generate bounded solidarity—or, for that matter, that an 
absence of bounded solidarity implies a community too weak or fragmented to form an 
enclave. A contrasting, but still instructive, example is that of Welch (2010), who 
described the amount of effort and patience it took to create a networking group of Latino 
business owners in a rural Iowa community. While the networking community that 
emerged was entirely Latino, some intervention was required to facilitate meetings and 
communication between the members. The work of Valdez (2008), Levanon (2014), and 
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Lo et al. (2003) also serve as reminders that an enclave as a group might still be 
disadvantaged, even if showing high levels of social capital and bounded solidarity. 
Local planners and economic development professionals may be able to 
contribute to work already started by community organizations and non-profits. The 
United States Hispanic Chamber of Commerce has more than 200 local branches (United 
States Hispanic Chamber of Commerce (USHCC), 2018). Other umbrella organizations 
include NALCAB; Hispanic Federation, which covers the greater New York City area; 
and industry-specific associations such as ALPFA (Association of Latino Professionals 
For America) and SHPE (Society of Hispanic Professional Engineers). Branches of these 
organizations may in turn partner with local organizations, such as Durham’s Latino 
Community Credit Union or Atlanta’s Latin American Association.38 These established 
organizations, some tied specifically to business and others more broadly serving the 
Latino community, would be able to help economic development professionals better 
document the focus and needs of local Latino entrepreneurs. This recommendation is 
similar to that given by Carpenter and Loveridge (2018) in their examination of minority-
owned businesses using Census microdata. 
The case study by Agius Vallejo (2009) of the Santa Ana, California, chapter for 
the Association for Latinas in Business (ALB) (a pseudonym) is valuable both in its 
detailed, sympathetic descriptions of Latina networking efforts and in the way it suggests 
                                                 
38 To date there is not a great deal of literature specifically looking at the role of Latino churches and other 
religious organizations in providing social services. Hung (2007), in analyzing differences in non-profits 
serving particular ethnic groups, found that such activities may be more often provided by non-religious 
service non-profits. Brown (2008) found that Latino congregations were less likely to provide long-term 




local economic development professionals could enhance those efforts. Agius Vallejo 
describes how the ALB’s activities take place in the context of Orange County, which has 
a long history of discrimination, both legal and social, against its Latino population. She 
herself experienced such discrimination while working at the ALB’s behalf at an event 
billed as “Orange County’s Largest Mixer” for business professionals: 
When an older, well‐dressed white male approached our table, I handed him a 
membership brochure and inquired about his line of work. He replied that he is a 
cosmetic surgeon in Laguna Beach, an affluent city located in South Orange County, and 
that he specializes in working with women professionals who may not have a lot of time 
to go under the knife for lengthy procedures. I suggested he join the Association for 
Latinas in Business as it might be a good opportunity to obtain new clients because a 
majority of the ALB’s members are female entrepreneurs and professionals. He promptly 
handed back the membership brochure and exclaimed, “This is a Latina organization? I 
don't think your members are my caliber of people. I usually deal with the Newport 
Beach type of ladies.” (Agius Vallejo, 2009) 
 
In such cases the economic development practitioner can promote groups such as 
ALB, normalizing their presence in majority-dominated existing business networks, and 
pushing back against the idea that Latino participants are not of the same “caliber” as 
white participants. In this way the economic development professional is something of an 
intermediary between Latino-serving organizations and the greater business community, 
allowing Latino entrepreneurs to access a larger network while retaining the benefits of 
working primarily with a culturally competent organization. 
In the case of credit facilitation, the balance between economic development 
provision and local community-development organization would have to be even more 
delicate. It is one thing to facilitate greater access to capital, and another to actually be the 
capital provider. Making loans to small businesses, regardless of the entrepreneur’s 
background, is inherently risky, and local planners may not have the financial capital—
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or, perhaps even more crucially, the political capital—to become venture capitalists, 
especially in metropolitan areas where immigrant settlement is particularly contested. As 
Bates (2000a) observed in his overview of the history of MESBICs, many of those 
organizations, although they were receiving government financing to support borrowers 
deemed a higher credit risk, ended up either failing altogether, hobbled by lack of 
repayments, or financing only larger businesses deemed less risky, thus limiting their 
ability to reach the very borrowers they were created to serve. 
For economic developers and other policy-makers to assume the responsibility of 
making loans to minority entrepreneurs also fails to take into account the historical trend 
of immigrant groups coming up with ways to fund their own ventures, from the founding 
of a bank for Japanese-Americans in Los Angeles in the 1920s to the founding of the 
Latino Community Credit Union in Durham in 2000. But the latter is the exception, not 
the rule, for Latino communities. Cantor’s survey of nonprofits serving Latinos in the 
Washington, D.C., metropolitan area (2008) found that they were largely small and had 
few financial reserves to draw from; two-fifths had less than $100,000 in assets. In short, 
even if there are organizations serving the local Latino community that recognize a need 
for more capital, they may not have the administrative or financial capacity to meet that 
need. 
The economic development planner’s role, then, will depend on the identified 
needs of the local community. The planner might act as a facilitator between local 
organizations, entrepreneurs, and traditional banks. The planner’s role may be more 
indirect, supporting financial-education efforts in hopes of spawning more direct links 
between traditional banks and the Latino community. The planners may seek to attract 
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financial institutions already working with Latinos to open new local branches. Or they 
may support programs that operate more as entrepreneurship facilitators than as direct 
lenders, such as La Cocina in San Francisco, a non-profit “food incubator” that works 
exclusively with low-income, primarily Latina, aspiring restaurant owners. La Cocina’s 
model has inspired similar efforts, including Comal restaurant run by Focus Points in 
Elyria-Swansea. 
Such policy practices will require a willingness on the part of the planner or 
planning group to invest time and effort in cultivating a relationship with local nonprofits 
or community representatives. It will also require respecting the accumulated knowledge 
of the community partner and being willing to defer to that knowledge when appropriate. 
And even a planning agency that accomplishes all that humbly and well will might still 
underserve a portion of the Latino population. Existing organizations might attract Latino 
participants of one particular national, regional, or linguistic background, but seen as less 
responsive by a different portion of the Latino population; parents caring for children, or 
children caring for elderly parents, may have less flexibility in their schedules and less 
ability to travel to meetings; undocumented residents may lack driver’s licenses or be too 
worried about immigration authorities to travel, much less start a business. A government 
agency trying to gather data may be met with distrust.  
In short, there is no one perfect way for economic developers to reach out and 
help the aspiring entrepreneurs in their Latino communities. But for those planners 




5.5 What Next for Latino Entrepreneurship Research? 
This dissertation has illustrated both the necessity for and challenges of 
understanding how Latinos start and maintain businesses in the United States. Both 
within a particular MSA and comparatively across metropolitan areas, there remain a 
number of possibilities for future research. This becomes clear if we consider the 
founding of a business as not a smooth, straight process, but as a series of interactions, 
the outcomes of which are not necessarily predictable. What planning and preliminary 
research will the business owner be able to do? Will the business founder be able to 
obtain financing? How much, and from whom? What kind of physical space will the new 
business need, and will that space be available? Who is the founder’s target audience, and 
will they come? What regulations will the new founder have to abide by, and who wrote 
them, and who might be campaigning to repeal them? The context in which 
entrepreneurship takes place is not fixed; to borrow a cliché, it is a river into which no 
two aspiring entrepreneurs ever step into the same way. 
This research has also suggested a number of potential avenues for future research 
specific to Latino entrepreneurs, such as: 
• How might social media and Internet use affect Latino entrepreneurs’ 
ability to gain financial capital and business information outside of their 
local networks?  
• What is the relationship between density and entrepreneurial activity more 
generally, and between density and Latino entrepreneurship activity in 
particular? What effects do urban design, particularly auto-dependent 
design and suburbanization, have on how both native-born and foreign-
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born Latinos conceive of, locate, and finance their businesses? What 
effects might suburban location have on how Latino entrepreneurs target 
potential markets? 
• How do Latino entrepreneurs choose business locations? What role might 
co-ethnic real estate professionals play in facilitating Latino 
entrepreneurship? What factors go into choosing the physical location for 
a business? 
• How do differing and overlapping regulations at the city, metropolitan-
area, county, and state level affect the formation and maintenance of 
Latino-owned businesses? 
• Finally, how does Latino entrepreneurship in metropolitan areas with a 
disproportionately large share of one particular country or place of origin 
(such as Mexican origin in the southwest United States, or Puerto Rican 
origin in northeastern metropolitan areas) differ from entrepreneurship in 
Latino communities with a mix of countries and places of origin? 
This dissertation has described the state of Latino entrepreneurship at multiple 
scales, from the national to the street-level. In doing so it has illuminated how Latino 
entrepreneurship might grow at the local level and helped to illustrate the many different 
contributors to the formation and survival of a business. As such, and as a stepping stone 
to future work, it will prove valuable to scholars—and also, perhaps, to entrepreneurs and 






A.1 Statistics from the 2014 Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs (ASE) 
 
A.1.1 Industry Mix 


















Firms in Sample 
0 Total for all sectors 298,563 4,823,485 0.43% 0.50% 
11 Agriculture, forestry, 
fishing and hunting 
1,296 23,923 0.16% 0.41% 
21 Mining, quarrying, and 
oil and gas extraction 
485 19,639 0.02% 0.05% 
22 Utilities 65 2,321 13.51% 12.17% 
23 Construction 40,340 587,206 3.90% 4.61% 
31-33 Manufacturing 11,649 222,342 5.25% 5.67% 
42 Wholesale trade 15,683 273,588 10.77% 12.30% 
44-45 Retail trade 32,152 593,371 5.85% 3.05% 
48-49 Transportation and 
warehousing 
17,460 147,084 0.70% 1.22% 
51 Information 2,081 58,691 3.38% 4.15% 
52 Finance and insurance 10,104 200,213 3.45% 5.05% 
53 Real estate and rental 
and leasing 
10,291 243,775 10.38% 14.79% 
54 Professional, scientific, 
and technical services 
30,986 713,317 0.08% 0.30% 
55 Management of 
companies and 
enterprises 
243 14,501 8.36% 5.91% 
56 Administrative and 
support and waste 
management and 
remediation services 
24,970 285,066 0.85% 1.10% 
61 Educational services 2,544 52,920 10.32% 10.97% 
62 Health care and social 
assistance 
30,818 529,335 0.84% 1.74% 
71 Arts, entertainment, and 
recreation 
2,500 83,874 13.52% 9.07% 
72 Accommodation and 
food services 
40,371 437,364 8.23% 7.04% 
81 Other services (except 
public administration) 
24,565 339,553 0.18% 0.58% 




















Firms in Sample 
χ2 = 27,331; df = 19; p < 2.2 * e-16 
 
 

















Owned Firms with Paid 
Employees (2012 SBO) 
0 Total for all 
sectors 




1,296 631 0.16% 0.24% 
21 Mining, quarrying, 
and oil and gas 
extraction 
485 700 0.02% 0.05% 
22 Utilities 65 135 13.51% 13.46% 
23 Construction 40,340 38,704 3.90% 3.64% 
31-33 Manufacturing 11,649 10,475 5.25% 5.93% 
42 Wholesale trade 15,683 17,036 10.77% 11.53% 
44-45 Retail trade 32,152 33,136 5.85% 5.32% 
48-49 Transportation and 
warehousing 
17,460 15,291 0.70% 0.80% 
51 Information 2,081 2,312 3.38% 2.97% 
52 Finance and 
insurance 
10,104 8,529 3.45% 3.48% 
53 Real estate and 
rental and leasing 




30,986 29,582 0.08% 0.13% 
55 Management of 
companies and 
enterprises 
243 376 8.36% 8.78% 
56 Administrative and 




24,970 25,243 0.85% 0.75% 
61 Educational 
services 
2,544 2,142 10.32% 10.55% 
62 Health care and 
social assistance 




2,500 2,350 13.52% 13.16% 
72 Accommodation 
and food services 
40,371 37,825 8.23% 8.07% 
81 Other services 
(except public 
administration) 
24,565 23,214 0.18% 0.09% 
99 Industries not 
classified 
530 269   
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Owned Firms with Paid 
Employees (2012 SBO) 
χ2 = 864.86; df = 19; p < 2.2 * e-16 
 
 
A.1.2 Citizenship Status at Birth 
Table A.3: Respondents' Citizenship Status at Birth by Ethnicity (from 2014 ASE data)39 
Owner’s Citizenship Status Latino Non-Latino Total 
Born a US citizen 150,262 (47.6%) 4,707,357 (86.4%) 4,707,357 
Not born a US citizen 165,342 (52.4%) 743,733 (13.6%) 909,075 
Not reporting 1,166 (0.4%) 15,005 (0.3%) 16,171 
Total 315,604 5,451,090 5,766,694 
χ2 = 337,260; df = 1; p < 2.2 * e-16 
 
A.1.3 Age of Owner 
Table A.4: Respondents' Age (from 2014 ASE data) 
Age of Owner Latino Non-Latino Total 
Under 25 2,814 (0.9%) 23,454 (0.4%) 26,268 
25 to 34 26,181 (8.3%) 290,296 (5.3%) 316,477 
35 to 44 79,490 (25.2%) 906,986 (16.6%) 986,476 
45 to 54 107,050 (33.9%) 1,567,409 (28.8%) 1,674,459 
55 to 64 71,920 (22.8%) 1,671,928 (30.7%) 1,743,848 
65 or older 28,133 (8.9%) 991,015 (18.2%) 
1,019,148 
Total 315,588 5,451,088   
 
A.1.4 Highest Level of Education Reported 
Table A.5: Highest Education Level Reported by Owner (from 2014 ASE data) 




Less than high school graduate 39,033 (6.8%) 158,781 (2.9%) 197,814 
High school diploma or GED 76,177 (13.3%) 1,032,827 (19.0%)  1,109,004 
Tech/trade/vocational school 20,535 (3.6%) 316,410 (5.8%) 336,945 
Some college 49,447 (8.6%) 813,503 (14.9%) 862,950 
Associate’s degree 17,779 (3.1%) 303,718 (5.6%) 321,497 
                                                 
39 For this and subsequent tables presenting ASE data, the percentages shown are by column. 
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Bachelor’s degree 52,875(9.2%) 1,585,732 (29.1%) 1,638,607 
Master’s or professional degree or higher 315,549 (55.2%) 1,238,794 (22.7%) 1,554,343 
Total 571,395 5,449,765   
χ2 = 97,891; df = 8; p < 2.2 * e-16 
 
A.1.5 Motivation for Starting a Business 











Wanted to be 
my own boss 
Latino 
Very important 191,734 61.00% 
Somewhat important 82,507 26.25% 
Not important 40,078 12.75% 
Not Latino 
Very important 2,839,158 72.48% 
Somewhat important 162,708 4.15% 
Not important 915,247 23.37% 
Flexible hours 
Latino 
Very important 162,686 51.82% 
Somewhat important 95,603 30.45% 
Not important 55,675 17.73% 
Not Latino 
Very important 2,257,343 41.64% 
Somewhat important 1,917,554 35.37% 




Very important 189,556 60.42% 
Somewhat important 86,901 27.70% 
Not important 37,290 11.89% 
Not Latino 
Very important 2,466,853 45.53% 
Somewhat important 1,922,145 35.47% 
Not important 1,029,520 19.00% 
Greater income 
Latino 
Very important 198,306 63.12% 
Somewhat important 88,921 28.31% 
Not important 26,925 8.57% 
Not Latino 
Very important 2,853,817 52.64% 
Somewhat important 1,873,805 34.56% 
Not important 694,028 12.80% 
Best avenue for 
ideas 
Latino 
Very important 179,709 57.28% 
Somewhat important 96,831 30.86% 
Not important 37,201 11.86% 
Not Latino 
Very important 2,522,294 46.56% 
Somewhat important 1,901,582 35.10% 
Not important 993,967 18.35% 
Latino Very important 35,597 11.35% 












Couldn't find a 
job 
Somewhat important 58,734 18.72% 
Not important 219,391 69.93% 
Not Latino 
Very important 350,128 6.46% 
Somewhat important 824,034 15.21% 
Not important 4,245,298 78.33% 




Very important 90,478 28.83% 
Somewhat important 113,625 36.20% 
Not important 109,779 34.97% 
Not Latino 
Very important 1,415,963 26.11% 
Somewhat important 2,028,670 37.41% 
Not important 1,978,142 36.48% 
Always wanted 
to start my own 
business 
Latino 
Very important 179,268 57.10% 
Somewhat important 85,086 27.10% 
Not important 49,589 15.80% 
Not Latino 
Very important 2,083,040 38.45% 
Somewhat important 1,864,057 34.41% 
Not important 1,470,319 27.14% 
Entrepreneurial 
friend or family 
member was a 
role model 
Latino 
Very important 96,617 30.78% 
Somewhat important 83,780 26.69% 
Not important 133,540 42.54% 
Not Latino 
Very important 1,313,883 24.24% 
Somewhat important 1,504,793 27.76% 
Not important 2,602,618 48.01% 
Other 
Latino 
Very important 12,633 12.72% 
Somewhat important 9,327 9.39% 
Not important 77,365 77.89% 
Not Latino 
Very important 180,083 10.96% 
Somewhat important 162,442 9.89% 
Not important 1,299,821 79.14% 
Did not respond 
Latino N/A 1,960 N/A 
Not Latino N/A 30,578 N/A 
 
A.1.6 Previous Self-Employment Experience 
Table A.7: Previous Self-Employment Experience Reported by 2014 ASE Respondents (author's calculations) 
Previous self-employment 






Yes 93,279 29.6% 1,805,856 70.4% 
Table A.6 continued 
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No 222,302 33.1% 3,645,097 66.9% 
χ2 = 1,722.4; df = 1; p < 2.2 * e-16 
 
A.1.7 Number of Hours Worked Per Week on Business 
Table A.8: Number of Hours Worked Per Week on Business (from 2014 ASE Data) 
Reported Hours Worked 
per Week by Owner Latino Non-Latino Total 
No hours per week 23,016 (7.3%) 498,900 (9.1%) 521,916 
Less than 20 hours per week 40,523 (12.8%) 837,516 (15.4%) 
878,039 
20 to 39 hours 43,716(13.9%) 782,118 (14.3%) 825,834 
40 hours 56,276 (17.8%) 818,978 (15.0%) 875,254 
41 to 59 hours 88,415 (28.0%) 1,534,917 (28.1%) 1,623,332 
60 hours or greater 63,674 (20.2%) 980,728 (18.0%) 1,044,402 
Total 315,620 5,453,157   
χ2 = 4,777.8; df = 5; p < 2.2 * e-16 
 
A.1.8 How Business Was Acquired 
Table A.9: How Business Was Acquired (from ASE data) 
How Business Was Acquired Latino Non-Latino Total 
Founded or started by survey 
respondent 248,866 (77.4%) 3,814,822 (68.3%) 4,063,688 
Purchased 46,766 (14.5%) 1,165,137 (20.9%) 1,211,903 
Inherited 6,188 (1.9%) 221,221 (4.0%) 227,409 
Survey respondent was transferred or 
gifted the business 19,635 (6.1%) 385,721 (6.9%) 405,356 
Total 321,455 5,586,901   
χ2 = 942,470; df = 3; p < 2.2 * e-16 
 
A.1.9 Age of Business 
Table A.10: Reported Age of Business (from 2014 ASE data) 
Age of Business Latino-owned Not Latino-owned Total 
Less than 2 years 
in business 39,107 (13.1%) 425,389 (8.82%) 464,496 
2 to 3 years 56,331 (18.9%) 641,490 (13.3%) 697,821 
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235 
 
Age of Business Latino-owned Not Latino-owned Total 
4 to 5 years 38,617 (12.9%) 458,489 (9.5%) 497,106 
6 to 10 years 70,188 (23.5%) 1,026,950 (21.3%) 1,097,138 
11 to 15 years 90,112(30.2%) 2,141,559 (44.4%) 2,231,671 
16 or more years 4,209 (1.4%) 129,608 (2.7%) 133,817 
Total 298,564 4,823,485 5,122,049 
χ2 = 30,926; df = 5; p < 2.2 * e-16 
 
A.1.10 Intellectual Property Holdings 
Table A.11: IP Holdings of Primary Business by Ethnicity of Respondents, 2014 ASE (author's calculations) 
IP Holdings of Firm in 2014 Latino-owned firms 
Non-Latino-
owned firms Total 
Owned a copyright 6,620 (3.3%) 141,061 (3.8%) 147,681 
Owned a trademark 9,970 (5.0%) 217,629 (5.9%) 227,599 
Owned a patent (granted) 1,361 (0.7%) 41,760 (1.1%) 43,121 
Owned a patent (pending) 913 (0.5%) 27,360 (0.7%) 28,273 
Owned none of the above 182,414 (90.6%) 
3,255,113 
(88.4%) 3,437,527 
Total 201,278 3,682,923   
χ2 = 1,132.7; df = 1; p < 2.2 * e-16 
 
A.1.11 Business Operations Outside the United States 
Table A.12: Respondents Reporting Operations Outside the United States (2014 ASE data) 
Operated 





owned firms Total 
Yes 5,085 (2.6%) 48,058 (1.3%) 53,143 
No 192,027 (97.4%) 3,515,012 (98.7%) 3,707,039 
Total 197,112 3,563,070   
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A.1.12 Language Spoken at the Business 
Table A.13: Respondents Reporting English Spoken at Business (2014 ASE data) 
Speaks English at 
the Business? Latino Non-Latino Total 
Yes 189,274 3,540,146 3,729,420 
No 7,728 21,559 29,287 
Total 197,002 3,561,705   
χ2 = 26,571; df = 1; p < 2.2 * e-16 
 
 
Table A.14: Respondents Reporting Spanish Spoken at Business (2014 ASE data) 




Yes 131,884 (66.9%) 412,324 (11.6%) 544,208 
No 65,118 (33.1%) 
3,149,381 
(88.4%) 3,214,499 
Total 197,002 3,561,705   
χ2 = 462,190; df = 1; p < 2.2 * e-16 
 
A.1.13 Family Ownership of Business 







Yes 49,370 (24.9%) 1,027,319 (28.7%) 1,076,689 
No 149,207 (75.1%) 2,554,524 (71.3%) 2,703,731 
Total 198,577 3,581,843   
χ2 = 1,347.3; df = 1; p < 2.2 * e-16 
 
A.1.14 Initial Amount of Startup Capital 











Less than $5,000 Latino 31,755 16.0% 
Non-Latino 543,384 11.3% 
$5,000 to $9,999 Latino 24,914 12.6% 
Non-Latino 295,700 6.1% 
$10,000 to $24,999 Latino 32,513 16.4% 
Non-Latino 425,479 8.8% 
$25,000 to $49,999 Latino 23,257 11.7% 













$50,000 to $99,999 Latino 22,351 11.3% 
Non-Latino 369,118 7.7% 
$100,000 to $249,999 Latino 16,354 8.3% 
Non-Latino 367,429 7.6% 
$250,000 to $999,999 Latino 8,861 4.5% 
Non-Latino 242,690 5.0% 
$1,000,000 to 
$2,999,999 
Latino 1,393 0.7% 
Non-Latino 53,511 1.1% 
$3,000,000 or more Latino 488 0.2% 
Non-Latino 20,713 0.4% 
Don't know Latino 24,065 12.2% 
Non-Latino 609,367 12.6% 
Not applicable Latino 12,106 6.1% 
Non-Latino 307,050 6.4% 
Total reporting Latino 198,058 100.0% 
Non-Latino 4,823,485 100.0% 
Item not reported Latino 1,668   
Non-Latino 25,826   
 
A.1.15 Source of Startup Capital 
Table A.17: Source of Startup Capital by Ethnicity of Owner (2014 ASE data) 
Source of Startup 
Capital 




personal/family savings 143,203 (49.1%) 2,324,684 (44.4%) 2,467,887 
Personal/family assets 
other than savings 19,544 (6.7%) 359,839 (6.9%) 379,383 
Personal/family home 
equity loan 15,251 (5.2%) 265,473 (5.1%)  280,724 
Personal credit card(s) 
carrying balances 29,452 (10.1%) 367,838 (7.0%) 397,290 
Business credit card(s) 
carrying balances 11,837 (4.1%) 194,164 (3.7%) 206,001 
Business loan from 
federal, state, or local 
government 834 (0.3%) 15,355 (0.3%) 16,189 
Loan (guaranteed by the 
government) from a 2,606 (0.9%) 70,372 (1.3%) 72,978 
Table A.16 continued 
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Source of Startup 
Capital Latino-owned firms 
Non-Latino-owned 
firms Total 
bank or financial 
institution 
Business loan from a 
bank or financial 
institution 25,604 (8.8%) 664,534 (12.7%) 690,138 
Business loan from 
family or friends 8,847 (3.0%) 183,052 (3.5%) 191,899 
Venture capital 1,014 (0.3%) 18,178 (0.3%) 19,192 
Grant 393 (0.1%) 7,055 (0.1%) 7,448 
Other 7,431 (2.5%) 117,474 (2.2%) 124,905 
Don’t know 13,602 (4.7%) 343,930 (6.6%) 357,532 
None needed 12,106 (4.1%) 307,050 (5.9%) 319,156 
Total 291,724 5,238,998   
χ2 = 12,169; df = 13; p < 2.2 * e-16 
 
A.1.16 Negative Impacts on Business 












Yes 34,486 17.5% 
No 162,580 82.4% 
Non-Latino 
Yes 375,029 10.5% 




Yes 31,186 15.8% 
No 165,756 84.0% 
Non-Latino 
Yes 397,375 11.2% 




Yes 52,940 26.8% 
No 143,945 73.0% 
Non-Latino 
Yes 978,541 27.5% 
No 2,578,353 72.4% 
Taxes 
Latino 
Yes 90,007 45.6% 
No 106,911 54.2% 
Non-Latino 
Yes 1,771,566 49.7% 
No 1,785,646 50.1% 
Slow business 
or lost sales Latino 
Yes 96,027 48.7% 
No 101,017 51.2% 












Yes 1,564,280 43.9% 
No 1,993,867 56.0% 




Yes 67,009 34.0% 
No 129,966 65.9% 
Non-Latino 
Yes 1,086,550 30.5% 





Yes 85,013 43.1% 
No 111,981 56.8% 
Non-Latino 
Yes 1,578,765 44.3% 





Yes 29,563 15.0% 
No 167,116 84.7% 
Non-Latino 
Yes 568,687 16.0% 
No 2,987,680 83.9% 
Other 
Latino 
Yes 7,590 3.8% 
No 94,655 48.0% 
Non-Latino 
Yes 157,805 4.4% 
No 1,596,435 44.8% 
Total reporting 
Latino   197,290 100.0% 
Non-Latino   3,562,283 100.0% 
Not reporting 
Latino   2,436 N/A 
Non-Latino   36,807 N/A 
χ2 (for negative impacts) = 13,148; df = 9; p < 2.2 * e-16 
 
A.1.17 Attempts to Acquire More Capital 
Table A.19: Attempts to Establish New Funding Relationships in 2014 and the Outcomes by Ethnicity of Owner, 2014 











Received total amount requested Latino 
2,490 1.3% 
Non-Latino 28,323 0.8% 
Did not receive total amount 
requested 
Latino 1,595 0.8% 
Non-Latino 16,236 0.5% 
Did not attempt to establish this 
relationship in the previous year Latino 
192,084 
97.3% 
Non-Latino 3,506,020 98.3% 
Received total amount requested Latino 5,326 2.7% 
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Family, friends, or 
employees 
Non-Latino 64,226 1.8% 
Did not receive total amount 
requested 
Latino 2,640 1.3% 
Non-Latino 26,944 0.8% 
Did not attempt to establish this 
relationship in the previous year 
Latino 189,015 95.7% 
Non-Latino 3,468,814 97.3% 
Banks, credit 
unions, or other 
financial institutions 
Received total amount requested Latino 17,403 8.8% 
Non-Latino 345,366 9.7% 
Did not receive total amount 
requested 
Latino 11,255 5.7% 
Non-Latino 119,135 3.3% 
Did not attempt to establish this 
relationship in the previous year 
Latino 168,549 85.4% 
Non-Latino 3,097,309 86.9% 
Home equity loans 
in the name of the 
business owner 
Received total amount requested Latino 3,045 1.5% 
Non-Latino 55,505 1.6% 
Did not receive total amount 
requested 
Latino 2,079 1.1% 
Non-Latino 24,639 0.7% 
Did not attempt to establish this 
relationship in the previous year 
Latino 191,880 97.2% 
Non-Latino 3,479,529 97.6% 
Credit cards 
Received total amount requested Latino 23,003 11.7% 
Non-Latino 298,573 8.4% 
Did not receive total amount 
requested 
Latino 7,838 4.0% 
Non-Latino 65,907 1.8% 
Did not attempt to establish this 
relationship in the previous year 
Latino 166,151 84.2% 
Non-Latino 3,195,911 89.6% 
Trade credit 
Received total amount requested Latino 5,264 2.7% 
Non-Latino 84,633 2.4% 
Did not receive total amount 
requested 
Latino 2,029 1.0% 
Non-Latino 18,358 0.5% 
Did not attempt to establish this 
relationship in the previous year 
Latino 189,727 96.1% 
Non-Latino 3,456,326 96.9% 
Angel investors 
Received total amount requested Latino 808 0.4% 
Non-Latino 7,574 0.2% 
Did not receive total amount 
requested 
Latino 510 0.3% 
Non-Latino 9,868 0.3% 
Did not attempt to establish this 
relationship in the previous year 
Latino 195,590 99.1% 
Non-Latino 3,541,517 99.3% 
Venture capital 
Received total amount requested Latino 467 0.2% 
Non-Latino 6,534 0.2% 
Did not receive total amount 
requested 
Latino 708 0.4% 
Non-Latino 9,529 0.3% 
Latino 195,548 99.0% 





Table A.20: Profitability of Business in 2014 by Ethnicity of Owner, 2014 ASE (author's calculation) 
Did Firm Make a 











No, broke even 43,143 (21.9%) 628,636 (17.6%) 671,779 
No, lost money 40,435 (20.5%) 688,574 (19.3%) 699,009 
Total 197,432 3,564,729   
Did not attempt to establish this 
relationship in the previous year Non-Latino 3,541,684 99.3% 
Other investor 
businesses 
Received total amount requested Latino 930 0.5% 
Non-Latino 9,750 0.3% 
Did not receive total amount 
requested 
Latino 656 0.3% 
Non-Latino 11,162 0.3% 
Did not attempt to establish this 
relationship in the previous year 
Latino 192,852 97.7% 
Non-Latino 3,502,267 98.2% 
Crowdfunding 
platform 
Received total amount requested Latino 382 0.2% 
Non-Latino 4,724 0.1% 
Did not receive total amount 
requested 
Latino 439 0.2% 
Non-Latino 5,076 0.1% 
Did not attempt to establish this 
relationship in the previous year 
Latino 196,030 99.3% 
Non-Latino 3,548,818 99.5% 
Grants 
Received total amount requested Latino 639 0.3% 
Non-Latino 8,697 0.2% 
Did not receive total amount 
requested 
Latino 728 0.4% 
Non-Latino 9,332 0.3% 
Did not attempt to establish this 
relationship in the previous year 
Latino 195,633 99.1% 
Non-Latino 3,541,668 99.3% 
Other 
Received total amount requested Latino 988 0.5% 
Non-Latino 12,772 0.4% 
Did not receive total amount 
requested 
Latino 365 0.2% 
Non-Latino 5,344 0.1% 
Did not attempt to establish this 
relationship in the previous year 
Latino 124,600 63.1% 
Non-Latino 2,156,269 60.5% 
Total reporting   Latino 197,434 100.0% 
Non-Latino 3,565,976 100.0% 
Not reported   Latino 2,293   
Non-Latino 33,114   
χ2 = 15,846; df = 37; p < 2.2 * e-16 
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χ2 = 2,587.2; df = 2; p < 2.2 * e-16 
 
A.1.19 Current Operations 
Table A.21: Current Operating Status of Business by Ethnic Self-Identification of Owner (2014 ASE data) 
Is Business 
Currently 
Operating? Latino-owned firms 
Non-Latino-
owned firms Total 
Yes 184,291 (93.9%) 3,304,593 (93.0%) 3,488,884 
No 11,985 (6.1%) 250,534 (7.0%) 262,519 
Total 196,276 3,555,127   
χ2 = 251.99; df = 1; p < 2.2 * e-16 
 
A.1.20 Reason Business Ceased Operations 
Table A.22: Reason Given for Ceasing Business Operations by Ethnicity of Owner, 2014 ASE (author's calculations) 
Reason Business Ceased 
Operations Latino-owned firms 
Non-Latino-owned 
firms Total 
Owner(s) deployed to military 0 (0.0%) 80 (0.0%) 80 
Injury or illness to owner(s) 692 (4.5%) 13,219 (4.3%) 13,911 
Retirement of owner(s) 1,474 (9.6%) 55,260 (18.0%) 56,734 
Death of owner(s) 174 (1.1%) 7,905 (2.6%) 8,079 
Business was for a one-time 
event 
248 (1.6%) 3,559 (1.2%) 
3,807 
Inadequate cash flow or sales 4,023 (26.2%) 71,231 (23.2%) 75,254 
Lack of business loans or credit 1,003 (6.5%) 9,731 (3.2%) 10,734 
Lack of personal loans or credit 729 (4.8%) 5,483 (1.8%) 6,212 
Owner(s) started another 
business 1,342 (8.7%) 17,390 (5.7%) 18,732 
Owner(s) sold the business 1,477 (9.6%) 51,888 (16.9%) 53,365 
Other 4,178 (27.2%) 71,206 (23.2%) 75,384 
Total 15,340 306,952   
χ2 = 2,766.5; df = 10; p < 2.2 * e-16 
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Table A.23: Owner's Hopes for Firm in Five Years by Ethnicity of Owner, 2014 ASE (author's calculations) 
Where Do You See the 
Business Being in Five Years? 





Smaller 5,978 (3.0%) 117,656 (3.3%) 123,634 
About the same 36,452 (18.3%) 766,430 (21.4%) 802,882 
Larger 139,994 (70.5%) 2,258,092 (63.1%) 2,398,086 
Other 16,238 (8.2%) 437,279 (12.2%) 453,517 
Total 198,662 3,579,457   
χ2 = 5,054.6; df = 3; p < 2.2 * e-16 
 
A.2 Comparing Metropolitan Areas by SBO Data 
 




firms, 2002  
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, FL 
New York-Newark-Edison, NY-NJ-PA 
Houston-Baytown-Sugar Land, TX 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 
San Antonio, TX 
McAllen-Edinburg-Pharr, TX 















Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, FL 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 
New York-Newark-Edison, NY-NJ-PA 
Houston-Baytown-Sugar Land, TX 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 





















Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 
New York-Newark-Edison, NY-NJ-PA 
Houston-Baytown-Sugar Land, TX 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 









firms in the 

























Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA 
Houston-Baytown-Sugar Land, TX 
Dalton, GA 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 













































Mount Vernon-Anacortes, WA 










Idaho Falls, ID 
Pueblo, CO 
Honolulu, HI 
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC 
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 
Barnstable Town, MA 















Vallejo-Fairfield, CA  
South Bend-Mishawaka, IN-MI  
Greeley, CO 
Mount Vernon-Anacortes, WA 
Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL 
Denver-Aurora, CO 













A.3 Gateway Classification of Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
 
Table A.25: 104 Metropolitan Areas Classified by Gateway Status (reproduced from Singer, 2015) 
Type of 
gateway Description Metropolitan areas included 
Former 
gateway 
Higher share of immigrant 
population than the national 
average, 1900–30; lower share 
than the national average in 
every decade since. 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI 
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 
Pittsburgh, PA 
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA 
St. Louis, MO-IL 
Major-
continuous 
“The quintessential immigrant 
destinations”, with share of 
immigrant population higher 
than the national average for 




New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, 
NY-NJ-PA 
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 
Minor-
continuous 




El Paso, TX 




50, but smaller than the major-
continuous gateways. 
Fresno, CA 




New Haven-Milford, CT 
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA 
Rochester, NY 






Small immigrant populations 
until the 1950s, followed by 
rapid growth. 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 





Similar to former gateways in 
early 20th century, now seeing 
renewed immigrant settlement 
in 21st century. 
Baltimore-Towson, MD 
Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO 






San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 
Major-
emerging 
Small immigrant populations 
until 1990; immigrant 
population share exceeding 
national average in every 
decade since. 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA 
Austin-Round Rock-San Marcos, TX 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 




Immigrant growth at least 
three times the national rate in 
1990s or 2000–14, with little 
prior history of immigrant 
settlement. 
Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL 
Columbus, OH 
Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 
Greensboro-High Point, NC 
Indianapolis-Carmel, IN 
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, 
TN 
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Meet none of the above 
criteria and their share of 
immigrant population is lower 





Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC 
Baton Rouge, LA 
Birmingham-Hoover, AL 





Colorado Springs, CO 
Columbia, SC 
Dayton, OH 
Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL 
Des Moines-West Des Moines, IA 





Kansas City, MO-KS 
Knoxville, TN 
Lancaster, PA 
Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR 
Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN 
Madison, WI 
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA 
North Port-Bradenton-Sarasota, FL 
Ogden-Clearfield, UT 
Oklahoma City, OK 
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA 
Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL 












A.4 Tables Created in Calculating Regression Comparing Gateways 
 
Table A.26: Legislative Welcoming/Hostility Scores from Monogan (2013) and Dummy Variable Calculation 
MSA State Monogan state score Dummy variable 
Phoenix AZ -1.05 0 
Tucson AZ -1.05 0 
Bakersfield CA 1.41 1 
Fresno CA 1.41 1 
Los Angeles CA 1.41 1 
Modesto CA 1.41 1 
Oxnard CA 1.41 1 
Riverside CA 1.41 1 
Sacramento CA 1.41 1 
San Diego CA 1.41 1 
San Francisco CA 1.41 1 
San Jose CA 1.41 1 
Stockton CA 1.41 1 
Denver CO -0.14 0 
Bridgeport CT 1.98 1 
Hartford CT 1.98 1 
New Haven CT 1.98 1 
Cape Coral FL 0.37 1 
Lakeland, FL FL 0.37 1 
Miami FL 0.37 1 
Orlando FL 0.37 1 
Tampa-St. Petersburg FL 0.37 1 
Atlanta GA -0.25 0 
Honolulu HI 0.81 1 
Chicago IL 0.97 1 
Indianapolis IN -0.2 0 
Boston MA 0.41 1 
Worcester MA 0.41 1 
Baltimore MD 0.98 1 
Toledo, OH 
Tulsa, OK 









MSA State Monogan state score Dummy variable 
Detroit MI 0.55 1 
Minneapolis MN -0.05 0 
St. Louis MO -0.31 0 
Charlotte NC -0.61 0 
Durham-Chapel Hill NC -0.61 0 
Greensboro, NC NC -0.61 0 
Raleigh NC -0.61 0 
Las Vegas NV 0.26 0 
Buffalo NY 1.05 1 
New York NY 1.05 1 
Rochester NY 1.05 1 
Cleveland OH 0.79 1 
Columbus OH 0.79 1 
Portland, OR OR -0.45 0 
Philadelphia PA 1.24 1 
Pittsburgh PA 1.24 1 
Providence RI 1.51 1 
Nashville TN -0.66 0 
Austin TX 0.98 1 
Dallas-Fort Worth TX 0.98 1 
El Paso TX 0.98 1 
Houston TX 0.98 1 
McAllen TX 0.98 1 
San Antonio TX 0.98 1 
Salt Lake City UT -0.59 0 
Washington, DC VA 0 0 
Seattle WA 1.41 1 
Milwaukee WI 0.98 1 
Mean score  0.2788  
Median score  0.2694  
 
Table A.27: Calculating Dummy Variable for CDFI Presence in Gateway MSAs (author's calculations from 2014 5-
















Atlanta  3 569,206 5.2705E-06 0 0 
Austin  5 594,369 8.41228E-06 0 1 
Bakersfield 0 431,960 0 0 0 
Baltimore  1 134,919 7.41185E-06 0 1 
Boston  8 454,685 1.75946E-05 1 1 




Bridgeport  2 166,920 1.19818E-05 0 1 
Buffalo  0 49,634 0 0 0 
Cape Coral  0 122,820 0 0 0 
Charlotte  1 214,691 4.65786E-06 0 0 
Chicago  16 2,017,414 7.93095E-06 0 1 
Cleveland  0 103,722 0 0 0 
Columbus, OH  2 70,832 2.82358E-05 1 1 
Dallas-Fort Worth  2 1,848,167 1.08215E-06 0 0 
Denver  3 611,525 4.90577E-06 0 0 
Detroit  2 172,718 1.15796E-05 0 1 
Durham-Chapel 
Hill  
5 24,818 0.000201467 1 1 
El Paso 4 670,345 5.96708E-06 0 0 
Fresno 1 485,983 2.05769E-06 0 0 
Greensboro, NC  0 59,438 0 0 0 
Hartford  2 161,082 1.2416E-05 0 1 
Houston  0 2,214,,643 0 0 0 
Indianapolis  1 118713 8.42368E-06 0 1 
Lakeland  0 115,144 0 0 0 
Las Vegas  0 596,821 0 0 0 
Los Angeles  13 5,852,020 2.22146E-06 0 0 
McAllen  2 732,967 2.72864E-06 0 0 
Miami  4 2,429,853 1.64619E-06 0 0 
Milwaukee  8 154,552 5.17625E-05 1 1 
Minneapolis-St. 
Paul  
14 185,729 7.53786E-05 1 1 
Modesto  0 224,905 0 0 0 
Nashville  3 124,197 2.41552E-05 1 1 
New Haven  1 137,949 7.24906E-06 0 1 
New York  35 4,619,351 7.57682E-06 0 1 
Orlando  1 594,373 1.68245E-06 0 0 
Oxnard  0 344,554 0 0 0 
Philadelphia  8 509,364 1.57059E-05 1 1 
Phoenix  4 1,291,080 3.09818E-06 0 0 
Pittsburgh 1 34,128 2.93015E-05 1 1 
Portland, OR  6 262,105 2.28916E-05 1 1 
Providence  3 174,823 1.71602E-05 1 1 
Raleigh 1 123,829 8.07565E-06 0 1 
Riverside  0 2,104,710 0 0 0 
Rochester 3 69,912 4.29111E-05 1 1 
Sacramento  2 453,209 4.41298E-06 0 0 
St. Louis  3 78,212 3.83573E-05 1 1 
Salt Lake City  2 192,627 1.03828E-05 0 1 





San Antonio  2 1,235,005 1.61943E-06 0 0 
San Diego  2 1,040,234 1.92264E-06 0 0 
San Francisco  4 974,579 4.10434E-06 0 0 
San Jose  3 492,078 6.09659E-06 0 1 
Seattle  4 332,039 1.20468E-05 0 1 
Stockton  0 278,364 0 0 0 
Tampa-St. 
Petersburg  
0 485,566 0 0 0 
Tucson  1 351,515 2.84483E-06 0 0 
(Urban) Honolulu 6 86,640 6.92521E-05 1 1 
Washington, DC  9 844,390 1.06586E-05 0 1 
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MSA HIST_DUM SE_NOT_LAT SE_MX SE_PR SE_CUB SE_OTHR WAGE_NOT_LAT WAGE_MX WAGE_PR WAGE_CUB WAGE_OTHR
Atlanta 0 278,491 18,067 2,115 1,170 11,981 2,564,122 143,190 23,626 10,600 83,858
Austin 0 752,811 22,727 307 520 4,306 96,704 253,824 6,929 4,470 40,730
Bakersfield 1 23,897 11,180 80 4 1,782 204,482 177,695 2,056 496 13,158
Baltimore 1 120,534 1,455 567 98 3,343 1,461,637 19,998 11,765 2,402 39,554
Boston 1 258,941 1,016 2,230 660 11,454 2,521,492 17,641 56,429 6,159 159,217
Bridgeport 1 62,541 1,284 1,599 141 8,693 403,390 8,891 28,286 1,473 22
Buffalo 1 43,308 121 532 37 272 607,406 2,942 14,477 856 4,740
Cape Coral 0 39,805 1,080 828 1,572 2,238 244,961 17,081 13,040 10,595 18,329
Charlotte 0 107,874 3,851 864 588 4,538 1,128,632 49,124 9,222 3,032 42,964
Chicago 1 405,229 36,037 3,320 1,008 10,017 4,120,314 797,324 98,917 10,699 103,549
Cleveland 1 92,227 666 1,132 89 438 1,081,914 12,917 28,278 1,088 8,371
Columbus 0 85,363 881 206 45 453 1,015,021 20,308 4,636 739 10,631
Dallas-Fort Worth 1 277,569 60,320 1,511 869 13,049 2,652,628 731,360 21,360 7,309 117,946
Denver 1 157,544 15,749 567 431 4,843 1,227,897 236,015 6,086 2,505 60,607
Detroit 1 193,368 2,842 466 170 1,132 2,113,062 58,344 8,554 1,738 13,406
Durham-Chapel Hill 0 9,770 616 57 4 193 97,350 6,663 1,021 224 4,848
El Paso 1 7,942 23,374 128 527 1,007 82,874 289,984 3,900 608 9,073
Fresno 1 28,364 12,974 166 17 1,095 225,412 203,450 1,872 402 12,471
Greensboro, NC 0 36,758 1,136 116 77 269 386,794 17,660 2,574 643 6,113
Hartford 1 57,666 352 1,441 135 1,737 618,544 5,971 51,858 1,720 20,724
Honolulu 1 43,278 633 686 112 1,219 504,143 13,765 12,752 653 17,059
Houston 1 212,954 77,192 1,185 1,488 31,359 2,153,833 782,758 18,966 10,992 235,184
Indianapolis 0 83,605 2,913 161 18 1,355 992,899 40,764 3,381 1,036 11,427
Lakeland, FL 0 26,252 872 837 729 1,164 232,986 19,750 18,253 4,614 10,025
Las Vegas 0 72,318 14,493 633 997 4,319 782,567 219,757 9,898 12,169 54,655
Los Angeles 1 644,844 210,818 3,394 3,309 94,638 3,731,852 2,119,830 32,563 23,337 592,405
McAllen 1 4,889 43,643 20 66 1,100 30,715 277,287 790 346 7,363
Miami 1 249,081 9,467 8,876 80,907 102,194 1,627,794 64,190 113,249 496,922 515,599
Milwaukee 1 59,661 1,930 646 21 682 811,809 48,681 16,927 990 8,157
Minneapolis 1 185,776 3,019 348 93 1,715 1,877,128 63,705 5,395 1,394 24,594
Modesto 1 18,440 6,211 140 46 542 147,945 94,279 1,708 232 7,288
Nashville 0 106,743 3,019 336 283 1,591 926,865 36,140 3,697 2,363 16,948
New Haven 1 39,465 356 1,238 31 1,275 414,999 9,648 36,013 1,519 19,474
New York 1 922,829 28,648 27,244 6,556 134,758 8,030,088 294,085 584,341 74,179 1,343,145
Orlando 0 98,798 2,458 8,101 2,281 11,504 866,226 37,388 144,567 23,785 95,195
Oxnard 1 46,750 11,226 337 80 3,303 260,304 156,011 2,177 800 16,101
Philadelphia 1 262,690 3,258 4,530 635 4,822 3,065,155 51,209 114,849 7,377 67,904
Phoenix 0 184,171 39,914 511 203 4,927 1,605,647 496,253 12,147 5,117 51,187
Pittsburgh 1 101,098 371 263 51 547 1,286,709 6,536 4,273 663 6,401
Portland, OR 1 146,016 7,029 174 116 2,556 1,135,620 103,869 3,660 1,866 19,317
Providence 1 73,268 270 1,010 72 3,759 821,844 6,153 23,847 1,180 51,753
Raleigh 0 59,440 2,071 207 45 1,649 613,810 34,799 6,290 2,292 16,857
Riverside 1 137,717 68,924 1,704 730 11,950 1,092,180 817,671 15,362 5,010 105,976
Rochester 1 49,944 315 895 48 628 572,715 3,506 20,523 2,121 5,823
Sacramento 1 107,117 13,145 569 125 3,292 904,322 174,802 7,288 1,432 32,806
Salt Lake City 0 48,704 3,559 73 9 2,102 522,755 70,920 2,024 656 23,246
San Antonio 1 62,627 43,103 672 177 5,907 567,187 546,984 13,335 2,809 49,520
San Diego 1 149,196 42,444 504 305 4,606 1,156,909 423,748 12,215 3,025 41,300
San Francisco 1 273,068 33,685 1,276 449 21,379 1,920,822 330,597 16,570 4,178 145,170
San Jose 1 81,004 16,641 143 248 3,662 740,989 207,622 4,179 1,524 32,092
Seattle 1 202,003 9,164 680 239 3,596 1,849,822 117,109 10,168 2,572 37,483
St. Louis 1 127,996 1,642 129 95 618 1,501,872 25,756 3,350 1,381 9,695
Stockton 1 23,288 6,089 135 37 1,180 209,054 117,038 2,253 126 13,041
Tampa-St. Petersburg 1 140,353 3,053 4,480 6,121 7,493 1,209,061 45,880 75,467 47,354 69,276
Tucson 1 39,953 15,894 280 41 818 340,865 148,162 3,558 1,084 13,388
Washington, DC 1 259,536 5,254 1,710 811 37,718 2,917,525 70,021 30,962 10,350 362,416
Worcester 1 42,143 116 484 26 1,026 457,578 3,416 22,405 598 15,962
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MSA NOWRK_NOT_LAT NOWRK_MX NOWRK_PR NOWRK_CUB NOWRK_OTHRTOT_LAT TOT_NOT_LATPCT_SE_LAT PCT_SE_NOT_LAT
Atlanta 1,962,318 170,780 21,920 8,978 72,921 569,206 4,804,931 5.86% 5.80%
Austin 444,525 222,910 4,649 2,540 30,457 594,369 1,294,040 4.69% 58.18%
Bakersfield 196,722 209,184 1,862 357 14,106 431,960 425,101 3.02% 5.62%
Baltimore 988,078 18,113 9,820 1,540 26,264 134,919 2,570,249 4.05% 4.69%
Boston 1,511,462 11,049 63,823 4,742 120,265 454,685 4,291,895 3.38% 6.03%
Bridgeport 301,589 8,639 26,318 1,891 31,706 118,943 767,520 9.85% 8.15%
Buffalo 434,726 2,606 19,034 289 3,728 49,634 1,085,440 1.94% 3.99%
Cape Coral 239,962 15,760 14,614 10,898 16,785 122,820 524,728 4.66% 7.59%
Charlotte 829,570 52,723 9,272 2,689 35,824 214,691 2,066,076 4.58% 5.22%
Chicago 2,940,658 774,032 93,713 9,892 78,906 2,017,414 7,466,201 2.50% 5.43%
Cleveland 790,661 12,699 30,153 1,057 6,834 103,722 1,964,802 2.24% 4.69%
Columbus 675,722 20,149 3,569 514 8,701 70,832 1,776,106 2.24% 4.81%
Dallas-Fort Worth 1,817,131 782,537 16,508 4,405 90,993 1,848,167 4,747,328 4.10% 5.85%
Denver 711,884 235,791 4,485 1,349 43,097 611,525 2,097,325 3.53% 7.51%
Detroit 1,760,358 61,994 11,603 1,596 10,873 172,718 4,066,788 2.67% 4.75%
Durham-Chapel Hill 60,006 7,989 625 73 2,505 24,818 167,126 3.51% 5.85%
El Paso 62,351 328,083 4,229 527 8,905 670,345 153,167 3.73% 5.19%
Fresno 208,613 239,744 2,475 403 10,914 485,983 462,389 2.93% 6.13%
Greensboro, NC 304,623 23,422 2,671 488 4,269 59,438 728,175 2.69% 5.05%
Hartford 378,168 4,410 58,642 1,250 12,842 161,082 1,054,378 2.28% 5.47%
Honolulu 341,460 11,182 13,999 567 14,013 86,640 888,881 3.06% 4.87%
Houston 1,567,134 845,738 14,131 8,171 187,479 2,214,643 3,933,921 5.02% 5.41%
Indianapolis 713,812 42,936 2,630 986 11,106 118,713 1,790,316 3.75% 4.67%
Lakeland, FL 242,944 24,466 20,639 4,928 8,867 115,144 502,182 3.13% 5.23%
Las Vegas 551,332 220,209 9,434 10,289 39,968 596,821 1,406,217 3.43% 5.14%
Los Angeles 2,834,688 2,242,501 25,847 22,131 481,247 5,852,020 7,211,384 5.33% 8.94%
McAllen 37,710 393,962 908 151 7,331 732,967 73,314 6.12% 6.67%
Miami 1,431,793 63,461 97,278 471,151 406,559 2,429,853 3,308,668 8.29% 7.53%
Milwaukee 539,768 46,235 21,686 1,126 7,471 154,552 1,411,238 2.12% 4.23%
Minneapolis 1,128,287 59,285 4,332 793 21,056 185,729 3,191,191 2.79% 5.82%
Modesto 131,605 107,331 1,373 126 5,629 224,905 297,990 3.09% 6.19%
Nashville 650,510 42,413 3,553 1,517 12,337 124,197 1,684,118 4.21% 6.34%
New Haven 270,281 6,826 46,317 828 14,424 137,949 724,745 2.10% 5.45%
New York 6,236,976 286,960 648,791 62,853 1,127,791 4,619,351 15,189,893 4.27% 6.08%
Orlando 640,975 34,560 141,661 18,685 74,188 594,373 1,605,999 4.10% 6.15%
Oxnard 184,628 141,552 1,371 526 11,070 344,554 491,682 4.34% 9.51%
Philadelphia 2,207,504 50,569 145,531 5,478 53,202 509,364 5,535,349 2.60% 4.75%
Phoenix 1,267,019 623,113 11,985 3,688 42,035 1,291,080 3,056,837 3.53% 6.02%
Pittsburgh 890,386 5,806 4,159 310 4,748 34,128 2,278,193 3.61% 4.44%
Portland, OR 761,113 104,607 2,870 1,545 14,496 262,105 2,042,749 3.77% 7.15%
Providence 540,477 5,976 33,781 982 46,040 174,823 1,435,589 2.92% 5.10%
Raleigh 426,703 36,106 5,899 1,451 16,163 123,829 1,099,953 3.21% 5.40%
Riverside 1,008,691 958,212 15,261 6,202 97,708 2,104,710 2,238,588 3.96% 6.15%
Rochester 401,448 2,650 26,761 1,741 4,901 69,912 1,024,107 2.70% 4.88%
Sacramento 734,530 182,936 7,250 1,328 28,236 453,209 1,745,969 3.78% 6.14%
Salt Lake City 367,520 71,880 1,300 437 16,421 192,627 938,979 2.98% 5.19%
San Antonio 399,705 520,723 9,340 1,729 40,706 1,235,005 1,029,519 4.04% 6.08%
San Diego 839,430 466,185 9,055 2,729 34,118 1,040,234 2,145,535 4.60% 6.95%
San Francisco 1,295,090 298,181 12,776 3,682 106,636 974,579 3,488,980 5.83% 7.83%
San Jose 525,702 195,641 2,557 986 26,783 492,078 1,347,695 4.21% 6.01%
Seattle 1,172,716 115,928 8,460 1,358 25,282 332,039 3,224,541 4.12% 6.26%
St. Louis 1,080,935 25,256 2,040 694 7,556 78,212 2,710,803 3.18% 4.72%
Stockton 190,804 124,010 3,147 221 11,087 278,364 423,146 2.67% 5.50%
Tampa-St. Petersburg 1,015,749 49,639 80,761 43,267 52,775 485,566 2,365,163 4.36% 5.93%
Tucson 261,260 155,017 2,152 854 10,267 351,515 642,078 4.85% 6.22%
Washington, DC 1,735,860 54,272 22,760 6,787 241,329 844,390 4,912,921 5.39% 5.28%
Worcester 291,322 2,593 29,820 462 12,815 89,723 791,043 1.84% 5.33%
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MSA TOT_POP_POV TOT_125POV PCT_125POV TOT_POP_UNEMP TOT_UNEM PCT_UNEM PCT_LAT_LABOR ANTI_DUM
Atlanta 5,362,258 1,092,401 20.37% 3,997,768 295,020 7.38% 10.59% 0
Austin 1,796,217 346,435 19.29% 1,364,995 66,934 4.90% 31.47% 1
Bakersfield 824,972 253,677 30.75% 572,889 47,636 8.32% 50.40% 1
Baltimore 2,685,026 376,805 14.03% 2,088,499 115,640 5.54% 4.99% 1
Boston 4,496,596 606,785 13.49% 3,623,979 196,890 5.43% 9.58% 1
Bridgeport 916,013 110,304 12.04% 700,100 45,974 6.57% 13.42% 1
Buffalo 1,105,152 205,348 18.58% 883,261 43,911 4.97% 4.37% 1
Cape Coral 637,614 138,362 21.70% 518,727 33,046 6.37% 18.97% 1
Charlotte 2,262,538 451,763 19.97% 1,705,294 123,264 7.23% 9.41% 0
Chicago 9,363,290 1,714,940 18.32% 7,114,338 503,309 7.07% 21.27% 1
Cleveland 2,026,451 402,987 19.89% 1,577,761 99,078 6.28% 5.01% 1
Columbus 1,896,601 362,931 19.14% 1,448,153 73,739 5.09% 3.84% 1
Dallas-Fort Worth 6,613,497 1,312,320 19.84% 4,825,344 255,322 5.29% 28.02% 1
Denver 2,618,375 419,791 16.03% 1,985,445 105,768 5.33% 22.58% 0
Detroit 4,250,482 902,190 21.23% 3,256,163 256,196 7.87% 4.07% 1
Durham-Chapel Hill 500,919 111,423 22.24% 404,203 22,631 5.60% 12.93% 0
El Paso 812,182 254,257 31.31% 561,238 30,233 5.39% 81.40% 1
Fresno 931,998 316,015 33.91% 660,061 59,482 9.01% 51.24% 1
Greensboro, NC 718,280 171,228 23.84% 561,030 37,408 6.67% 7.55% 0
Hartford 1,168,739 160,281 13.71% 932,659 58,704 6.29% 13.25% 1
Honolulu 944,550 122,818 13.00% 714,269 27,222 3.81% 8.88% 1
Houston 6,122,011 1,307,649 21.36% 4,455,040 233,088 5.23% 36.02% 1
Indianapolis 1,887,732 358,567 18.99% 1,411,633 84,374 5.98% 6.22% 0
Lakeland, FL 602,537 148,928 24.72% 465,251 31,636 6.80% 18.65% 1
Las Vegas 1,979,101 412,801 20.86% 1,492,471 120,783 8.09% 29.80% 0
Los Angeles 12,868,687 2,932,443 22.79% 9,899,913 688,118 6.95% 44.80% 1
McAllen 797,048 340,968 42.78% 524,880 32,587 6.21% 90.91% 1
Miami 5,697,923 1,318,946 23.15% 4,503,915 321,514 7.14% 42.34% 1
Milwaukee 1,535,820 301,218 19.61% 1,175,815 66,644 5.67% 9.87% 1
Minneapolis 3,367,361 464,731 13.80% 2,558,279 121,313 4.74% 5.50% 0
Modesto 516,698 137,426 26.60% 373,865 38,984 10.43% 43.01% 1
Nashville 1,691,272 320,674 18.96% 1,296,444 67,569 5.21% 6.87% 0
New Haven 836,739 136,115 16.27% 665,806 45,459 6.83% 15.99% 1
New York 19,514,260 3,580,070 18.35% 15,233,636 929,925 6.10% 23.32% 1
Orlando 2,185,714 476,854 21.82% 1,699,933 118,172 6.95% 27.01% 1
Oxnard 824,329 124,385 15.09% 620,642 39,135 6.31% 41.20% 1
Philadelphia 5,866,415 981,240 16.73% 4,571,672 295,397 6.46% 8.43% 1
Phoenix 4,260,900 944,327 22.16% 3,174,890 180,646 5.69% 29.69% 0
Pittsburgh 2,299,786 373,321 16.23% 1,867,780 86,125 4.61% 1.48% 1
Portland, OR 2,254,504 408,646 18.13% 1,746,141 112,898 6.47% 11.37% 0
Providence 1,547,987 276,787 17.88% 1,245,291 78,421 6.30% 10.86% 1
Raleigh 1,163,236 194,850 16.75% 873,641 48,548 5.56% 10.12% 0
Riverside 4,261,627 1,004,945 23.58% 3,082,531 272,869 8.85% 48.46% 1
Rochester 1,042,790 194,514 18.65% 831,403 41,374 4.98% 6.39% 1
Sacramento 2,161,829 450,439 20.84% 1,644,041 125,046 7.61% 20.61% 1
Salt Lake City 1,108,285 185,737 16.76% 788,617 38,486 4.88% 17.02% 0
San Antonio 2,193,994 482,400 21.99% 1,609,902 79,174 4.92% 54.54% 1
San Diego 3,102,463 597,270 19.25% 2,357,731 146,992 6.23% 32.65% 1
San Francisco 4,402,039 658,429 14.96% 3,507,298 207,116 5.91% 21.83% 1
San Jose 1,870,891 253,128 13.53% 1,439,337 88,388 6.14% 26.75% 1
Seattle 3,499,589 520,481 14.87% 2,713,738 150,758 5.56% 9.34% 1
St. Louis 2,741,015 467,365 17.05% 2,114,358 123,193 5.83% 2.80% 0
Stockton 686,706 172,191 25.07% 493,265 46,788 9.49% 39.68% 1
Tampa-St. Petersburg 2,805,897 578,896 20.63% 2,229,886 139,728 6.27% 17.03% 1
Tucson 967,318 239,340 24.74% 753,578 48,292 6.41% 35.38% 0
Washington, DC 5,758,974 633,124 10.99% 4,411,351 218,630 4.96% 14.67% 0
Worcester 894,426 132,720 14.84% 704,218 42,109 5.98% 10.19% 1
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Table A.31: Raw Data Used to Calculate Gateway Regressions, Part 4 (PCT_PRO_IND and PCT_CONST_IND) 
 
 
MSA TOT_IND CONST_IND INFO_IND FIRE_IND PRO_IND PCT_PRO_IND PCT_CONST_IND
Atlanta 2,529,425 160,613 82,491 183,774 266,265 10.53% 6.35%
Austin 931,710 69,196 22,970 64,362 87,332 9.37% 7.43%
Bakersfield 321,221 19,571 3,329 12,543 15,872 4.94% 6.09%
Baltimore 1,360,481 83,837 28,573 91,484 120,057 8.82% 6.16%
Boston 2,412,001 123,110 62,270 199,325 261,595 10.85% 5.10%
Bridgeport 455,515 29,210 13,153 55,651 68,804 15.10% 6.41%
Buffalo 537,148 24,098 8,505 39,561 48,066 8.95% 4.49%
Cape Coral 253,789 22,052 4,400 17,572 21,972 8.66% 8.69%
Charlotte 1,074,528 70,549 23,885 104,177 128,062 11.92% 6.57%
Chicago 4,500,169 226,654 100,392 343,570 443,962 9.87% 5.04%
Cleveland 962,453 44,531 17,626 72,131 89,757 9.33% 4.63%
Columbus 954,180 47,395 21,317 90,454 111,771 11.71% 4.97%
Dallas-Fort Worth 3,239,278 234,970 81,632 286,771 368,403 11.37% 7.25%
Denver 1,359,828 99,626 50,119 110,301 160,420 11.80% 7.33%
Detroit 1,864,469 81,454 33,810 116,634 150,444 8.07% 4.37%
Durham-Chapel Hill 252,949 15,987 4,996 12,842 17,838 7.05% 6.32%
El Paso 321,472 20,144 6,672 16,146 22,818 7.10% 6.27%
Fresno 367,392 19,715 4,811 18,547 23,358 6.36% 5.37%
Greensboro, NC 332,492 18,226 5,792 21,544 27,336 8.22% 5.48%
Hartford 604,150 30,612 14,364 64,661 79,025 13.08% 5.07%
Honolulu 452,324 29,783 7,683 30,292 37,975 8.40% 6.58%
Houston 2,912,278 260,920 39,767 168,550 208,317 7.15% 8.96%
Indianapolis 914,855 52,283 16,514 62,862 79,376 8.68% 5.71%
Lakeland, FL 241,628 16,576 3,414 13,614 17,028 7.05% 6.86%
Las Vegas 903,785 52,877 15,577 53,497 69,074 7.64% 5.85%
Los Angeles 6,027,289 338,409 230,377 413,795 644,172 10.69% 5.61%
McAllen 291,917 23,913 3,810 11,637 15,447 5.29% 8.19%
Miami 2,637,873 170,275 58,628 205,226 263,854 10.00% 6.46%
Milwaukee 761,730 31,721 13,913 55,961 69,874 9.17% 4.16%
Minneapolis 1,808,192 86,304 37,221 155,916 193,137 10.68% 4.77%
Modesto 205,219 14,164 2,563 7,581 10,144 4.94% 6.90%
Nashville 840,212 53,888 23,305 58,845 82,150 9.78% 6.41%
New Haven 416,917 20,071 9,568 26,456 36,024 8.64% 4.81%
New York 9,370,220 521,468 312,736 867,004 1,179,740 12.59% 5.57%
Orlando 1,034,320 60,905 25,601 70,897 96,498 9.33% 5.89%
Oxnard 394,105 23,225 10,307 32,725 43,032 10.92% 5.89%
Philadelphia 2,828,888 147,584 58,524 233,997 292,521 10.34% 5.22%
Phoenix 1,900,116 125,989 36,559 178,105 214,664 11.30% 6.63%
Pittsburgh 1,132,393 63,988 20,690 80,940 101,630 8.97% 5.65%
Portland, OR 1,097,390 62,004 22,704 74,122 96,826 8.82% 5.65%
Providence 776,830 44,165 12,864 51,057 63,921 8.23% 5.69%
Raleigh 588,199 36,829 15,056 39,967 55,023 9.35% 6.26%
Riverside 1,707,944 130,429 26,032 88,100 114,132 6.68% 7.64%
Rochester 513,456 24,570 11,379 26,105 37,484 7.30% 4.79%
Sacramento 950,735 59,978 20,345 70,023 90,368 9.51% 6.31%
Salt Lake City 546,824 36,179 13,692 45,490 59,182 10.82% 6.62%
San Antonio 1,005,683 76,756 18,566 86,300 104,866 10.43% 7.63%
San Diego 1,421,325 79,839 32,394 92,523 124,917 8.79% 5.62%
San Francisco 2,222,606 115,266 78,187 173,464 251,651 11.32% 5.19%
San Jose 914,021 48,284 37,374 43,749 81,123 8.88% 5.28%
Seattle 1,766,203 99,951 52,065 105,739 157,804 8.93% 5.66%
St. Louis 1,339,420 75,478 28,290 106,930 135,220 10.10% 5.64%
Stockton 275,581 18,682 4,709 13,525 18,234 6.62% 6.78%
Tampa-St. Petersburg 1,249,152 75,573 29,798 119,364 149,162 11.94% 6.05%
Tucson 418,055 25,589 7,032 23,597 30,629 7.33% 6.12%
Washington, DC 3,090,548 193,258 89,117 188,902 278,019 9.00% 6.25%
Worcester 457,194 26,095 8,666 28,208 36,874 8.07% 5.71%
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Table A.32: Raw Data Used to Calculate Gateway Regression, Part 5 (PCT_FB) 
 
MSA CDFI_MEAN_DUM CDFI_MED_DUM TOT_POP_FB TOT_FB PCT_FB
Atlanta 0 0 5,455,053 727,285 13.33%
Austin 0 1 1,835,016 269,646 14.69%
Bakersfield 0 0 857,730 175,262 20.43%
Baltimore 0 1 2,753,396 259,051 9.41%
Boston 1 1 4,650,876 794,041 17.07%
Bridgeport 0 1 934,215 191,275 20.47%
Buffalo 0 0 1,135,667 67,873 5.98%
Cape Coral 0 0 647,554 99,454 15.36%
Charlotte 0 0 2,298,915 211,636 9.21%
Chicago 0 1 9,516,448 1,679,627 17.65%
Cleveland 0 0 2,067,490 118,348 5.72%
Columbus 1 1 1,948,188 136,128 6.99%
Dallas-Fort Worth 0 0 6,703,020 1,170,629 17.46%
Denver 0 0 2,651,392 323,181 12.19%
Detroit 0 1 4,292,647 383,033 8.92%
Durham-Chapel Hill 1 1 525,050 63,672 12.13%
El Paso 0 0 827,206 214,493 25.93%
Fresno 0 0 948,844 206,325 21.74%
Greensboro, NC 0 0 735,777 62,258 8.46%
Hartford 0 1 1,215,159 155,291 12.78%
Honolulu 1 1 975,690 189,052 19.38%
Houston 0 0 6,204,141 1,394,516 22.48%
Indianapolis 0 1 1,931,182 119,849 6.21%
Lakeland, FL 0 0 617,323 62,198 10.08%
Las Vegas 0 0 2,003,613 436,457 21.78%
Los Angeles 0 0 13,060,534 4,420,863 33.85%
McAllen 0 0 806,447 233,400 28.94%
Miami 0 0 5,775,204 2,233,014 38.67%
Milwaukee 1 1 1,565,368 108,738 6.95%
Minneapolis 1 1 3,424,786 331,886 9.69%
Modesto 0 0 522,794 106,944 20.46%
Nashville 1 1 1,730,515 128,489 7.42%
New Haven 0 1 863,148 100,989 11.70%
New York 0 1 19,865,045 5,655,928 28.47%
Orlando 0 0 2,226,835 364,012 16.35%
Oxnard 0 0 835,790 190,562 22.80%
Philadelphia 1 1 6,015,336 597,654 9.94%
Phoenix 0 0 4,337,542 625,736 14.43%
Pittsburgh 1 1 2,358,793 81,362 3.45%
Portland, OR 1 1 2,288,796 285,904 12.49%
Providence 1 1 1,604,317 204,506 12.75%
Raleigh 0 1 1,189,579 139,633 11.74%
Riverside 0 0 4,345,485 941,363 21.66%
Rochester 1 1 1,082,578 71,927 6.64%
Sacramento 0 0 2,197,422 389,353 17.72%
Salt Lake City 0 1 1,123,643 133,639 11.89%
San Antonio 0 0 2,239,222 265,693 11.87%
San Diego 0 0 3,183,143 743,480 23.36%
San Francisco 0 0 4,466,251 1,336,045 29.91%
San Jose 0 1 1,898,457 700,049 36.87%
Seattle 0 1 3,557,037 608,584 17.11%
St. Louis 1 1 2,797,737 125,211 4.48%
Stockton 0 0 701,050 161,686 23.06%
Tampa-St. Petersburg 0 0 2,851,235 362,154 12.70%
Tucson 0 0 993,144 127,106 12.80%
Washington, DC 0 1 5,863,608 1,285,767 21.93%
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